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Abstract 
 
This study explores why some university spin-outs (USOs) are able to attract first 
venture capital (VC) investment. Furthermore, factors including first VC investment are 
associated with USO’s superior firm performance. The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm 
is replicated and extended with signalling theory. VC firms (supply-side) seeking to reduce 
uncertainty and information asymmetry problems request positive ‘signals’ from 
entrepreneurs and firms (demand-side). Entrepreneurs can provide such ‘signals of quality’ 
relating to their own as well as their firms’ resources. Hypotheses were derived accordingly. 
This is the first nationwide study using cross-sectional data from British USOs on a 
firm and founder level related to attracting first VC investment and firm performance. A 
population of 505 British USOs founded between 1990 and 2007 that were still active in 
2008 was identified. Founders of 125 USOs participated in an online survey (25% response 
rate). No response biases were detected. Secondary data sources provided information on 
financing and performance. Hypotheses were tested with regression techniques. 
Key findings on the attraction of first VC investment support the joint framework of 
the RBV of the firm and signalling theory. The most prominent signals of quality were 
experienced and reputable founding teams (specific human capital), network links to VC 
investors (networks), firm-owned IP, patented IP (intellectual capital) and founders who 
were professor (general human capital). USOs with public backed equity (finance) avoided 
an ‘equity gap’ when seeking less than £500,000 of VC. USOs with radical innovation 
(intellectual capital) were less likely to attract generalist VC firms. 
Key findings on factors related to superior firm performance suggest the importance 
of USO’s internal resources as implied by the RBV of the firm. Strategic alliances (networks) 
and USOs with VC investment reported superior firm performance. However, generalist VC 
firms performed better than industry specialists. VC investment reduced the direct influence 
of experienced and reputable founding teams (specific human capital) and founders who 
were professors (general human capital) related to firm performance. Former important 
signals to attract first VC investment such as patented IP, firm-owned IP (intellectual capital) 
and public backed equity investments (finance) were not related to firm performance. 
Best practices and recommendations on how USOs can overcome barriers to 
attracting first VC investment and achieve superior firm performance are made for several 
practitioner groups. Limitations and areas of future research are discussed. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Economies with small reserves of natural resources or shrinking industrial 
manufacturing sectors are highly dependent on knowledge-based business opportunities in 
order to generate growth, employment and wealth (Stam and Garnsey, 2006). Several issues 
are at the centre of an ongoing debate about building knowledge-based economies. 
Education and academic research are regarded as crucial sources of new knowledge, 
technologies and innovation (Foray, 2004). Entrepreneurship is considered an effective 
vehicle to commercialize knowledge in order to bring it to the market place (Audretsch and 
Thurik, 2001). Further, external financing and business expertise from private venture 
capital (VC) investors are commonly regarded as valuable resources and crucial drivers of 
entrepreneurship in growing new knowledge-based and innovative businesses (Gompers 
and Lerner, 2006). 
This study contributes to the general debate about building knowledge-based 
economies by exploring VC financing and the performance of university spin-outs (USOs) 
and their founding academic entrepreneurs (Lockett et al., 2003; Wright et al., 2006). USOs 
can be defined as firms which are founded in order to exploit the business opportunities to 
be gained by commercializing the intellectual property (IP) of academic research (Shane, 
2004a). Most USOs are active in sectors related to technology transfer from natural science 
research in biology, chemistry, engineering and computer sciences (Steffensen et al., 2000; 
Mowery and Shane, 2002). USOs are originally owned by their founding academic 
entrepreneurs and their university of origin (Nicolaou and Birley, 2003a; Lockett et al., 
2005). 
The formation of USOs has been strongly encouraged by public policy makers in the UK 
since the late 1990s in order to develop a knowledge- and innovation-driven economy which 
grows and increases employment. British universities aim to generate revenue streams by 
having ownership in their spin-outs (Lockett and Wright, 2005). However, there is evidence 
that the development and performance of USOs in the UK depend on the availability of 
financing and business expertise (Lockett et al., 2002; Wright et al., 2006). Two specific 
debates on the barriers that constrain access to these resources, as well as their influence 
on USO development and performance, are the subject of this thesis.  
15 
 
The first debate relates to what factors influence USOs’ ability to attract first external 
investments in the form of VC which can provide finance as well as business expertise. This 
debate is subject to identify factors which can explain the co-ordination between the 
demand and supply of VC investment, despite risks resulting from uncertainty and 
asymmetric information when valuating new firms (Stiglitz, 1985; Sanders and Boivie, 2004). 
The second debate relates to what factors, including the ability to attract first VC 
investment, lead to superior firm performance of USOs. 
Section 1.2 discusses both debates within the context of USOs in the UK. It illustrates 
the specific research setting of this study which explores USO formation and development in 
the UK between 1990 and 2008. Thereafter, Section 1.3 discusses gaps in the knowledge 
base related to academic studies on both debates. Section 1.4 introduces the focus, purpose 
and contribution of this study to both debates. Finally, Section 1.5 provides an overview of 
the forthcoming chapters. 
 
1.2 Context for USO Development and Financing in the UK 
1.2.1 USO Formation in the UK 
 
Figure 1 shows the formation of USOs in the UK between 1980 and 20071. Their 
rapid rise in the middle of the 1990s relates to a combination of the new economy boom 
and increasing political support. USOs were particularly encouraged by the British 
government’s introduction of the white paper ‘Our Competitive Future’ in 1998. It aimed to 
duplicate the successful American model of entrepreneurially active researchers with a 
supportive legal infrastructure assigning IP rights from publically funded research to 
university and researchers (DTI, 1999; Birchall, 2007)2. This initiative sought to transfer the 
excellence of research at British universities into the commercial domain in order to grow a 
successful innovation driven knowledge-based economy (Sainsbury, 2007). 
                                                            
1 The data for this figure has been obtained from the venture capital data base Library House in 2007. Public 
sources lack systematic data on the USO population in the UK (see e.g. DTI, 1999; Lambert, 2003).  UNICO 
representing all Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) in the UK was contacted for this research but was unable to 
provide more accurate data. Library House’s data can also be regarded as a representative source as it was 
recently used and acknowledged in the public policy Sainsbury Review (2007) on USO activities in the UK. 
2 Introduced by the Bay-Dole Act in the US in 1980 (Shane, 2004a,b). 
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Figure 1: USO Formations in the UK between 1980 and 2007 (Source: Library House, 2007) 
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Figure 2 shows that most USOs are active in high-technology sectors, indicating 
commercialization of research in the natural sciences which are at the heart of a knowledge-
based economy (Stam and Garnsey, 2006, 2007). 
Figure 2: Sectors and Industries of USOs in the UK until 2007 (Source: Library House, 2007) 
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Universities see USOs as an additional source of income from commercializing their 
IP. Traditionally, universities have relied more on licensing their IP to generate these returns 
(Bray and Lee, 2000; Shane, 2004b). However, markets for selling novel and innovative IP 
are often imperfect due to technological uncertainties and difficulties in assessing the 
commercial value (Arrow, 1962). As a consequence, universities cannot always expect to 
receive an attractive market price when selling licences to established companies. By 
contrast, USOs aim to bring the IP directly to the market in the form of products and 
services. The success of this approach depends on the development and performance of 
USOs. 
A change in the legal framework is a necessary requirement for USOs to emerge and 
develop. Research into the developmental stages of USOs shows that the availability of, and 
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access to resources of finance and business expertise, are of great importance in their 
development and growth (Ndonzuau et al., 2002; Vohora et al., 2004). These resource needs 
are typical for all new firms. Failure to attract them can lead to inferior levels of 
performance (Lockett and Wright, 2005; Gompers and Lerner, 2006). 
The two major public stakeholders in USOs, government and universities, recognise 
and address this (Acworth, 2008). First, full-time academics need guidance throughout the 
commercialization process, especially in relation to business, entrepreneurial and legal 
expertise. Consequently, a nationwide scheme to establish Technology Transfer Offices 
(TTOs) launched across universities in the UK. By 2003, 125 British universities which 
generated revenues from IP had TTOs. These TTOs are organized in nationwide associations 
such as UNICO and AURIL (Wright et al., 2006). Second, the financing of new ventures based 
on academic research was a key issue from the beginning. The year 1998 saw the launch of 
the University Challenge Seed Fund to facilitate the creation and development of new spin-
outs (Abreu et al., 2008). 
Although both measures by public stakeholders in combination with the new 
economy boom of the late 1990s increased the quantity of spin-outs until 2001, criticism 
about the quality of spin-outs emerged. Two public policy reviews (Lambert, 2003; 
Sainsbury, 2007) questioned the quality rather than the quantity of USOs. This was based on 
the fact that there was a lack of commercial success stories (Library_House, 2007). They 
attributed this failure to missing links between USOs and the private sector needed to 
develop a stronger commercial orientation and performance. The Lambert Review (2003) 
especially saw VC investors as the solution to creating more commercially successful USOs. 
The financing of the development and performance of USOs is discussed in the following 
sections with a special focus on the VC market in the UK.  
 
1.2.2 Barriers to USO Development and Performance: Financing 
 
Figure 3 shows that VC involvement in first and follow-up investment rounds was 
prominent until about 2006, given the total formation of USOs between 1980 and 2007. The 
importance of VC financing is now analysed by comparing the characteristics of two major 
types of financing available to USOs in the UK. 
18 
 
Figure 3: USO Formation and Venture Capital Investment between 1989 and 2007 (Source: 
Library House, 2007; n = 599) 
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Financial resources are generally regarded as crucial for new firms such as USOs to 
develop (Westhead and Storey, 1997; Astebro and Bernhardt, 2003). However, their 
availability for USOs depends highly on the type of finance. If academic entrepreneurs have 
insufficient internal finance for their USOs, they have the choice between two major forms 
of external finance. These are summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1: Types of External Finance (Based on Berger and Udell, 1998) 
 Debt Finance Equity Finance 
Selected providers: Banks Business angels, Venture Capital 
Costs of obtaining 
external finance: 
Interest rate Ownership share of equity in 
entrepreneur’s firm 
Securities, 
guarantees: 
Collateral 
Diligence of credit record 
Due diligence based on investors’ 
specific investment criteria 
General time of 
investment: 
Later stage Early stage depends highly on 
specialisation of provider) 
Event of business 
success: 
Full repayment of interest 
rates 
Entrepreneur receive all 
residual cash-flows 
Entrepreneur and investors share 
residual cash-flows accordingly 
Event of business 
failure: 
Bank looses interest payment 
Entrepreneur looses collateral 
Entrepreneur and investors share 
losses accordingly 
General risk profile: Low risk capital High risk capital 
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Debt finance is borrowed capital that is typically provided by banks in the form of 
credit and loans. In return for borrowing capital, entrepreneurs have to agree with the bank 
on a repayment schedule at an interest rate. Banks require collateral, such as property 
owned by the entrepreneur, as a guarantee in case the entrepreneur defaults the 
repayment schedule. If the entrepreneur defaults, as in the case of a bankruptcy, the 
collateral is transferred to the bank (Dollinger, 2003). The level of the interest rates and the 
collateral required by the bank are subject to a risk assessment. Because new firms, 
especially in high technology sectors, usually have a high likelihood of failure (Freeman et 
al., 1983; Audretsch, 1991) academic entrepreneurs have to expect that banks will charge 
high interest rates and have high collateral requirements. Banks are not specialized in 
financing firms with high-risk capital (Berger and Udell, 1998) and therefore ration their 
credit (Jaffee and Russell, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).  
Equity investments present an alternative source for external finance. Equity 
investors receive, in return for their investment, a share of the ownership. All owners of a 
firm, such as the founders, management and equity investors, share residual cash-flows or 
losses according to their percentage of the firm’s ownership (Dollinger, 2003). Additionally, 
all equity sharing parties can exercise control rights and influence managerial decision-
making. Equity investors are thus able to take higher risks compared to credit offering banks 
that can only passively rely on the interest schedule and collateral agreement (Timmons and 
Spinelli, 2003). 
Business angels are informal equity investors who are usually wealthy individuals 
investing their own money. The scope of funding as well as the investment expertise is thus 
highly determined by the individual characteristics of the business angel (Mason and 
Harrison, 1997, 2000). 
Formal equity investors like VC firms manage larger funds provided by institutional 
investors such as insurance or pension funds. These funds are used to invest in attractive 
businesses to generate substantial returns (Gompers and Lerner, 1998; 2001, 2006). VC 
firms are attractive to new USOs because they are specialized to take on the higher levels of 
risk involved in investing in young firms (Winton and Yerramilli, 2008). 
To hedge their investment risks, VC investors individually negotiate a share of equity 
ownership in their investees (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1986; Amit et al., 1990). Part of this 
negotiation process is also a thorough due diligence process to identify investment 
opportunities with an attractive risk and return relationship (Wright and Robbie, 1996; 
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Zacharakis and Meyer, 1998). In order to reduce risk and uncertainty in their investment 
decision, VC investors examine the business plans of investment-seeking firm. Business 
plans usually include an executive summary on the business concept and model, the target 
market and projections, the firm’s competitive advantage, the financing and costs of 
running the business, the financial plan and profitability estimates, the founding team’s 
composition as well as the desired financing along with equity shares and exit strategy for 
investors (DTI, 1996; Timmons and Spinelli, 2003). VC investors reduce their risk in setting 
up contractual incentives to achieve the optimal commitment of their investees (Sahlman, 
1990; Berglof, 1994; Gompers and Lerner, 1996). Often investors specialise in sectors and 
industries or geographic regions (Florida and Smith, 1993; Mason and Harrison, 2002b; 
Myint et al., 2005). Very frequently, new CEOs are appointed by VC investors to substitute 
for founding entrepreneurs in the more management intensive stages of growth (Rosenstein 
et al., 1993; Wasserman, 2003). Popular exit strategies for VC investors include quoting their 
investees on a stock market or selling them on (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003; Gompers 
and Lerner, 2006). This is in order to generate their competitive returns in converting their 
equity ownership into cash. Therefore, VC investors pursue a strong commercially guided 
growth strategy in order to increase the market value of their investees. 
For these reasons, VC investors were seen by the Lambert Report (2003) as highly 
influential and beneficial to the formation of USOs: ‘Venture capitalists have made it 
possible for research projects that once could only be financed by big companies to be spun 
out and developed in new start-up companies’ (2003: 11). The report further claims that it is 
‘[...] easier to attract private investment into early stage seed funding for spinouts. Private 
finance provides an important quality measure and should be used to decide which spinouts 
to pursue wherever possible’ (2003: 62). VC investors are thus regarded by policy makers as 
being capable of separating and identifying those USOs of high quality of commercial 
prospects. VC investors shall accordingly trigger the superior firm performance of USOs with 
the help of substantial financial resources. Furthermore, VC investors are regarded as very 
effective in adding managerial skills and business expertise to their investees (Timmons and 
Spinelli, 2003). In consequence, driven by public policy there are high expectations of how 
VC investment can transform the commercial success of USOs. It appears that the demand 
for VC investment is often not met by the supply in the UK. This is discussed in the next 
section. 
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1.2.2.1 VC Market for USOs in the UK: ‘Equity gap’ (Supply-side) vs. ‘Investment 
Readiness’ (Demand-side) 
 
The previous section has shown that there is a strong demand for VC finance by 
public policy makers, TTOs and USOs (Wright et al., 2006). However, there is an important 
debate on a particular barrier affecting the development of USOs and their ability to attract 
VC investment. The debate is twofold. USOs may suffer from a lack of VC because of the 
supply-side, leading to an i.e. ‘equity gap’. Alternatively, the demand-side may fail to 
produce attractive investment opportunities to VCs and therefore reflects a lack of 
‘investment readiness’. 
Figure 4 shows that the frequency of VC finance in the first external investment 
rounds was, with the exception of 2006, lower than at its peak in 2000, which was likely due 
to the new economy boom.  
Figure 4: Share of Equity Funding Types in First Finance Rounds of USOs per Year in the UK 
(Source: Library House, 2007; n = 599 USOs)  
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The overall increase of USOs’ ability to attract equity investment needs also to be 
linked to equity funds which are backed by the public sector. These public schemes aimed to 
reduce the ‘equity gap’ such as to reduce risk for follow-on investment by private VC 
investors (Wright et al., 2006). Further, non-equity public support in the form of grants and 
awards remain a common support scheme. 
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The latest policy report by Sainsbury (2007) argued that VC investors are reluctant 
to take the risk of supplying sufficient investments to USOs. The resulting ‘equity gap’ 
(Wright et al., 2006) affects early stage investments between £250,000 and £2 million 
(Sainsbury Report, 2007). The identified ‘equity gap’ is highlighted by studies into the supply 
side. Although the British VC industry is the largest in Europe and the second largest in the 
world to the US, VC investors in the UK are likely to hesitate to get involved with USOs. 
Research by Murray and Lott (1995) and Lockett et al. (2002) repeatedly asserted that VC 
investors in the UK are generally sceptical about investing in high-technology start-up 
companies. High levels of uncertainty regarding the success of the technology and its 
market size substantially increase the risk to VC investors by becoming involved (Brierley, 
2001). The need for thorough due diligence increases the fixed costs of VC investors. As a 
consequence, only a larger scope of investments between £250,000 and £2 million are likely 
to be feasible. However, a report by Library House (2007) and the data in Figure 5 show that 
the average amount of first round VC investments in USOs has been steadily falling since 
2001. 
Figure 5: Average Amount (in thousand £) of Investment in the First Round by Equity 
Providers in USOs (Source: Library House, 2007; n = 599 USOs)3 
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In response to claims that the VC supply is the dominant reason for a market 
mismatch, VC investors stress that USOs on the demand-side often fail to meet their 
investment criteria (Vohora et al., 2004). The lack of USOs’ ‘investment readiness’ relates, 
                                                            
3 No reliable data was available to calculate the average amount (in thousand £) of investment in the first round 
by VC firms between 1993 and 1997 
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according to Mason and Harrison (2001), to three issues. First, entrepreneurs are often not 
prepared to share ownership and control with an external investor. Second, entrepreneurs 
often fail to present a business case and business plan of adequate quality (Vohora et al., 
2004). Finally, entrepreneurs frequently fail to show ‘investability’ in meeting the necessary 
requirements of investors. Mason and Harrison (2001) criticise public policy programmes 
aimed at educating entrepreneurs on how to attract VC investment because they fail to take 
into consideration the third dimension of ‘investment readiness’. They do not focus 
sufficiently on identifying the commercial attractiveness of new business ideas. VC investors 
prefer to focus on business development and therefore want investees who are looking to 
exploit commercially viable business ideas which generate high returns. 
Evidence that VC investors fail to generate substantial returns from investing in 
early stage and high-technology firms in the UK is presented Figure 6. This shows 
continuously poor returns on investments in early stage technology companies (Connell, 
2007). The disappointing performance record is thus likely to affect VC investors’ willingness 
to invest in USOs. 
Figure 6: Average Annual Rate Return of Investment (%) in Private Equity (PE), FTSE All 
Share, Early Stage VC Investment and VC Investment in Technology (Source: BVCA (2000-
2007) 
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1.2.3 USO Firm Performance in the UK 
 
Complicating the debate on USOs’ development is the central question of how to 
measure firm performance. Young high-technology firms to which most USOs belong rarely 
report profits due to their research and development intensive business models (Lambert, 
2003). Moreover, because of long technology-to-market times (Sainsbury, 2007) turnover 
figures are also difficult to assess in a population of young USOs. 
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Data on USOs’ company status reported by Library House (2007), and shown in 
Figure 7, reveals that only a minority of USOs were quoted on a stock market with initial 
public offerings (IPOs) or became subject to mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Only 11% of 
USOs in the sample of Library House are out of business. Crucially, the rare events of IPOs 
and M&As are likely to reduce the interest of VC investors as they depend on these exit 
options in order to generate substantial returns (Mohnen et al., 2008). 
Figure 7: Company Status of USOs in 2007 (Source: Library House, 2007) 
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Given the relatively early stage of the population of USOs in the UK, their ability to 
attract financing can be an alternative measure of their development and an indicator of 
firm performance potential (Vohora et al., 2004). Especially, because the ability to attract VC 
investment is likely to influence future firm performance due to the substantial resources of 
finance and business expertise combined with strictly commercial goals. However, Figure 8 
shows that the total annual average amount of equity investments attracted has been 
decreasing since the end of the new economy boom.  
Figure 8: Total Annual Average Amount of Equity Investments (in thousand £) in British 
USOs (Source: Library House, 2007; n = 599 USOs) 
£0
£50,000
£100,000
£150,000
£200,000
£250,000
£300,000
£350,000
£400,000
£450,000
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
Total average of equity investments
VC/PE Firm
Business Angel(s)
Public Sector Backed Fund (equity)
Public Sector Organisation (non-
equity)
 
25 
 
Nevertheless, VC investments remain substantially higher than those of alternative 
equity providers. The high average of VC investments also fuels expectations that VC 
investments can positively influence USO performance (Wright et al., 2006). 
Unfortunately, public policy reports on USO development in the UK are unable to 
provide a firm-level analysis of USO firm performance. Public policy reports like Lambert 
(2003) and Sainsbury (2007) have no representative firm-level statistics on USO 
performance related to measures like turnover, revenue, employment or employment 
change. Reports aimed at VC investors, like that of Library House (2007), continue to 
emphasise statistics on survival, IPO and M&A statistics. Due to the small population of 
USOs which achieved M&As and IPOs a huge amount of information on firms’ performance 
of independent USOs is not adequately addressed. Therefore, the assessment of USO firm 
performance in the UK is still in a controversial and at an early stage which requires further 
research. It is to this assessment that this study contributes.  
 
1.3 Gaps in the Knowledge Base 
 
Several gaps in the knowledge base, relating to the take-up of first VC investment and 
the performance of USOs, were identified by this study. They are summarized below and 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
The body of literature on USOs’ ability to take-up first VC investment is just emerging 
and is therefore predominantly exploratory (Rothaermel et al., 2007). The qualitative 
methods of case studies and interviews are mostly used to collect anecdotal evidence on 
this phenomenon. These insights are often used to build new theories. They relate to an 
array of factors and resources that are characteristic for USOs seeking first VC investment as 
well as characterizing the supply side of VC. However, due to their exploratory nature, 
previous studies rarely replicate, integrate and extend established theoretical insights. This 
leads to a substantial gap in the knowledge base. To close this gap a theoretical framework 
needs to be established that integrates the available body of literature and links it to related 
work on financing start-ups. In particular, a theoretical framework is needed that 
incorporates both a demand and supply side perspective in order to explore market 
coordination between USOs and VC investors. Hypotheses can then be derived in order to 
explore what factors are related to USOs’ ability to attract first VC investment. Further, 
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these hypotheses need to be empirically tested. Accordingly, quantitative data needs to be 
collected on firm and founder level in order to generate representative cross-sectional 
samples and conduct multivariate statistical analyses. This approach has rarely been used in 
previous studies on the VC financing of USOs. These major gaps in knowledge are further 
discussed in Section 2.2. 
Similar to the body of literature on the take-up of first VC investment, USO firm 
performance studies are still in an emerging and exploratory stage. Qualitative methods 
such as case studies or interviews were commonly used to collect, analyse and organise 
evidence. The resulting emphasis on building theories has generated a gap in the knowledge 
base as previous studies rarely replicated, integrated and extended established theories. 
Hence, only a few studies are available that test hypotheses empirically in order to identify 
what factors and resources relate to USOs and their superior firm performance. More 
research is required to identify whether internal resources and capabilities help young firms 
to adapt successfully to their environment. Additionally, the importance of first VC 
investment in leading USOs to superior firm performance has been only conceptually 
addressed rather than been supported by statistical evidence. Only a few studies are 
currently available that use representative cross-sectional samples and multivariate 
statistical analyses to test these hypotheses. The resulting gaps in the knowledge base on 
factors related to USO firm performance are discussed in more detail in Section 2.5. 
 
1.4 Focus, Purpose and Contribution 
 
This study focuses on two debates related to the development of USOs. The first 
debate focuses on what factors relate to USOs’ ability to attract a first round of VC 
investment. The second debate focuses on what factors drive USO firm performance and 
whether VC-funded USOs report superior performance. Both debates are relevant to 
academic research on entrepreneurship as well as practitioners in the context of 
commercialising IP from academic research. 
The purpose of this study is to address the identified substantial gaps in the 
knowledge base in previous academic research as introduced in Section 1.3. They are 
further discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. By contrast to predominantly exploratory 
earlier research, this study replicates, integrates and extends theoretical frameworks in 
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order to derive and empirically test hypotheses on what factors of USOs relate to the take-
up of first VC investment and superior firm performance in light of this investment. 
This study contributes to theory development. It replicates the RBV to identify 
which themes of initial resources characterize USOs seeking first VC investment. Using the 
RBV as a base theory, additional emerging resource-based theories are integrated. These 
include general and specific human capital that characterize the founding entrepreneurs as 
well as networks, intellectual capital and finance that characterize the firm. In addition to 
this demand-side perspective the RBV is extended using signalling theory in order to 
incorporate the supply-side perspective of VC investors, thus explaining market co-
ordination. This integrative theoretical framework argues that the identified themes of 
resources are signals of quality which reduce VC investors’ risks which, in turn, influences 
their investment decisions. Figure 9 summarizes the theoretical framework that is used to 
explore the first research question: 
 
Research Question 1:  Which resources of university spin-outs (USOs) are signals of quality     
  and attract first venture capital (VC) investment? 
 
Figure 9: Overview of Theoretical Framework on the Attraction of first VC Investment 
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In order to investigate USO firm performance, in the light of VC investment this study 
also replicates the RBV. It is used to demonstrate that the internal resources of founders 
and their new firms can adapt to external influences and drive firm performance. Because of 
VC investors’ unique combination of financial resources and business expertise it is argued 
that USOs with VC investment report superior firm performance. Figure 10 summarizes this 
theoretical framework by exploring the second research question: 
 
Research Question 2:  Do VC funded USOs report superior firm performance? 
 
Figure 10: Overview of Theoretical Framework on USO Firm Performance 
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Table 2: Dimensions of Contributions to the Knowledge Base 
Dimensions: Contributions: 
Theory: - Replication of the RBV of the firm. Integration of resource themes 
(general and specific human capital, networks, intellectual capital and 
finance) to characterize USOs and their demand for VC investment and 
firm performance potential. 
- Extension of the RBV of the firm with signalling theory to provide a 
supply-side perspective in order to explain co-ordination on the VC 
market despite constraints of uncertainty and asymmetric information. 
 
Level of 
analysis and 
related types 
of variables: 
- Lead entrepreneur: general and specific human capital of founding 
academic entrepreneurs (all independent variables). 
- Firm level: firm age (control variable), networks, intellectual capital, 
finance (all independent variables), VC investment, firm performance 
(dependent variables). 
- External environment: sector, region, relative market size (all control 
variables). 
Research 
setting, Data 
and 
Timeframe: 
- Cross-sectional sample of 125 USOs founded between 1990 and 2007 
and still active in 2008 in the UK. 
- Sample represents 20% of the total population. 
- Individual negotiations to access secondary data identifying population 
and firm level information. 
- Collection of primary data from founders of USOs as key informants with 
a custom online survey (Response rate of valid respondents = 25%). 
- Response bias tests confirmed the sample was similar to the population. 
Methodology: - Positivist paradigm: Test of hypotheses derived from theoretical 
framework in a quantitative study using multivariate analysis techniques 
in order to identify the relationships between independent and 
dependent variables. 
- Face and content validity of measures, pilot interviews and study. 
Adoption of variables and measures from previous studies to replicate 
hypotheses. 
- Assumptions of multivariate techniques are met to achieve reliable, 
valid findings that can be generalized. Logistic and multinominal logit 
regression analysis is used for categorical dependent variables. Tobit and 
OLS linear regression analysis is used for continuous variables. 
- Array of dependent variables for conducting sensitivity analysis of 
hypotheses testing. 
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Table 2 (Continued): Dimensions of Contributions to the Knowledge Base 
Dimensions: Contributions: 
Methodology 
(Continued): 
- Dependent variables measuring the attraction of first VC investment: 
Likelihood of attracting First VC Investment (yes, no); Number of First VC 
Offers (number; none, one, two or more); Number of First VC 
Investments (number; none, one, two or more); First VC Investment 
Amount (amount (£'); none, £1 to £500,000, > £500,000); Investor Types 
Relating to First VC Investment (no VC, Generalist VC, Specialist VC). 
- Dependent variables measuring USO firm performance: Total Number of 
External Investment Rounds Attracted Until 2008; Total Amount of 
External Investment (£’s) Attracted Until 2008; Likelihood of Product 
Launch to the Market Until 2008; Book Value of Total Assets (£’s) Until 
2008; Number of Employees in the USOs in 2008; Absolute Employment 
Change between Founding Year and 2008; Composite Measure of Firm 
Performance. 
Implications 
and recom-
mendations 
- Implications and best practice suggestions practitioners which are 
concerned about the barriers USOs face in attracting first VC investment 
and achieving superior firm performance: academic entrepreneurs, 
universities and their TTOs, VC investors as well as public policy makers. 
- Suggestions for areas of future academic research. 
 
This is the first study on VC financing and firm performance of USOs to combine 
founder, firm and external levels of analysis. Founding academic entrepreneurs’ general and 
specific human capital (independent variables) was measured. On a firm level, firm age 
(control variable), networks, intellectual capital, finance (all independent variables), VC 
investment, firm performance (dependent variables) were also measured. Furthermore, 
external environment measures related to sector, region and relative market size (control 
variables) were measured. 
The research setting contributes to the understanding of new firm development in 
the context of USO development in the UK. This study contributes by being the first with a 
cross-sectional sample of 125 USOs founded between 1990 and 2007 and still active in 2008 
in the UK. Secondary sources comprise respected data bases such as Companies House, 
Library House and FAME which were used to identify the population of 505 British USOs 
founded between 1990 and 2007 and still active in 2008. In addition, primary data was 
collected using an online survey with a response rate of 25%. The final valid sample of 125 
USOs thus represents one in five USOs of the identified population in the UK. Response bias 
tests ensured that findings were representative and could be generalized. 
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The positivist paradigm contributes by testing replicated and new hypotheses 
derived from a theoretical framework. Multivariate regression techniques were used to 
analyze the relationship between a set of independent variables and a dependent variable. 
To increase the robustness of the results measures of the variables were replicated from 
previous studies were possible. Furthermore, a range of dependent variables as shown in 
Table 4 were used to conduct sensitivity analysis. The choice of regression techniques was 
based on the characteristics of the dependent variable. Logistic and multinominal regression 
analysis was used for categorical dependent variables. Tobit and OLS linear regressions 
analysis was used for continuous variables. The assumptions of the used regression 
techniques were met. Tests for face and content validity, robustness as well as common 
methods bias of measures were reported. Pilot interviews and a pilot study were conducted 
before the primary data collection. Therefore, contributions and implications of this study 
are based on a sound methodology leading to generalisable and representative results that 
can be replicated and tested in future studies. 
Finally, this study contributes to improved practitioner understanding of USO 
development. Four major practitioner groups including public policy makers, academic 
entrepreneurs, universities and VC investors are addressed and provided with specific 
implications derived from this study.  
 
1.5 Structure of the Remainder of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 2 identifies prominent gaps in the knowledge base. Thereafter theoretical 
insights are reviewed to build theoretical frameworks from which hypotheses are derived. 
This is done for each of the two identified research questions. 
Chapter 3 discusses the methodology of this study including issues of research 
philosophy, methods of data collection, response bias tests, variable operationalisation as 
well as assumptions and preparations for multivariate data analysis. 
Chapter 4 tests the earlier derived sets of hypotheses exploring the first research 
question on the attraction of first VC investment. Multivariate data analysis is used for 
hypotheses testing. Sensitivity analysis was conducted using an array of dependent variables 
measuring the attraction of first VC investment. 
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Chapter 5 tests the earlier derived sets of hypotheses exploring the second research 
question on superior firm performance and the influence of first VC investment. 
Multivariate data analysis is used for hypotheses testing. Sensitivity analysis is conducted 
using an array of dependent variables measuring USO firm performance. 
Chapter 6 concludes major findings, contributions to theory, research implications 
and limitations of the study. Specific implications are made for practitioners including 
academic entrepreneurs, universities, policy makers and VC investors. 
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Chapter 2: Gaps in the Knowledge Base, Theoretical Insights and 
Derivation of Hypotheses 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter identifies gaps in the knowledge base, develops theoretical insights and 
derives hypotheses to explore the two presented research questions. Gaps in the knowledge 
base are identified by a review of the body of literature on the attraction of first VC 
investment and the firm performance of USOs. Theoretical insights are replicated, 
integrated and extended in order to develop theoretical frameworks to derive hypotheses. 
 
2.2 Gaps in the Knowledge Base: Attraction of First VC Investment 
 
The starting point in the debate on USOs’ ability to attract VC investment is the 
identification of a demand for VC investment. Early research on the formation and 
development of USOs in Table 3 highlights that VC investments are in great demand in order 
to enhance growth and are a necessary requirement for promoting entrepreneurial 
exploitation of academic research (Roberts and Malone, 1996). This relates to VC investors’ 
ability to generate growth with substantial investments as well as business expertise, which 
are both demanded by USOs aiming for high growth strategies (Steffensen et al., 2000). 
In particular, the business knowledge needed to commercially exploit business 
opportunities is a scarce resource within USOs and their founders due to their academic 
background (Ndonzuau et al., 2002). The added value of VC is generated by combining high 
risk finance with managerial skills, for example, building new management teams in order to 
lead firms to sustained growth and success. In consequence, Lockett et al. (2003) find that 
USOs in regional clusters with high levels of VC investment activities benefit 
overproportionally, leading to greater numbers of USOs as well as USOs achieving IPOs 
(Powers and McDougall, 2005). 
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Table 3: Studies Exploring Factors Associated with the Take-up of First VC Investment by USOs 
Author(s) Research Question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Sample Size and 
Context 
Findings 
Roberts and 
Malone (1996) 
What are the guides in 
spinning off new 
companies from R&D 
organizations? 
Exploratory and 
descriptive study, 
no theories, no 
hypotheses tested 
Qualitative case 
studies, demand-
side perspective 
 
n/a 8 R&D 
organizations, US 
- The spin-off process is more difficult in environments where VC 
investors and entrepreneurial commitment is lacking. 
- VC investors get involved as early as the evaluation stage but more 
likely wait until seed funding requests from USOs. 
- VC investors prefer protected (i.e. patented) technology. 
- VC investors prefer investment at business development stages. 
They seek control through their board of directors in order to 
influence executive management decision making. 
- VC investors seek IPO or sale as typical exit strategies to convert 
equity ownership in USOs into cash. 
Bray and Lee (2000) Are Licensing fees or 
equity positions more 
attractive to generate 
returns from 
technology transfer? 
 
Exploratory Quantitative, 
descriptive 
statistics 
n/a 5 universities, US - Reasons for equity: the flexibility for licensing managers in 
structuring deals, the possibility that universities still hold a value if 
their technology is replaced and the reduced time required to 
generate revenue compared to a traditional license. 
- A traditional license is preferred when the technology is not 
suitable for a spin-off company, or when the technology is one of 
the rare jackpot licenses that bring in millions of dollars every year. 
- If none of the start-ups produce a million-dollar equity sale, the 
financial return is similar to the range normally received from 
licensing. Taking equity leaves the door open for the occasional 
jackpot, which brings significantly more money than a standard 
license. 
- When combined with a strong program of traditional licensing, 
making equity in start-up companies maximizes the financial return 
that universities realize from their intellectual property. 
- VC investors increase the valuation and sale value of start-ups. 
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Table 3 (Continued): Studies Exploring Factors Associated with the Take-up of First VC Investment by USOs 
Author(s) Research Question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Sample Size and 
Context 
Findings 
Chiesa and 
Piccaluga (2000) 
What are the profiles, 
opportunities, and 
obstacles faced by spin-
off companies in Italy? 
 
Exploratory and 
descriptive study, 
no theories, no 
hypotheses tested 
Quantitative 
survey, descriptive 
statistics, demand-
side perspective 
n/a 48 USOs, Italy - Personal financial resources are regarded as most important, VC 
investment as least. However, the need for VC investment and 
other institutional investment rise rapidly in growth periods. 
- Inability to secure external funding is a strong barrier to growth and 
opportunity exploitation. 
- An additional identified barrier to growth is the lack of resources in 
entrepreneurial and managerial skills. 
Steffensen et al.  
(2000) 
What factors facilitate 
or prevent the 
formation of new spin-
offs from research 
centres? 
Exploratory Qualitative, Case 
Study 
n/a 6 of the 19 spin-offs 
from the 55 
research centres at 
the University of 
New Mexico (UNM) 
in 1997, US 
- Few conflicts between spin-off and parent. However, lengthy 
negotiations about IP rights are required. 
- Spin-offs represent an important mechanism for technology 
transfer, as a spin-off is typically founded around a core 
technological innovation that was initially developed at the parent 
organization. 
- University administrators and community leaders envision a future 
technopolis (technology city), but achieving this goal will be 
difficult, given the lack of infrastructure, entrepreneurship and 
venture capital in the Albuquerque region. 
Mason and 
Harrison (2001) 
Critical review of public 
policies on educating 
entrepreneurs to 
become ‘investment 
read’ 
Exploratory and 
descriptive study, 
no theories, no 
hypotheses tested 
Qualitative, review 
of policy 
propositions and 
investment 
guidelines 
n/a n/a - Investment readiness is based on three dimensions: 
1) Entrepreneur’s attitude to equity investment and willingness to 
share ownership and control. 
2) Entrepreneur’s ability to present the business case and quality of 
business plan. 
3) ‘Investability’: meeting the requirements of investors such as 
capability of entrepreneur/team, business and market position, 
potential return and exit expectations. 
- Investment readiness is about business development. 
- Public awareness programmes need to stress ‘investability’ 
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Table 3 (Continued): Studies Exploring Factors Associated with the Take-up of First VC Investment by USOs 
Author(s) Research Question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Sample Size and 
Context 
Findings 
Birley (2002) Which issues are faced 
by organisations when 
attempting to 
commercialize their 
Intellectual Property? 
Theory building Qualitative case 
study, interviews 
n/a Case study of 
Imperial College 
London, UK 
- Three types of spinouts: Orthodox, hybrid and technology, with the 
hybrid being the most common and most complicated 
- The inventor and multiple stakeholders, such as the university, can 
face conflicts of interest, when allocating of equity to third parties 
such as VC investors. 
- A transparent policy on managing IP ownership is required for 
successful commercial exploitation of IP from academic research. 
Lockett et al. (2002) Do UK venture 
capitalists still have a 
bias against investment 
in new technology 
firms? 
Exploratory and 
descriptive study, 
no theories 
Quantitative 
survey, descriptive 
statistics 
n/a 60 VC firms, UK - General increase in the importance of technology investments by 
generalist VC firms (<50% of total portfolio are technology 
investments). 
- VC investors are interested in access to IP and complementary 
resources; especially, via inter-firm networks. 
- Government policies to promote technology start-ups (including 
USOs) are frequently aimed at providing incentives to VC 
investment. VC demand may be increased by USO formations. 
- UK VC firms remain biased against early stage technology 
companies. 
Ndonzuau et al. 
(2002) 
What are the stages 
and issues in the 
creation of university 
spin-offs according to 
public and academic 
authorities? 
 
Theory building Qualitative, 
Interviews with 
technology 
transfer related 
personnel at 15 
universities in 
different countries 
 
n/a 15 Universities: 2x 
Finland, 1 x Sweden, 
1 x Netherlands, 2 x 
Belgium, 1 x France, 
2 x Israel, 4 x USA, 1 
x Canada 
- Stage 1: to generate business ideas from research, academic 
culture, internal identification. 
- Stage 2: to finalize new venture projects including issues of IP 
protection, development of the business idea and financing. 
- Stage 3: to launch spin-off firms, ensure access to resources and 
manage relationship with university. 
- Stage 4: to strengthen the creation of economic value by spin-off 
firms in managing risk and trajectories. 
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Table 3 (Continued): Studies Exploring Factors Associated with the Take-up of First VC Investment by USOs 
Author(s) Research Question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Sample Size and 
Context 
Findings 
Shane and Stuart 
(2002) 
How do initial resource 
endowments affect the 
performance of new 
ventures? 
 
Social Capital / 
Network Theory, 
RBV 
Quantitative 
study, event 
history analysis, 
interviews with 
founders and 
survey of R&D 
managers, 
demand-side 
perspective 
Venture capital, 
Survival, IPO 
145 USOs from MIT, 
US 
- Founder’s direct and indirect relationships with venture investors 
help new ventures to receive VC funding and to avoid failure. 
- Founder team’s industry experience and patent effectiveness have 
positive effect on IPO, VC funding rate and negative effect on 
failure. 
- Technology endowment increases the likelihood of IPOs and 
decreases the likelihood of failure. 
Lockett et al. (2003) Which strategies are 
used by technology 
transfer/business 
development officers to 
promote the creation of 
spin-out companies? 
Theory building Quantitative 
survey, descriptive 
statistics, Mann-
Whitney non-
parametric tests 
between 9 
established 
universities and 
‘new’ universities 
 
n/a 57 UK Universities - More successful universities have clearer strategies for spinning out 
companies and the use of surrogate entrepreneurs. 
- More successful universities have greater expertise and networks 
that may be important in fostering spin-out companies. However, 
the role of the academic inventor was not found to differ between 
the more and less successful universities. 
- Equity ownership was more widely distributed among the members 
of the spin-out company from more successful universities. 
- The boundary between an investor of financial capital and an 
investor of human capital is becoming increasingly blurred. 
Nicolaou and Birley 
(2003) 
What mechanisms 
generate different 
types of university 
spinout structures? 
Social Capital / 
Network Theory 
Conceptual n/a n/a - Trichotomous categorization of university spinouts as orthodox, 
hybrid or technology spinouts. 
- The academic's rootedness in a network of exo-institutional and 
endo-institutional ties influences the type of spinout initiated. 
- Networks provide feedback effects and generate legitimacy in 
entrepreneurial actions. Venture capitalists are more inclined to 
invest in companies that they know or have been referred to by 
trusted sources to alleviate informational asymmetry problems. 
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Table 3 (Continued): Studies Exploring Factors Associated with the Take-up of First VC Investment by USOs 
Author(s) Research Question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Sample Size and 
Context 
Findings 
Vohora et al. 
(2004) 
How do USOs progress 
through different stages 
to compete in the 
commercial market? 
 
Exploratory and 
descriptive study, 
no theories, no 
hypotheses 
tested, theory 
building 
Qualitative case 
studies 
n/a 9 USOs from 7 
universities, UK 
- USOs go through five distinct phases of activity in their 
development: the research phase, opportunity framing phase, pre-
Organisation phase, re-orientation phase, and sustainable returns 
phase. 
- At the intersection between phases, USOs face ‘critical junctures’ in 
terms of the resources and capabilities for the next phase: 
opportunity recognition, entrepreneurial commitment, credibility 
and sustainability. 
- Critical juncture of ‘credibility’ includes the need to attract external 
investment. 
- VC investors complain about lack of ‘investment readiness’. Many 
USOs underestimate the importance of market size and commercial 
prospects that are relevant to VC investors. 
De Coster and 
Butler (2005) 
How to assess new 
technology venture 
spin-offs from 
universities? 
 
Theory building Qualitative 
analysis and 
descriptive 
statistics derived 
from information 
provided by the 
business plan and 
interview with key 
personnel.  
n/a 14 university spin-
offs and 14 
company spinoffs, 
UK 
 
- Assessment criteria categories: technological and commercial risk; 
level of product innovation; how it satisfies a market sector; market 
timeliness; fitness into a family of products; longevity of 
product/process line; previous record of technical innovation; 
intellectual property rights. 
Lockett and Wright 
(2005) 
What is the impact of 
university resources 
and routines as well as 
capabilities on the 
creation of spin-out 
companies? 
RBV Quantitative, mail 
questionnaire 
survey conducted 
over a 2-year 
period, Poisson 
Regression 
 
Number of USOs 
formed in 2002 
48 universities, UK 
 
- The number of spin-out companies created and the number of spin-
out companies created with equity investment are significantly 
positively associated with expenditure on intellectual property 
protection, the business development capabilities of technology 
transfer offices and the royalty regime of the university. 
- A key constraint on the development of spin-outs is reported by 
technology transfer offices to be access to venture capital finance. 
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Table 3 (Continued): Studies Exploring Factors Associated with the Take-up of First VC Investment by USOs 
Author(s): Research Question(s): Theory (ies): Methodology: Dependent 
Variable(s): 
Sample Size and 
Context: 
Findings: 
Powers and 
McDougall, 2005 
What resources 
influence the number 
of new USOs formed as 
well as the number of 
IPOs? 
RBV Quantitative, 
secondary, 
negative 
binominal 
regression 
Number of USOs 
formed; Number 
of USOs with IPO 
120 universities, US - Industry R&D, faculty quality, TTO age and amount of VC 
investment are significant and positively associated with the 
number of USOs as well as USOs achieving an IPO. 
Wright et al. (2006) What problems do 
USOs face when trying 
to access VC 
investment? 
Pecking-order 
Theory 
Quantitative 
survey of TTOs 
and VC investors, 
demand and 
supply-side 
perspective 
n/a 124 TTOs, UK - Venture capital is the most common resource constraint for USOs 
according to TTOs in the UK. 
- Venture capital is perceived by TTOs representing their USOs to be 
more important than internal funds. 
- A mismatch between the demand and supply side of the VC market 
for USOs is identified. 
- In line with the pecking order theory, venture capitalists prefer to 
invest after the seed stage. They are unwilling to take on the risk of 
investing in early stage USOs due to uncertainty and informational 
asymmetries. 
Clarysse et al. 
(2007) 
Does the formal 
technology transfer 
from a public research 
organization influence 
the amount of capital a 
spin-off raises at start-
up, and does it increase 
in capital post start-up? 
 
 
 
 
 
RBV, Pecking 
Order Theory 
Quantitative OLS 
regression 
Capital raised 
within 18 
months of start-
up 
 
135 Spin-offs 40 x 
Belgium; 31  x 
Germany; 17 x 
France; 29 x Italy; 
28 x UK) 
- Spin-offs with formal technology transfer start with a larger amount 
of capital but subsequently do not raise more capital than spin-offs 
without formal technology transfer. 
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Table 3 (Continued): Studies Exploring Factors Associated with the Take-up of First VC Investment by USOs 
Author(s): Research Question(s): Theory (ies): Methodology: Dependent 
Variable(s): 
Sample Size and 
Context: 
Findings: 
Mosey and Wright 
(2007) 
What structural social capital is in place at 
the start of new venture development for 
academic entrepreneurs with different 
levels of prior business ownership 
experience? 
What new ties are developed during the 
early stages of new venture development by 
academic entrepreneurs with different 
levels of prior business ownership 
experience? 
 
What is the nature of the resources gained 
through the social networks of academic 
entrepreneurs with different levels of prior 
business ownership experience at the early 
stages of venture development? 
 
What governance mechanisms are utilized 
by academic entrepreneurs with different 
levels of prior business ownership 
experience to access resources through 
social networks at the early stages of 
venture development? 
 
What is the influence of discipline-based 
and industrial experience aspects of human 
capital, the degree of success of previous 
ventures and the nature of the university 
incubator environment on the ability of 
academic entrepreneurs with different 
levels of prior business ownership 
experience to develop social networks and 
access resources through social networks at 
the early stages of venture development? 
Human Capital 
Theory, Social 
Capital / 
Network 
Theory, Theory 
building 
Qualitative, 
Multiple case studies, 44 
interviews with academics, 
business development officers 
and head of schools involved in 
new venture creation process 
n/a 24 academics 6 nascent 
entrepreneurs, 12 
novice entrepreneurs, 6 
habitual entrepreneurs), 
UK 
- Entrepreneurs with prior business 
ownership experience have broader 
social networks and are more 
effective in developing network 
ties. Less experienced 
entrepreneurs likely encounter 
structural holes between their 
scientific research networks and 
industry networks. 
- Support initiatives help attract 
industry partners for novice 
entrepreneurs from engineering 
and the material sciences but 
academics based within biological 
sciences encounter greater 
difficulties building such ties. 
- Regardless of academic discipline, 
business ownership experience 
appears essential to learn to build 
relationships with experienced 
managers and potential equity 
investors. 
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Table 3 (Continued): Studies Exploring Factors Associated with the Take-up of First VC Investment by USOs 
Author(s): Research Question(s): Theory (ies): Methodology: Dependent 
Variable(s): 
Sample Size and 
Context: 
Findings: 
Rothaermel et al. 
(2007) 
What are the major 
themes of research in 
the literature on 
university 
entrepreneurship? 
Theory building Literature review 
of 173 articles on 
USOs 
n/a n/a - The literature on university entrepreneurship is rapidly expanding, 
in both the United States and Europe but is also fairly fragmented 
regarding the use of theories and choices of methodologies. 
-  Four major research streams emerge: 
i) The entrepreneurial research university. 
ii) Productivity of technology transfer offices. 
iii) New firm creation and development. 
iv) Environmental context and networks of innovation influencing 
the formation and development of USOs. 
- The study of new firm creation can be leveraged to address one of 
the most important and vexing questions in strategic management 
today: where do capabilities come from? 
- Need for multidisciplinary perspectives to study new firm 
development. 
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The strength of the above studies is to underline the conceptual importance of VC 
investments for the growth of USOs. Their qualitative and descriptive methodology provides 
an overview of anecdotal evidence describing the process of USO formation and 
development as well as justifying a strong demand for VC investment to optimize the 
process. However, the weakness of these studies is that they rarely investigate 
systematically, or in a theory driven manner, the difficulties and barriers that USOs face 
when demanding VC investment. Whereas selected case studies highlight the importance of 
legal issues such as the protection and ownership of IP (Birley, 2002; Lockett and Wright, 
2005) they fall short of a market perspective in order to explain the coordination between 
VC demand and supply for USOs. 
More recent studies, shown in Table 3, start to address this weakness by adopting a 
market perspective. Wright et al. (2006) show, for the UK, that the demand for VC 
investment by USOs is commonly not met by its supply. A common explanation for this 
‘equity gap’ is that VC investors are not willing to take the high risks related to USOs that 
come from their early stage risks (Lockett et al., 2002). Despite an increase in specialized VC 
firms for high-technology sectors early stage VC investments appear to fall short of their 
demand by USOs. De Coster and Butler (2005) attribute the reported aversion of the VC 
supply-side to the technological and commercial risks from the radical innovation and 
unproven technologies stemming from USOs, to which investors are exposed to. 
The debate on how USOs can overcome VC investors’ risk aversion is dominated by 
the thought that they have to convince investors about the credibility and performance 
prospects. Nicolaou and Birley (2003) identify that the relationship between USOs and VC 
investors is distorted by informational asymmetries that need to be resolved in order to 
allow a fair judgement of their future prospects. Vohora et al. (2004) regard this as a critical 
juncture in the process of USO development between entrepreneurial commitment and 
achieving credibility and sustainability with the help of attracting external finance. Their 
argument relates to the earlier work of Mason and Harrison (2001) which shows that the 
credibility of new firms can be achieved if they fulfil the conditions of ‘investment readiness’ 
demanded by VC investors. Accordingly, the profiles, characteristics and resources of new 
firms need to be associated by VC investors with leading to future success. 
Correspondingly, a wide range of qualitative studies, as shown in Table 3, explore 
the question of which characteristics and information of USOs can reduce investment risks 
and attract VC investment. There is first evidence that VC investors prefer experienced 
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founders as well as firms with strong networks (Mosey and Wright, 2007). TTOs with links to 
VC investors are more likely to obtain VC investment (Roberts and Malone, 1996; Myint et 
al., 2005; Mosey et al., 2006). Firms with patented IP are also reported to obtain VC 
investment more often (Roberts and Malone, 1996; Shane, 2004b; Myint et al., 2005). 
Although this body of literature recognizes the constraints of risk, information 
exchange problems and the struggle for proving credibility they fall short of a sound 
theoretical framework which can be used to derive and test hypotheses with which to 
explore market coordination. None of the discussed studies use an integrative theoretical 
framework that allows a comparison between several important themes of resources, and 
their ability to enhance USOs’ credibility towards VC investors. Additionally, none of the 
above studies uses a quantitative methodology and large samples to explore which factors 
are related to USOs’ ability to attract VC investment. 
Shane and Stuart (2002) is currently the only study that addresses these weaknesses 
in the context of USOs, as shown in Table 3. It explores the market co-ordination of VC 
investment within a quantitative study that uses a resource-based theoretical framework to 
derive and test hypotheses on which factors of USOs are related to attracting VC 
investment. It argues that the initial resources of USOs can contain the required information 
that VC investors need to assess risks and investment readiness in order to make an 
investment decision. Their major finding is that USOs with network ties to VC investors are 
very effective at attracting VC investment. 
Therefore, the work by Shane and Stuart is a good initial point from which this study 
can replicate and extend a theory-driven approach in order to explore market coordination 
between USOs and VC investors. It is also effective at addressing current gaps in the 
knowledge base including a lack of a theory-driven multivariate study. The relationship 
between several themes of initial resources owned by USOs as independent variables and 
the event to attract first VC investment as dependent variable requires further investigation. 
Moreover, a further is gap in the knowledge base to address is whether founder or firm 
specific resources as units of analysis are more important in this relationship (Rothaermel et 
al., 2007). 
In order to address the identified gaps in the knowledge base the following section 
replicates, integrates and extends theoretical perspectives related to the attraction of first 
VC investment. A joint theoretical framework is developed from which hypotheses can be 
derived. 
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2.3 Theoretical Insights: Attraction of First VC Investment 
2.3.1 Perspectives on the Take-up of First VC Investment 
 
Three groups of studies with theoretical insights related to the take-up of first VC 
investment are discussed in this chapter. Table 4 summarizes the first and earliest group of 
studies, which focuses on a supply-side perspective of first VC investment (Tyebjee and 
Bruno, 1984). These studies show there is a renowned reluctance to invest. ‘Of every 100 
business plans reviewed by a venture capitalist, 10 are given serious consideration, and only 
one is funded’ (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1986: 54).  
The strength of this approach is to identify a range of investment criteria used by VC 
investors (Hall and Hofer, 1993) and the structure of the decision making process (Boocock 
and Woods, 1997). In order to assess the risk of potential investment opportunities, VC 
investors rely on a large variety of investment criteria which they attribute to performance 
prospects (MacMillan et al., 1985; Muzyka et al., 1996). A frequently cited criterion in VC 
investors’ decision making is an attractive market-size. It serves as a proxy to VC investors in 
order to assess the future growth and return potential of firms pitching for investment 
(MacMillan et al., 1985). Other important criteria, highlighted in Table 4, include the 
qualifications and experience of founders and the firms’ founding teams as well as 
intellectual capital in the form of patents and IP ownership. 
Most studies on VC decision making, shown in Table 4, have an exploratory or a 
qualitative methodology. They rarely rely on theories from which hypotheses can be derived 
to be empirically tested. Zacharakis and Meyer (1998) question whether these findings can 
be generalized. Their experimental study tests how well VC investors understand and 
follow-up their own investment criteria. Relying on a theoretical framework based on 
theories in behavioural decision making (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979) they find that VC investors are not very good in reflecting their decision-
making process. This finding has been replicated by Levie and Gimmon (2008) who strongly 
state that the use of investment criteria can lead to availability biases in VC decision-making. 
Investment criteria need to be frequently updated reflecting the performance of VC 
investors’ portfolio. 
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Table 4: Theoretical Insights Relating to the Supply-Side Perspective on the Provision of VC Investment 
Author(s) Research question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent 
variable(s) 
Sample size and 
context 
Findings 
Tyebjee 
and Bruno 
(1984) 
What defines the key step in venture 
capital investment activities? 
(1) Deal Organization (2) Deal screening: 
key policy variables (3) Deal evaluation: 
perceived risk and expected return (4) 
Deal structuring: price (equity 
relinquished), covenants to limit 
investors’ risks (5) Post-Investment 
activities 
Theory building  Factor analysis, 
regression 
n/a 41 venture 
capitalists providing 
data on total of 90 
deals 
Modal venture: 
start-up in 
electronics industry 
seeking $1 million 
(median) of outside 
financing, US 
- Five underlying dimensions of the deal: 1) market attractiveness 
(size, growth, access to customers); 2) product differentiation 
(uniqueness, patents, technical edge, profit margin); (3) managerial 
capabilities (skills in marketing, management, fiancé and the 
references of the entrepreneur) (4); environmental threat resistance 
(technology life cycle, barriers to competitive entry, insensitivity to 
business cycles and down-side risk protection.;(5) Cash-Output 
Potential (future opportunities to realise capital gains by M&A, IPO). 
- Expected return is determined by (1) and (2) which positively 
influence investment decisions. 
- Perceived risk is determined by (3) and (4) which negatively 
influences investment decisions. 
MacMillan 
et al. 
(1985) 
What are venture capitalists’ most 
important criteria used to invest in new 
ventures? 
Theory building  Quantitative, 
interviews, 
questionnaire, 
Factor analysis 
n/a 100 venture 
capitalists, US 
- ‘horse’ (product), horse race (market), odds (financial criteria) are all 
necessary – but it is the ‘jockey’ (entrepreneur) who fundamentally 
determines whether the venture capitalist places a bet at all 
Tyebjee 
and Bruno 
(1986) 
How does one negotiate a deal with VC 
investors? 
Theory building  Qualitative, 
interviews 
n/a n/a - The price of VC is the equity share of the business given to the VC. 
- Valuation of a business is subject to: future earnings stream, 
dividend policy, sources and uses of cash, balance sheet analysis of 
net assets and their liquidity, and gross revenues. 
- New ventures have often no track-record and are subject to risk 
resulting in discount rates of 30% and more when VC investors 
evaluate the investment prospect. 
- VC investors bring more than financial investment if they have 
experience from previous investments leading to successful and 
rapid growing start-ups. 
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Table 4 (Continued): Theoretical Insights Relating to the Supply-Side Perspective on the Provision of VC Investment 
Author(s) Research question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent 
variable(s) 
Sample size and 
context 
Findings 
Hall and 
Hofer 
(1993) 
What criteria do venture capitalists use to 
evaluate their investments? 
VC Decision-
Making 
Qualitative,  
Semi-structure 
interviews;  
n/a 4 VC with 22 
investments, US 
Key Criteria: 
- Fit with the venture firm’s lending guidelines 
- Long-term growth and profitability of the industry in which the 
proposed business will operate. 
- Second stage of proposal assessment: the source of the business 
proposal played a major role in the venture capitalists’ interest in 
the plan, with proposals previously reviewed by persons known and 
trusted by the venture capitalist receiving a high level of interest. 
- Venture capitalists attach surprisingly little importance to the 
entrepreneur/entrepreneurial team and the strategy of the 
proposed venture during these early stages of the venture 
evaluation process. 
Muzyka et 
al. (1996) 
What characteristics of investment 
opportunities are important to venture 
capitalists? 
VC Decision-
Making 
Conjoint 
analysis, cluster 
analysis 
n/a 73 interviews with 
venture capitalists, 
US 
- The ‘human factor’ is of utmost importance. 
- All five management team criteria (as opposed to management 
competence criteria) were ranked among the first seven, product-
market criteria appeared to be only moderately important, and fund 
and deal criteria were at the bottom of the rankings. 
- The venture capitalists interviewed would, as a group, prefer to 
select an opportunity that offers a good management team and 
reasonable financial and product-market characteristics, even if the 
opportunity does not meet the overall fund and deal requirements. 
Without the correct management team and a reasonable idea, good 
financials are meaningless because they will never be achieved. 
- Three groupings of venture capitalists: those primarily concerned 
with investing nationally, those who focus solely upon the deal, and 
those mainstream investors who consistently and instinctively rank 
the five management team criteria at the top of their list. 
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Table 4 (Continued): Theoretical Insights Relating to the Supply-Side Perspective on the Provision of VC Investment 
Author(s) Research question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent 
variable(s) 
Sample size and 
context 
Findings 
Boocock 
and Woods 
(1997) 
What characterizes the Midland 
Enterprise Fund and which applications 
were successful?  
VC Decision-
Making 
Qualitative, 
interviews 
n/a Case Study of the 
Midland Enterprise 
Fund of the East 
Midlands analysing 
232 applications 
leading to three 
investments 26 
pending, UK 
- Evaluation criteria are difficult to generalise – especially, with 
respect to how they are weighted regarding their importance against 
each other. 
- Evaluation criteria appear to be flexible tools along the multi-staged 
evaluation process which investment seeking firms face when 
applying for VC financing. 
Zacharakis 
and Meyer 
(1998) 
How deeply do VC investors think about 
their own decision process, and are they 
biased? 
Social 
judgement 
theory 
Quantitative, 
Real-time 
decisions, 
controlled 
experiment, 
regression 
Likelihood to 
invest in firm 
on a seven-
point Likert 
scale 
51 VC investors, US - VCs are not good at introspecting about their own decision process - 
even within the confines of a controlled experiment, which greatly 
reduces the amount of information. 
- Most decision-makers would like to have all relevant information 
available for their decision. However, as more information becomes 
available, insight diminishes.  
- VCs are very consistent in their decision process, even though they 
do not necessarily understand how they make their decisions. VCs 
face a plethora of information when making an investment decision 
(i.e., business plan, outside consultants, due diligence, etc). It may be 
difficult for VCs to truly understand their intuitive decision process 
because of all the noise caused by this information overload.  
- Decision aides can minimize the danger of salient information (e.g., 
the lead entrepreneur is a winner) clouding the VC's judgement.  
- People have a tendency to overstate the information they believe 
they relied upon and to use far less information (typically three to 
seven factors) to make a decision than they actually think they use. 
- Even though VCs are experts in the new venture funding realm, their 
decision process has room for improvement. Almost 40% of all 
backed ventures fail to provide a return to the VC. 
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Table 4 (Continued): Theoretical Insights Relating to the Supply-Side Perspective on the Provision of VC Investment 
Author(s) Research question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent 
variable(s) 
Sample size and 
context 
Findings 
Franke et 
al. (2006) 
Is there a similarity between the profile of 
a venture capitalist and the profile of a 
start-up team, and does this result in a 
more favourable evaluation by the 
venture capitalist? 
 
Learning 
theory, Self-
categorization 
theory, Social 
Capital / 
Network 
Theory 
 
Quantitative, 
Conjoint 
Analysis, 
ordered probit 
n/a 51 interviews in 26 
VC firms in Germany 
and Austria 
- Existence of this distortion due to the interaction of characteristics 
of VC and start-up team. 
- The more closely the team members’ profiles resemble that of the 
VC with respect to two important dimensions, the better—on 
average—the team will be rated. 
- Rather strong similarity bias for the type of education: VCs who had 
received training both in engineering and in business gave a 
significantly higher rating than other VCs to teams whose members 
have an education partly in engineering, partly in business. 
- VCs who had received training in business administration only rated 
teams whose members also have an education only in business 
higher than other VCs. 
- A strong bias also exists with respect to the type of firm where VC 
and members of the venture team have gathered prior professional 
experience. 
- VCs with prior experience obtained in large firms only; these 
individuals tend to prefer teams whose members have largely come 
from a large-firm background. 
Dimov and 
Murray 
(2008) 
Which factors influence a VC firm’s 
decision to undertake seed capital 
investments and, subsequently, the scale 
of such activity? 
Behavioural 
decision 
making, 
Agency 
theories 
Quantitative, 
secondary data, 
probit 
regressions 
(1) the 
proportion 
and (2) the 
number of 
seed 
investments 
made by a 
particular VC 
fund 
Investments made 
by 2949 VC funds 
raised worldwide 
between 1962 and 
2002, US 
- Investor age, timing of investment, and fund location are of 
importance. 
- The size of the fund and the existing number of portfolio firms exert 
opposite influences on the level of seed capital activity of the VC 
firm. 
- Seed activity is a valuable source of market intelligence for leading 
VC firms seeking proactively to identify and invest in novel 
technologies. 
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Boocock and Woods (1997) are also critical of the fact that investment criteria are 
difficult to generalize because different VC firms follow very individual strategies and stages 
when negotiating with potential investees. To date, only a few studies explore the 
heterogeneity of VC firms themselves, and whether their investors’ human capital and 
experience influence their decisions and their portfolio’s performance (Dimov and 
Shepherd, 2005; Dimov and Murray, 2008). Given this criticism, it appears to be difficult to 
solely rely on a supply-side perspective to explain the attraction of VC. 
The second group of studies have utilized a market perspective to explore the 
coordination between supply (i.e. VC firms) and demand (i.e. entrepreneurs) actors relating 
to VC investment. These studies are summarized in Table 5. Prominent theoretical 
perspectives, used to explain market co-ordination, are taken from principal agent theory 
(Reid, 1999) and game theory (Cable and Shane, 1997): the latter perspectives both 
recognizing that VC firms (i.e., VC investors) and entrepreneurs (i.e., VC investees) are 
mutually dependent. Their individual actions and efforts affect each other’s outcomes 
(Wijbenga and van Witteloostuijn, 2006). The degree to which they can mutually benefit 
from each other is constrained by an information exchange problem which affects market 
co-ordination. Purely theoretical studies by Elitzur and Gavious (2003b) and Fairchild (2004) 
show that informational asymmetries regarding the capabilities and efforts of entrepreneurs 
and VC investors threaten mutually beneficial outcomes. If a party can exploit such 
informational asymmetries to maximise its own self-interest, the other party’s outcome will 
be adversely affected (Reid, 1999). VC investors will not invest if they cannot overcome 
informational asymmetries and uncertainty about the capabilities and prospects of 
investment opportunities, unless there are mechanisms in place to protect them and help 
them to reduce their risks.  
As a possible solution to the information exchange problem in the VC market, the 
principal agent literature suggests that contracts with incentives and performance- 
dependent outcomes can incentivize both parties not to exploit each other (Elitzur and 
Gavious, 2003a; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003). Principal agent theory and game theory both 
illustrate that demand and supply can be coordinated in the presence of uncertainty and 
informational asymmetries. Their mathematical models are of abstract but analytical 
strength in explaining market outcomes.  
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Table 5: Theoretical Insights Relating to the Market Perspective on the Attraction of VC Investment 
Author(s) Research question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent 
variable(s) 
Sample size and 
context 
Findings 
Berglof 
(1994) 
How do an entrepreneur and an external 
investor allocate revenues and control 
among themselves in a venture capital 
relationship, given that they want to 
liquidate their holdings in the future? 
Principal Agent 
Theory, 
Contracting 
Theoretical n/a n/a - Standard and debt equity can play a role in contracting between 
investor and entrepreneur. 
- Standard debt contract is an effective way to prevent value 
decreasing actions in losing control to third parties. 
- The capital structure must match the financial strategy: If an IPO is 
the preferred exit option contracts must allow the spread of 
ownership. 
Cable and 
Shane 
(1997) 
Does the relationship between venture 
capitalist and investee resemble the 
‘prisoners’ dilemma’? 
Game Theory Theoretical n/a n/a - New business start-ups with VC backing depend on mutual co-
operation between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. 
- The probability of a co-operative relationship increases with each 
party’s perceived time pressure. However, these pressures are likely 
to be greater for entrepreneurs than VC investors. 
- The probability of a cooperative relationship increases with each 
party’s perceptions of the payoffs from cooperation. 
- The probability of a cooperative relationship increases with the 
quality and frequency of communication between the parties. 
Reid (1999) Can VC investor and investee 
relationships be modelled as principal 
agent relationships? 
Principal-Agent 
Theory 
Qualitative, Face 
to face 
interviews 
n/a Panel of 50 
investors for the 
years 1988–92 
cross-section of 20 
paired investor-
investee cases for 
1993; cross-section 
of 14 investees for 
1993, UK 
- VC investors face information asymmetries when evaluating 
investment opportunities which constrain them in assessing their 
investment risks. 
- VC investors are principals which cannot optimally monitor the 
behaviour and performance of their investees (i.e. agents). 
- Optimizing contracts and incentives are required to reduce VC 
investors’ investment risks. 
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Table 5 (Continued): Theoretical Insights Relating to the Market Perspective on the Attraction of VC Investment 
Author(s) Research question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent 
variable(s) 
Sample size and 
context 
Findings 
Osnabrug-
ge (2000) 
What are the investment criteria and 
procedures of business angels (BAs) and 
venture capitalists (VCs) across the full 
investment process? 
Principal-Agent 
Theory 
Qualitative and 
quantitative, 
descriptive 
statistics 
 
n/a 40 personal 
interviews; 143 
survey responses 
from business 
angels, 119 survey 
responses from VC 
investors 
- Business angels reduce risk after investment (the incomplete 
contracts approach). 
- VC investors reduce risk before investment (the principal-agent 
approach). 
Lockett et 
al. (2002) 
Do UK venture capitalists still have a bias 
against investment in new technology 
firms? 
Theory Building Quantitative, 
Descriptive 
statistics, mean 
comparison 
n/a 1999 survey of 60 
UK venture capital 
firms compared to a 
1991 study, UK 
- Increasing importance of technology investments to VC firms 
- Adoption of collaborative strategies to access intellectual capital and 
complementary resources via inter-firm networks is particularly 
important 
- A bias is likely to remain against VC firms’ involvement in the earliest 
(seed and start-up) stage of the technology investment cycle 
Elitzur and 
Gavious 
(2003a) 
What characterizes equilibrium contracts 
in the relationship between an 
entrepreneur, an angel and a VC from the 
seed investment made by the angel to the 
exit stage? 
Signalling 
Theory, Game 
Theory, 
Principal Agent 
Theory  
Theoretical n/a n/a - Opportunistic behaviour of both the entrepreneur and VC leads to a 
moral hazard problem, with these two players becoming ‘free riders’ 
coasting on the investment made by the angel. 
- Behaviour of VCs and entrepreneurs leads to a prisoner-dilemma-
like outcome. This moral hazard problem cannot be avoided but 
could be alleviated through governance and financing mechanisms 
such as stock options, staged financing, and direct oversight. 
- If the entrepreneur has incurred some cost in dealing with the angel, 
this action signals that the entrepreneur has chosen to exert a 
positive level of effort and that he is going for the equilibrium 
leading to a positive cash-out firm value. 
- Angel-backed firms could be seen as firms whose founders opted for 
a viable firm, rather than choosing to ‘take the money and run.’ 
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Table 5 (Continued): Theoretical Insights Relating to the Market Perspective on the Attraction of VC Investment 
Author(s) Research question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent 
variable(s) 
Sample size and 
context 
Findings 
Janney and 
Folta 
(2003) 
How do young, publicly held technology 
firms contend with information 
asymmetry, and the hazards it introduces, 
to acquire the capital necessary for future 
growth? 
Principal Agent 
Theory, 
Signalling 
Theory 
Quantitative, 
secondary data, 
OLS regression 
Cumulative 
abnormal 
returns 
 
328 biotechnology 
firms with publicly 
traded stock 
between 1973 and 
1998; US 
 
- Firms issuing private equity signal to the marketplace that managers 
believe their growth opportunities are undervalued. 
- There are significant positive abnormal returns to announcements of 
private equity placements. 
- Returns are determined by the timing of previous signals. 
- The characteristics of the private placement signal, specifically 
whether private equity is bundled with research partnerships, 
influence the strength of the signal. 
Fairchild 
(2004) 
How can the relationship between 
manager and venture capitalist bargaining 
over the financial contract be modelled in 
the face of double-sided moral hazard 
problems? 
Bargaining 
Theory, 
Contracting 
Theoretical n/a n/a - The allocation of cash flows depends on the combined effects of 
value-added services, reputation seeking, and bargaining power. 
-  Welfare is maximized when the venture capitalist has high value-
adding capabilities, the market for reputation is informational 
efficient, and the manager has bargaining power. 
An’e (2007) What signalling costs can resolve adverse 
selection between VC investors and 
investees? 
Game Theory, 
Signalling 
Theory, 
Principal Agent 
Theory 
Theoretical n/a n/a - Relationship between VC investors and investees fits within a 
principal-agent framework. 
- In the asymmetric information, there exists serious adverse selection 
between the investor and the venture capitalist. 
- To eliminate this adverse selection, the investor can notice some 
signals to identify high-quality venture capitalist. 
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However, Shane and Cable (2002) assert that contractual solutions fail to be realistic. 
The view that entrepreneurs only accept contracts solely based on assumptions about the 
rationality of their decision making is questionable. Entrepreneurs are often considered to 
be overconfident about their own abilities (Busenitz and Barney, 1997; Camerer and Lovallo, 
1999): they can make misjudgements when negotiating contracts with VC investors which 
are subject to future performance goals. Furthermore, contracts do not relate to complete 
information (Osnabrugge, 2000). 
An alternative solution to purely contract based incentives, is to rely on available 
information which the negotiating parties can use as signals of quality to convince each 
other of their credible capabilities and prospects to generate mutually beneficial returns 
(Elitzur and Gavious, 2003a; An'e, 2007). This approach originates from Spence’s signalling 
theory (1973) which has been an important influence on game theoretic models focusing on 
the causes and consequences of markets and negotiations affected by informational 
asymmetries (Watson, 2002; Dixit and Skeath, 2004). However, for explaining market 
coordination with the help of signalling theory, a better understanding of the characteristics 
of the demand-side is required, too, as discussed in the following paragraphs. 
The third and most recent group of studies, shown in Table 6, focuses on the demand-
side characteristics of firms seeking VC investment (Shane and Cable, 2002; Janney and 
Folta, 2003). They attempt to identify which characteristics of start-ups are more likely to 
attract VC investment (Beckman et al., 2007). These demand-side studies are often context 
specific. For example, several studies focus on the financing of high-tech start-ups in order 
to identify their needs and barriers to development. The strength of this group of studies is 
in replicating resource-based theoretical frameworks. Social network theory has been used 
to explain why new firms can attract investors despite facing high level of risk and 
uncertainty (Shane and Cable, 2002). 
Additional resource categories, such as general and specific human capital (Beckman et 
al., 2007), networks and intellectual capital as well as financing are considered. Moreover, 
these insights from a demand-side perspective can be linked to the studies on the context of 
USOs already discussed in Section 2.2 which adopt the same perspective. Pure demand-side 
studies are associated with weaknesses. Section 2.2 illustrates that some studies fail to 
integrate different resource perspectives into a joint framework, in order to derive and test 
hypotheses exploring the co-ordination between supply and demand in the VC market.  
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Table 6: Theoretical Insights Relating to the Demand-Side Perspective on the Attraction of VC Investment 
Author(s) Research question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent variable(s) Sample size 
and context 
Findings 
Shane and 
Cable 
(2002) 
How do entrepreneurs overcome 
information asymmetry between 
themselves and potential investors to 
obtain financing? 
Social Capital / 
Network 
Theory 
Quantitative 
survey, logistic 
regression 
analysis 
 
 
VC Investment (yes, no) in-depth 
fieldwork with 
50 high-
technology 
ventures; 202 
seed-stage 
investors, US 
- Economic explanations for venture finance, which do not 
consider how social ties influence this process, are under-
socialized and incomplete. 
- Organization theoretic arguments, which draw on the concept 
of social obligation, are over-socialized. 
- Direct and indirect ties between entrepreneurs and seed-stage 
investors influence the selection of ventures to fund through a 
process of information transfer. 
Baum and 
Silverman 
(2004) 
Do VC investors ‘pick winners’ or ‘build 
winners’ when making investments in 
high tech start-ups? 
Signalling 
Theory, Human 
Capital Theory 
Quantitative, 
secondary data, 
panel data time 
series 
Amount of pre-IPO 
financing; revenue; R&D 
spending growth; 
number of annual 
patent applications; 
number of annual 
patents granted 
204 Biotech 
start-ups, 
Canada 
 
- VCs finance start-ups that have strong technology, but are at 
risk of failure in the short run, and so in need of management 
expertise. 
- VCs also appear to make a common attribution error 
overemphasizing start-ups’ human capital when making their 
investment decisions. 
Busenitz et 
al. (2005) 
Do signals about the wealth and 
experience of the founding team serve as 
credible signals for the future value of a 
venture? 
 
Signalling 
Theory 
Quantitative, 
Event history 
analysis (Cox 
regression) 
(1) out-of-business, (2) 
still-private, (3) merged 
or acquired, and (4) 
IPOs 
 
183 VC-backed 
ventures, US 
- Neither signals of value (percentage of equity held by founding 
team) nor signals of commitment (percentage of individual 
wealth invested by the founding team in their firm) have 
positive relationship with survival, M&A or IPOs. 
- Founding team’s experience with VC investors has no 
influence on performance. 
- Founding teams’ entrepreneurial experience has no strong 
influence on performance. 
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Table 6 (Continued): Theoretical Insights Relating to the Demand-Side Perspective on the Attraction of VC Investment 
Author(s) Research question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent 
variable(s) 
Sample size and 
context 
Findings 
Dimov and 
Shepherd 
(2005) 
Is there a relationship between the 
education and experience of the top 
management teams of VC firms and the 
firms’ performance in their portfolio? 
 
Human Capital 
Theory 
Quantitative, 
secondary data, 
Hierarchical OLS 
Regressions  
‘home runs’ = 
proportion of 
companies 
added to the 
VC firm’s 
portfolio in 
the last five 
years that 
had gone 
public;  ‘strike 
outs’ = 
proportion of 
the same 
companies 
that had gone 
bankrupt. 
112 VC firms that 
have also made at 
least one 
investment in the 
wireless 
communication 
industry, US 
 
- General human capital had a positive association with the 
proportion of portfolio companies that went public initial public 
offering (IPO), however, specific human capital did not. 
- Specific human capital was negatively associated with the proportion 
of portfolio companies that went bankrupt. 
Beckman et 
al. (2007) 
Does the founding team composition and 
turnover shape an entrepreneurial firm’s 
ability to attract venture capital and its 
ability to successfully complete an initial 
public offering? 
 
Human Capital 
Theory, Social 
Capital / 
Network 
Theory 
Quantitative, 
longitudinal, 
secondary data, 
event history 
analysis (Cox 
regression) 
Whether and 
when the 
founding 
team 
received any 
amount of 
money from a 
VC; Event of 
IPO 
 
161 young high-
technology 
Firms from Silicon 
Valley, US 
 
- Broad access to information by virtue of having top management 
team members that have worked for many different employers 
(diverse prior company affiliations) and have diverse prior 
experiences (functional diversity) tend to be associated with positive 
outcomes. 
- Entrants to and founder exits from the top management team 
increase the likelihood that a firm achieves an IPO. TMT exits, in 
turn, reduce the likelihood of achieving an IPO. 
- Prior human capital experience is consistently associated with 
positive firm outcomes. 
- Team experiences, composition and turnover are all important for 
bringing new insights to the firm and are associated with the 
likelihood that an entrepreneurial firm will succeed. 
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Table 6 (Continued): Theoretical Insights Relating to the Demand-Side Perspective on the Attraction of VC Investment 
Author(s) Research question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent 
variable(s) 
Sample size and 
context 
Findings 
Hsu (2007) Do varied levels of prior start-up founding 
experience, academic training, and social 
capital influence the sourcing and 
valuation of venture capital? 
Signalling 
Theory, Human 
Capital, 
Networks (VC 
demand) 
Quantitative 
survey of early 
stage 
technology-
based start-up 
firms 
Funding via 
direct VC tie 
(probit 
regression); 
pre-money 
valuation 
(OLS 
regression) 
 
149 early stage 
technology-based 
start-up firms, US 
- Prior founding experience especially financially successful 
experience) increases both the likelihood of VC funding via a direct 
tie and venture valuation. 
- Founders' ability to recruit executives via their own social network as 
opposed to the VC's network) is positively associated with venture 
valuation. 
- In the emerging at the time) Internet industry, founding teams with 
a doctoral degree holder are more likely to be funded via a direct VC 
tie and receive higher valuations, suggesting a signalling effect. 
- The paper therefore underscores some important dimensions of 
heterogeneity among VC-backed entrepreneurs. 
Levie and 
Gimmon 
(2008) 
Why is VC investors’ valuation of new 
business based on founders, human 
capital suboptimal? 
Signalling 
Theory, Human 
Capital (VC 
market and 
supply) 
Qualitative, 
semi-structured 
interviews 
n/a 3 VC investors, 3 
Business Angels;  
US, UK and Israel 
 
- There is a gap between VC investors’ decision-making criteria and 
espoused criteria. 
- There is extensive use of gut feeling in decision-making was 
supported. 
- VCs focus on harvest potential and de-emphasize measures of 
founder technology capability that predicted early survival and 
growth in an earlier study. 
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Notably, most of these studies are so exploratory and context specific that the ability to 
generalize from them is limited. Studies by Baum and Silverman (2004), Busenitz et al. 
(2005) and Hsu (2007) address the weakness of a pure demand-side perspective. They are 
the first to provide an integrative theoretical framework which links the demand-side 
characteristics of new firms with the information needs of the VC supply-side in order to 
explain market coordination. Their approach is replicated and further extended in this study. 
 
2.3.2 Demand-Side: The Resource-Based View of the Firm (RBV) 
 
This section develops a demand-side perspective for the take-up of first VC 
investment. The RBV of the firm is the base theory from which to argue that the resources 
of USOs are internal factors that characterize the demand-side and may influence the 
attraction of first VC investment. 
The RBV of the firm suggests that firms seek to generate and maximize profits. The 
scale and scope of firms is shaped by the composition and characteristics of their internal 
resources (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1989). Firms have to make best use of their available 
internal resources in order to provide their products and services with a competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991). Table 7 summarizes assumptions, conditions and implications of 
the RBV of the firm which are discussed below. 
The first assumption is that firms’ resources comprise all tangible and intangible 
assets, capabilities, firm attributes and information as well as knowledge which are tied to 
and controlled by the firm (Maijoor and Van Witteloostuijn, 1996). Second, firms within the 
same industry or sector differ regarding the strategic resources they control. This 
differentiation of internal resources explains differing outcomes by firms operating in the 
same industry or sector (Barney, 1991, 1995). Third, internal resources of firms are assumed 
to be imperfectly mobile across firms. This can be due to a variety of reasons such as natural 
monopolies, asset specificity or legal protection (Conner, 1991). 
The RBV of the firm assigns four conditions which resources have to fulfil in order to 
generate a sustained competitive advantage for a firm. Resources need to be valuable, rare, 
imperfect to imitate and difficult to substitute (Barney, 1991). These conditions need to be 
considered by firms when seeking optimal strategies based on their internal resources 
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targeting to a sustained competitive advantage against other firms operating in their 
markets and industries (Spanos and Spyros, 2001). 
 
Table 7: Resource-Based View of the Firm (RBV): Assumptions, Conditions and Implications 
Assumptions of the RBV of 
the firm: 
Conditions for a sustained 
competitive advantage: 
Implications of the RBV of 
the firm for this study: 
 Firm resources are all 
assets, capabilities, firm 
attributes, information, 
and knowledge 
controlled by a firm to 
conceive and implement 
strategies improving 
performance. 
 Firms in the same 
industry (or group) differ 
regarding the strategic 
resources they control. 
 Resources are not 
perfectly mobile across 
firms, and heterogeneity 
is long lasting. 
 Valuable: They enable a 
firm to conceive and 
implement strategies to 
exploit opportunities or 
neutralise threats. 
 Rare: They are required 
but not equally owned 
and controlled by 
competitors. 
 Imperfect to imitate: 
They were first acquired 
or require special skills 
or permission to 
replicate. 
 Substitutability: There 
are no other resources 
available that are 
strategically equivalent. 
 Internal resource 
endowments can 
determine firms’ 
development, 
performance and may 
lead to a sustained 
competitive advantage. 
 The RBV is compatible 
with the entrepreneurial 
process: new firms and 
opportunity discovery 
commonly involve novel 
and innovative 
combination of unique 
resources. 
 The RBV integrates 
fragmented views on 
which initial resource 
endowments are related 
to firm performance. 
RBV cannot explain the 
market co-ordination 
due to missing a supply-
side perspective. 
 
The RBV of the firm can be viewed as a critical response to Porter’s competitive 
advantage strategy. It assumes that all firms are identical regarding strategically relevant 
resources they control (Porter, 1987; 1991). According to Porter’s view, strategies are 
determined only in response to external factors such as market and industry conditions. The 
RBV of the firm argues instead that internal resources can be the source for firms’ sustained 
competitive advantage if they are valuable, rare, imperfect to imitate and substitute. 
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Different themes of resources can be integrated in the RBV of the firm characterising firms’ 
heterogeneity as the source of performance differentials (Rumelt, 1991). 
This study replicates and extends the RBV of the firm in order to explore whether 
some firms (and entrepreneurs) with certain resource profiles can provide ‘positive signals’ 
that increases the probability that they will obtain first VC investment. This approach is 
adopted from Baum and Silverman (2004), Busenitz et al. (2005) and Hsu (2007) as 
discussed in Section 2.3.1, who link a resource-based demand-side perspective as the initial 
point to explain market co-ordination relating to the supply of VC investment. Guided by 
insights from the RBV of the firm, five themes characteristic to the demand-side profile of a 
firm and its entrepreneur are considered to impact the ability to attract first VC investment. 
These themes are summarized in Figure 11. Each theme will be discussed, in turn, below. 
  
Figure 11: Resource Themes Linked to the Attraction of First VC Investment (Research 
Question 1) 
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2.3.3 Human Capital Theory 
 
Human capital theory originates from the discipline of economics and was initially 
applied to education and labour markets (Becker, 1993). It is based on the strong rationality 
assumption that individuals only invest in education or training if they can expect that 
obtaining new knowledge and skills will lead to benefits from increased levels in productivity 
(Becker, 1975). 
The scope of this general implication of human capital theory has been broadened 
by relaxing the assumption of rationality in individuals’ decision-making. Research in 
psychology and behavioural economics shows that decision-making is often situational and 
context specific (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Less conscious attributes of individuals like 
habits, attitudes and experiences building knowledge can also qualify as human capital 
(Becker, 1993). As a consequence, a distinction has been made between general and specific 
human capital. 
 
2.3.3.1 General Human Capital 
 
The general human capital of a firm relates to resources including capabilities, 
information and knowledge of their founders, owners and employees. These intangible 
assets can be distinguished according to two groups. General human capital occurs in ‘non-
intellectual’ form including demographic characteristics such as age, parental background or 
gender (Ucbasaran et al., 2008). These characteristics are unalterable and cannot be 
consciously invested in. Nevertheless, they can capture the experience and capabilities of 
the people involved in a firm (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Further, general human capital 
occurs in an ‘intellectual’ form, which is the result of individuals’ investments in education 
and learning. Investment in education is strongly associated to build and strengthen abilities 
of problem solving, discipline, motivation and self-confidence (Cooper et al., 1994). 
Entrepreneurs’ ability to identify and exploit business opportunities shaped by the 
organisation and leverage of general human capital (Venkataraman, 1997). 
Intangible assets relating to firm owners and employees can shape firm 
development. The availability of experts with the education and academic experience to 
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exploit a technology is required to ensure the competitive advantage of knowledge-based 
firms (Audretsch and Lehmann, 2005a, b). 
 
 
2.3.3.2 Specific Human Capital 
 
The specific human capital of a firm relates to resources comprising the capabilities, 
information and knowledge of firm founders and employees. It is context specific and 
difficult to transfer to other contexts. Specific human capital relevant to new firms can 
relate to a diverse range of knowledge including technology, market, customers or sales 
techniques (Marvel and Lumpkin, 2007). 
Firm owners with prior entrepreneurial experience are commonly regarded to have a 
rich collection of relevant specific human capital increasing their abilities to turn their 
ventures into successes. For instance, McGrath (1999) argues that experienced 
entrepreneurs learn from failure which will benefit the performance of their future 
ventures. The influence of experienced entrepreneurs on firm performance was studied 
more thoroughly by Westhead and Wright (1998a, b, 1999). They advocate the 
differentiation between different types of experienced entrepreneurs. Initial studies only 
compared novice and experienced (or habitual) entrepreneurs. More recently, the analysis 
of experienced entrepreneurs has focused upon on ‘serial entrepreneurs’ (i.e. 
entrepreneurs that only start a new firm after leaving their previous one) and ‘portfolio 
entrepreneurs’ (i.e. entrepreneurs that run two or more firms at the same time) (Ucbasaran 
et al. 2008). 
Ndonzuau et al. (2002) and Vohora et al. (2004) find that academic entrepreneurs 
are particularly challenged not only by the recognition of commercially viable business 
opportunities but also in managing the growth of their venture. Previous entrepreneurial 
experience of academic entrepreneurs and their founding team can reduce barriers to 
additional resources for firm development, and promote superior firm performance (Mosey 
and Wright, 2007). 
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2.3.4 Networks 
 
Networks are relational structures between individuals, organisations or firms 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The social capital of networks is an important resource which 
can help to attract and leverage resources required for firm development (Gulati, 1998). 
Networks are valuable as a result from repeated social or organisational interaction leading 
to trust (Uzzi and Gillespie, 1999), status (Podolny, 1993) and reputation (Podolny, 1994). 
Networks present an alternative to market transfers in order to obtain further resources 
and knowledge (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Network memberships can enable benefits 
from direct and indirect ties between individuals or firms which (Granovetter, 1973; Burt, 
1987), which are otherwise not available. 
USOs seeking finance from VC investors depend on networks to avoid disadvantages 
from regional clusters with less economic and VC investment activities (Mason and Harrison, 
2002a). Direct ties between experienced entrepreneurs and VC investors can lead to VC 
investment (Shane and Cable, 2002; Shane and Stuart, 2002). Inexperienced academic 
entrepreneurs can benefit from indirect ties to previous USOs from the same university of 
origin (Myint et al., 2005; Mosey et al., 2006). 
Strategic alliances with other organisations can attract and leverage resources required 
for firm development. These inter-firm networks are valuable and exclusive intangible assets 
resulting from voluntary agreements between firms. Alliance partners benefit from 
exchanging and sharing information as well as jointly develop products or services (Gulati, 
1998) leading to a competitive advantage. Strategic alliances are valuable in offering a 
reduction in transaction costs for firms (Kogut, 1988). 
 
2.3.5 Intellectual Capital 
 
The knowledge-based economy sees a shift from the importance of physical assets 
essential to an industrial and manufacturing based economy towards the resource of 
intellectual capital (Stam and Garnsey, 2007). This intangible asset captures firms’ 
innovative capabilities and abilities to process information and knowledge effectively to 
identify and exploit business opportunities (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Knowledge is not 
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only subject to the human capital of founders and employees but is also embedded in the 
nature and the process of organisations which defines the intellectual capital of firms 
(Marshall, 1965; Arrow, 1974). 
The more a firm depends on its intellectual capital to exploit a business opportunity the 
more it needs to defend this asset specificity in the market place. Patenting intellectual 
property (IP) is an important strategy to protect intellectual capital against competitors. 
Patents ensure that intellectual capital is difficult to imitate and substitute by competitors 
(Baum and Silverman, 2004). A firm with a patent has a competitive advantage on strategic 
factor markets (Barney, 1986). 
The innovation of intellectual capital is of particular asset specificity in the context of 
USOs. The lead entrepreneurs (i.e. the founding academic entrepreneurs) need to develop 
and implement an organisational form which best embeds the knowledge to exploit the 
identified business opportunity (Vohora et al., 2004). Schumpeter (1934, 1954) argues that 
radical innovation can provide a firm with monopoly power and related returns. However, 
investing in radical innovation is very risky as there is high uncertainty regarding the 
potential market size and competitors’ responses (von Hippel, 1988). 
 
2.3.6 Financial Resources 
 
The value of financial resources to new firms is subject to their individual financial 
needs, their individual wealth as well as their abilities to attract external financing. Financial 
resources can be defined as all monetary assets including firm’s borrowing capacity, ability 
to attract equity finance (Dollinger, 2003; Timmons and Spinelli, 2003). 
The availability of internal financing is subject to founders’ savings and wealth. 
Moreover, depending on the performance of their firms, profits can be reinvested to grow 
the business. In practice, many owners of firms are often lack sufficient personal internal 
financing sources (Astebro and Bernhardt, 2003). Capital intensive young firms often lack 
sufficient revenues to internally finance growth and survival (Kinsella and McBrierty, 1997; 
Chiesa and Piccaluga, 2000). This constitutes the demand for external finance. 
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Section 1.2.2 highlighted that debt and equity as two important types of external 
financing. The provision of external finance and the amount of external finance provided is 
subject to the providers’ willingness to take risk. Debt finance is sought by firm owners who 
seek to maintain control of their ventures. Firm owners have to be able to pay interest rates 
and provide sufficient collateral for receiving debt. Although debt financing is usually less 
costly to entrepreneurs than sharing ownership of the firm with an equity investor 
(Dollinger, 2003), new firms are often too risky for banks to invest in (Myers and Majluf, 
1984). As consequence, equity investments are most valuable for young firms with high risk 
profiles. In addition to attracting the required financial resources to generate growth and 
development of new firms, equity investments are valuable for a second reason. Equity 
investors such as VC firms are known for providing business expertise and a commitment for 
achieving strong commercial objectives. Sections 1.2.2 and 2.2 highlighted that USOs can 
benefit from the finance and expertise by VC firms. Issues relating to the supply and market 
co-ordination of VC investment are discussed in the following section. 
 
2.3.7 Supply-Side: Signalling Theory 
2.3.7.1 Overview 
 
Guided by insights from signalling theory (Spence, 1973), this study explores whether 
the provision of first VC investment to USOs is shaped by the demand-side profiles of USOs 
(and their academic entrepreneurs) and the supply-side preferences of VC investors (i.e. VC 
firms). Entrepreneurs and their firms (i.e. the demand-side) can provide signals which can 
reduce uncertainty and asymmetric information for potential VC investors (i.e. the supply-
side) in order to attract first VC investment. The types and the size of previous investments 
signalled by firms and entrepreneurs can be critically considered and evaluated by VC 
investors that are seeking to reduce their exposure to risk. This additional information can 
also be used by VC investors to more accurately ascertain whether they can lead their 
investees to superior performance after investing in them. 
Table 8 summarizes the market assumptions, conditions and implications of signalling 
theory. These issues are discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
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Table 8: Signalling Theory: Market Assumptions, Conditions and Implications 
Market assumptions of 
signalling theory: 
Conditions of for firms’ resources to 
become signals of quality: 
Implications of signalling 
theory for this study: 
 Signalling co-
ordinates demand 
and supply on 
markets constrained 
by adverse selection 
resulting from 
uncertainty and 
asymmetric 
information. 
 Resource characteristics need to be 
alterable. 
 Resource characteristics must be 
costly to obtain (signalling costs). 
 Investors (supply-side) associate 
signalling costs (demand-side) with 
future performance potential. 
 Investors frequently update their 
beliefs about the association 
between Signalling Costs and future 
performance potential. 
 VC investors look for 
observable and 
credible signals of 
quality revealing the 
performance prospects 
of investment 
opportunities and 
reducing their 
investment risks.  
 USOs’ initial resource 
endowments can be 
signals of quality. 
 
2.3.7.2 Market Assumptions: Uncertainty and Informational Asymmetries leading to 
Adverse Selection 
 
VC investors are specialised in identifying and investing in young firms with high 
performance potential (Timmons and Spinelli, 2003). In order to maximise future returns, VC 
investors need to separate ‘good’ from ‘bad’ investment opportunities (An'e, 2007). VC 
investors struggle to make this separation in markets which are affected by uncertainty and 
informational asymmetries as shown in Table 9. Both constraints lead to adverse selection 
(Akerlof, 1970) which prevent USOs from attracting VC investment as follows. 
Table 9: Market Assumptions for USOs seeking VC investment leading to Adverse Selection 
Uncertainty: Informational asymmetries: Adverse selection: 
 New USOs are like all new 
firms exposed to a high 
likelihood of failure in 
early years. 
 Technology and market 
specific risks increase 
uncertainty of USOs’ 
survival. 
 VC investors cannot 
perfectly observe the 
performance potential of 
finance seeking USOs. 
 Information on USOs’ 
performance prospects is 
unobservable, incomplete 
or manipulated. 
 If VC investors cannot 
differentiate between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
investment 
opportunities they do 
not invest and leave 
the market. 
66 
 
From a demand-side perspective, firms (and entrepreneurs) need to improve the flows 
of relevant information (i.e. signals) to VC investors in order to improve their chances of 
obtaining VC investment. From a supply-side perspective, VC investors request additional 
information from firms and entrepreneurs that have made sufficient previous investments 
in costly resources (e.g. education, IP, etc.). If the demand-side can anticipate that these 
signals fail to communicate their quality to the supply-side of VC and thus do not increase 
their likelihood to attract VC investment due to uncertainty and asymmetric information, 
they will choose not to invest in their resource base. The result is adverse selection, as the 
supply-side cannot separate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ investment opportunities. Therefore, 
VC investors will not choose to invest and will not meet the demand for VC investment.  
To resolve adverse selection it is thus important what types of signals are effective to 
overcome uncertainty and asymmetric information to communicate the quality of the 
demand-side of firms (and entrepreneurs) to the supply-side of VC investment. The 
theoretical framework of this study addresses this issue in the following section. 
 
2.3.7.3 Signalling to Attract VC Finance 
 
USOs need to provide VC investors with credible information on their future 
performance potential (Shane, 2004a). They need to overcome an information exchange 
problem which is commonly referred to as a ‘principal-agent problem’ (Reid, 1999; Arthurs 
and Busenitz, 2003). The VC investor is the principal who provides the risk-capital to an 
entrepreneur (i.e. the agent) in order to maximise returns (Arrow, 1991). The relationship 
between VC investors and entrepreneurs is particularly characterized by mutual 
interdependence (Cable and Shane, 1997). Both parties depend on each other to maximise 
their individual returns (Wijbenga and van Witteloostuijn, 2006). VC investors depend on 
the abilities and skills of the entrepreneur to maximise their returns, whilst entrepreneurs 
benefit from the financing and business expertise provided by the VC investors. 
According to signalling theory, information exchange problems can be resolved if 
several conditions are met. Signals can be all attributes by individuals or firms which are 
alterable and costly to obtain (Spence, 1973). VC investors need to decide on which 
resources of new firms can best predict their performance prospects. 
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A summary of frequent investment criteria reported by VC investors is presented in 
Table 10. Despite definitional differences between the presented studies, their identified 
investment criteria can be grouped according to key resource themes as done in the final 
column of Table 10. Interestingly, the identified resource themes sought after by the supply-
side of VC investors are similar to the resource themes identified by the demand-side 
perspective of the RBV of the firm as discussed in Section 2.3.2. Following the implications 
of signalling theory, firms (and entrepreneurs) investing in these resources (i.e. 
entrepreneur general and specific human capital and firm networks, intellectual capital and 
finance) generate signals of quality which can increase their likelihood of obtaining first VC 
investment.  
The resulting market co-ordination mechanism is summarized in Figure 12. This 
effectiveness of this mechanism depends on VC investors believe that investments in 
internal resources of the firm and entrepreneur such as specific human capital, intellectual 
capital and finance reduced risk exposure and promise a higher probability of up-side gains 
and superior firm performance if the USO receives additional external finance. 
 
Figure 12: Market Co-ordination between USO and VC Investor with Signalling 
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Table 10: Common Investment Criteria Reported by VC Firms (Adopted from Zacharakis and Meyer, 1998) 
Study: Wells (1974) Poindexter 
(1976) 
Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) MacMillan et 
al. (1985) 
MacMillan et 
al. (1987) 
Robinson 
(1987) 
Timmons et al. 
(1987) 
Hall and Hofer 
(1993) 
Resources 
characterising 
the demand-
side according 
to the RBV: 
Method: Interviews Questionnaire Phone survey and 
questionnaire 
Questionnaire Questionnaire Questionnaire Unstructured 
interviews 
Verbal 
protocol 
Sample Size: 8 97 46 / 41 100 67 53 47 16 
Entrepreneur/team 
characteristics: 
        General and 
specific 
human capital 
of founders 
and founding 
team 
Management skill and experience X X X X X X X X 
Venture team    X X X  X 
Management stake in firm  X X   X   
Personal motivation X     X   
Entrepreneur personality    X     
Product/Service characteristics:         Intellectual 
capital of USO Product attributes X  X X X  X  
Product differentiation   X      
Proprietary X  X X X  X  
Growth potential   X      
Market acceptance    X   X  
Prototype    X     
Market characteristics:         Controls 
for  
environment 
of USO 
Market size X  X    X X 
Market growth X  X X  X X  
Barriers to entry   X    X  
Competitive threat    X X  X  
Venture creates new market    X     
Financial characteristics:         Finance 
Cash-out method X  X     X 
Expected ROR  X X X   X  
Expected risk  X       
Percentage of equity  X       
Investor provisions  X       
Size of investment X  X      
Liquidity    X X X   
Other:          
References X     X   Networks 
Venture development stage  X X       
VC investment Criteria        X  
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2.4 Hypotheses Derivation: Attraction of First VC Investment 
2.4.1 Overview 
 
Guided by insights from the RBV of the firm and signalling theory, the integrated 
theoretical framework discussed in the previous section suggests that a firm’s internal 
resources (i.e. entrepreneur general and specific human capital and firm networks, 
intellectual capital and finance) can act as signals. Appropriate latter signals can reduce a VC 
investor’s risk exposure. Firms and entrepreneurs that provide sufficient signals relating to 
their internal resource profiles may, therefore, increase their chances of obtaining first VC 
investment. Hypotheses derived from this integrated theoretical framework are 
summarized in Figure 13. Each hypothesis is discussed, in turn, in the following sections. 
 
Figure 13: Overview of Hypotheses on the Attraction of First VC Investment (Research 
Question 1) 
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2.4.2 General Human Capital  
 
The first resource shown in Figure 13 relates to the general human capital of USOs’ 
founders. VC investors can use this information to assess whether founders have valuable 
skills and experience which are required to turn their firms into successful businesses. In line 
with signalling theory, founders who have invested greater opportunity costs to increase 
their general human capital will increase their credibility towards VC investors (Hsu et al., 
2007). Higher levels of general human capital benefits founders in their ability of problem 
solving, building network connections and assessing the feasibility of their venture’s 
objectives and are valued by VC investors. Due to the absence of direct performance 
measurements and limited commercial track-record of new firms, VC investors often rely on 
inferring from information on the abilities of founders to the quality of their firms (Stuart et 
al., 1999). 
In order to reduce their exposure to risk, some VC investors are more inclined to invest 
in older and more experienced entrepreneurs. Middle-aged entrepreneurs are often 
regarded more successful in securing funding due to their ability to provide collateral as well 
as providing a substantial credit record (Cressy and Storey, 1995). Older and more 
experienced entrepreneurs are also more likely to have higher levels of general human 
capital which help to attract further finance (Cooper et al., 1994). 
In the context of USOs, more mature academic entrepreneurs can have a longer 
academic career and broader research experience in the technology or area from which the 
IP is derived. Founders’ age may thus reflect their competence and skills in assessing the 
feasibility of the intellectual capital driving USOs’ business model. Consequently, the 
following hypothesis is suggested: 
Hypothesis 1: Older USO founders are more likely to attract first VC investment. 
 
VC investors commonly prefer founders with higher levels of education (MacMillan et 
al., 1985; Levie and Gimmon, 2008). This is because education is commonly regarded as the 
source of knowledge, problem-solving skills, discipline, motivation and self-confidence 
(Cooper et al., 1994; Davidsson and Honig, 2003). Education is a credible signal of quality as 
founders face substantial opportunity costs including finance, time and career trade-offs in 
order to achieve a higher level of qualification. The credibility of the signalling of education 
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to VC investors is increased by academic status among founders of USOs (Huggins, 2008). VC 
investors can rely on this signal if they are not experts in the founders’ field of research. The 
observable academic status of a founder allows also inferring to the quality of the IP which 
the USO seeks to commercially exploit. Shane and Stuart (2002) suggest that those 
academic entrepreneurs associated with the academic status of being a professor provide a 
signal of quality to VC investors. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
Hypothesis 2: USO founders with higher levels of academic reputation are more likely to   
              attract first VC investment. 
 
2.4.3 Specific Human Capital 
 
The second resource shown in Figure 13 relates to the specific human capital of USOs’ 
founders. VC investors are looking for experienced entrepreneurs as they seek to identify 
the most adept and qualified individuals who can turn their investment into a success. In the 
absence of more objective data on the prospects of new firm, founders’ entrepreneurial 
track-record is an alternative information source to make an informed judgement. VC 
investors are often looking for founders who possibly best understand their business model. 
Founders with entrepreneurial experience are more likely to have greater knowledge for 
understanding their technology, market and customers which helps them to control their 
operational risks. Founders who have proven before that they can start a new firm are thus 
more likely to also reduce VC investors’ risk leading to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: USO founders who are experienced entrepreneurs are more likely to  
       attract first VC investment. 
 
Firms are seldom started by single individuals. Founders recognize the need to build a 
team in order to add skills they don’t have themselves, but perceive as necessary to best 
exploit their business opportunity. Founding teams with a wide range of experiences, 
capabilities and skills are typically better equipped to develop and exploit new ideas 
(Beckman et al., 2007). The composition and characteristics of founding teams founding 
teams can thus reveal additional important information to VC investors which helps to 
assess the risk and return prospects of investment opportunities. A founding team with 
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balanced specific human capital of entrepreneurial and business experience increases 
expectations of superior firm performance and reduce investment risks. Founding teams 
with such reputable members are thus a valuable resource which can help to attract VC 
investors. The ability of a new firm to attract a competent founding team is consequently a 
credible signal to VC investors justifying the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: USOs with an experienced founding team are more likely to attract first VC  
       investment. 
 
2.4.4 Networks 
 
The third resource shown in Figure 13 relates to firms’ networks. Founders and their 
new firms can utilise networks if they need to attract resources which are not freely 
available in the market. The attraction of VC investment is representative for a resource 
which is not freely available in the market place as access needs to be individually 
negotiated. Network links between new firms and VC investors in order to reduce 
uncertainty and informational asymmetries. Status and reputation within the network are 
generated from repeated interaction with VC investors. Because repeated interaction in 
networks is costly due to being repeatedly built up over time, they are a credible signal of 
quality to investors (Podolny, 1993; Podolny and Stuart, 1995). 
Network links between universities and their USOs as well as VC investors require 
repeated interaction in order to mature and become effective for their members. USOs 
from universities with a long tradition of technology and spin-out activities can expect to 
have access to such networks (Birley, 2002; Nicolaou and Birley, 2003b). USOs from these 
universities with links to VC firms benefit from being introduced to VC investors and 
business advisors without first having had to establish a personal contact. This argument 
supports the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: USOs from universities that have a strong network of previously VC funded  
       USOs are more likely to attract first VC investment. 
 
A second important network resource is USOs’ ability to build inter-firm networks in the 
form of strategic alliances. Such alliances can be built between firms within the same sector 
73 
 
or across firms of differing but compatible factor markets. New firms benefit from strategic 
alliances as they can share resources and create synergies. For instance, resources which are 
difficult to freely obtain in the market place can be secured in forming alliances with 
resource providers. Consequently, these strategic alliances would reduce transaction costs 
compared to ongoing individual negotiations to secure access to key resources. Moreover, 
partners in strategic alliances benefit from increasing their market power compared to their 
competitors (Gulati, 1998). 
Strategic alliances are also attracting VC investors. They regard an exclusive partnership 
by another firm in the same or a related sector as a signal of credibility which reduces their 
investment risk (Stuart et al., 1999; Chang, 2004). The following hypothesis is derived: 
Hypothesis 6: USOs with alliance partners are more likely to attract first VC investment. 
 
2.4.5 Intellectual Capital 
 
The fourth resource shown in Figure 13 relates to firms’ intellectual capital. VC investors 
prefer to invest in firms which can sustain their competitive advantage. A strong indicator 
for this competitive advantage is the legal protection of IP which drives the business model 
of a firm in the form of patents. Patents turn the knowledge which is embedded in the firm 
in order to exploit the identified business opportunity, into valuable intangible assets 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Costly efforts for the legal protection of intangible assets in 
the form of patents are regarded signal commitment and credibility to VC investors. The 
presence of patents reduces the risk of investors as they strengthen their investees’ market 
position. Because of their strong signal of quality, new firms with patents often also attract 
investors who are not experts in understanding the source of the patented inventions, 
products, services or processes (Hsu, 2007). These investors rely on the assumption that 
firms which are able to afford patents have significant capabilities and performance 
prospects. Thus, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
Hypothesis 7: USOs with patented IP are more likely to attract first VC investment. 
 
Firms in their early stages without long business track records have often only their IP to 
measure and reflect their value. In order to protect their investment, VC investors thus 
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prefer that the ownership of IP is directly assigned to the firm (Kaplan and Stromberg, 
2003). Due to their equity share and control rights on the board of directors, VC investors 
can then ensure that the IP remains in the firm. For instance, founders cannot leave the firm 
and walk away with the IP and strip the new firm and its investors of the most important 
intangible asset. Consequently, IP owned by the firm protects the firm value. This is also 
crucial for VC investors’ exit strategies. The valuation of their investees in order to sell them 
(M&A) or quote them on a stock exchange (IPO) is sensitive to whether the IP is owned by 
the firm (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003). Therefore, the following hypothesis is derived: 
Hypothesis 8: USOs with IP ownership are more likely to attract first VC investment. 
 
Information about the degree of innovation in new firms’ business models can help to 
reduce VC investors’ risks. Sources of innovation such as new technologies, recognising and 
solving market inefficiencies or finding more cost-effective ways of offering established 
goods and services (Drucker, 1985) need to be assessed regarding their inherent risks. 
Investors need to decide whether these sources of innovation are too radical and therefore 
unlikely to be accepted by customers on the targeted market place (Gifford, 2003). In order 
to generate substantial returns, VC investors generally prefer not to invest in firms with too 
radical innovation as these often target insufficiently small markets which do not generate 
attractive returns. The risk of investing substantial costs and facing long time horizons to 
generate returns in developing products and services of radical innovation on unproven 
markets is unattractive to VC investors. In consequence, the following hypothesis is derived: 
Hypothesis 9: USOs whose main product or service is associated with radical innovation 
                                are less likely to attract first VC investment. 
 
 
2.4.6 Financial Resources 
 
The final resource shown in Figure 13 relates to firms’ financial resources. Attracting 
investments from markets for external finance is a major barrier to new firms. The prior 
ability to attract financial investment is a potential signal of enthusiasm, experience and 
expertise sought by VC investors. 
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Public backed equity funds are a form of external investment which can help USOs with 
high risk profiles to attract finance at an early stage. They are promoted by public policy 
makers to help USOs to overcome barriers to attract external financing in order to pursue 
the commercialisation of knowledge and IP from academic research (Wright et al., 2006). 
These barriers relate to the risk aversion of private investors such as VC investors which are 
reluctant to take on immature firms. The objective of public backed equity investments is 
thus to provide seed and early stage funding which would otherwise not be available on the 
market for external finance. Moreover, public backed equity investments also seek to 
improve USOs’ investment readiness in order to prepare them to attract future funding 
rounds and expertise from private investors such as VC firms to improve their performance 
(Boadway and Tremblay, 2005). Further, public backed equity funds also increasingly seek to 
support USOs and their founders to obtain skills and expertise for launching their products 
and services to the market. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
Hypothesis 10: USOs that have obtained publicly-backed equity funds are more likely to  
         attract first VC investment. 
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2.5 Gaps in the Knowledge Base: USO Firm Performance 
 
Numerous studies have looked at firm performance in the domain of 
entrepreneurship (Storey, 1994). Conversely, relatively few studies have explored research 
questions related to USOs’ firm performance and the role of VC investment (Rothaermel et 
al., 2007; O'Shea et al., 2008). These are summarized in Table 11 and discussed below. 
Studies on USO development frequently attribute firm performance to the question 
whether these new firms have optimal initial resources and investors in place (Vohora et al., 
2004; Colombo and Piva, 2008). The relationship between USOs’ internal resources and firm 
performances takes resource needs and capabilities of firms and their founding academic 
entrepreneurs into account (Lockett et al., 2005). This approach is replicated from the 
theoretical framework of the resource-based view of the firm (RBV) which implies that 
internal resources rather than the external environment are responsible to shape the 
performance prospects of new firms (Barney, 1991). 
The replication of the RBV for investigating USO firm performance is often rather 
conceptual and exploratory. There is a lack of studies with large representative samples 
testing hypotheses with the help of multivariate statistics to identify which internal factors 
explain firm performance (Rothaermel et al., 2007). The operationalisation of dependent 
variables suffers from inconsistent approaches in measuring firm performance (Djokovic and 
Souitaris, 2008; O'Shea et al., 2008). 
Studies on USO firm performance in the USA tend to measure the events of failure, 
successful IPOs or M&As (Shane and Stuart, 2002). American USOs report a survival rate of 
68% between 1980 and 2000 (AUTM, 2001). This represents a higher survival rate than the 
average of new firm survival in the US (AUTM, 1991-2009). For European USOs the survival 
rate is even higher (Dahlstrand, 1997; Mustar, 1997) which reduces the number of available 
observations required to conduct a meaningful survival analysis (Clarysse et al., 2007). 
British USOs have a failure rate of 11% between 1989 and 2007. Only 4% of them achieved 
an IPO and 7% were merged or acquired (Library House, 2007). Survival studies are thus 
unlikely to adequately reflect USO firm performance in the UK. Alternative measures of firm 
performance as possible dependent variables are required for future studies such as the 
amount of funding (Clarysse et al., 2007), number of patents, firm growth related to 
revenue (Ensley and Hmieleski, 2005) or employment size (Zhang, 2009).  
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Table 11: Studies Exploring USO Firm Performance 
Author(s): Research Question(s): Theory (ies): Methodology: Dependent 
Variable(s): 
Sample Size and 
Context: 
Findings: 
Dahlstrand 
(1997) 
Do spin-offs grow faster 
than non-spin-off firms? 
Exploratory and 
descriptive study, 
no theories, no 
hypotheses 
tested 
Quantitative, coded 
interviews, 
descriptive 
statistics, OLS 
Regression 
Relative annual 
growth, Patents 
per year 
30 USOs, 30 start-ups, 
Sweden 
- 13% of USOs from Chalmers Institute Sweden) founded between 1960 
and 1993 failed by 1993. 
- Spin-offs were growing significantly faster than the non-spin-offs. 
However, no significant difference in the inventiveness was found 
between the two groups. 
- Neither the growth nor the inventiveness could be explained by pre-
spin-off variables, but it is speculated that the earlier employment 
within the spin-off parent has indirectly influenced the performance of 
the spin-off firms. 
Chiesa and 
Piccaluga (2000) 
What are the profiles, 
opportunities, obstacles 
of spin-off companies in 
Italy? 
Exploratory and 
descriptive study, 
no theories, no 
hypotheses 
tested 
Quantitative survey, 
descriptive 
statistics, demand-
side perspective 
Turnover, 
Number of 
employees 
48 USOs, Italy - Modest growth rates are reported. Average number of employees = 
32) 
- Barriers to growth are lack of resources regarding external investment 
e.g. VC), entrepreneurial and managerial 
AUTM (2001) How many USOs 
founded between 2 
Industry report Quantitative, 
descriptive statistics 
n/a 3,376 USOs, US - Out of 3,376 USOs founded between 1980 and 2000, 68% are still in 
business 2001. Higher than average new firm survival in the US. 
Ndonzuau et al. 
(2002) 
What are the issues in 
the creation of 
university spin-offs 
according to public and 
academic authorities? 
 
Theory building Qualitative, 
interviews with 
technology transfer 
related personnel at 
15 universities in 
different countries 
n/a 15 Universities 2x 
Finland, 1 x Sweden, 1 
x Netherlands, 2 x 
Belgium, 1 x France, 2 
x Israel, 4 x USA, 1 x 
Canada) 
- Four stages and related issues of USO development: 
- Stage 1: to generate business ideas from research; academic culture, 
internal identification). 
- Stage 2: to finalize new venture projects out of ideas protection and 
development of the idea, financing). 
- Stage 3: to launch spin-off firms from projects access to resources, 
relationship with university). 
- Stage 4: to strengthen the creation of economic value by spin-off firms 
relocation of risk, change trajectories). 
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Table 11 (Continued): Studies Exploring USO Firm Performance 
Author(s): Research Question(s): Theory (ies): Methodology: Dependent 
Variable(s): 
Sample Size and 
Context: 
Findings: 
Shane and Stuart 
(2002) 
How do initial resource 
endowments affect the 
performance of new 
ventures? 
 
Testing 
hypotheses 
whether resource 
endowments 
influence venture 
capital funding, 
IPO, and failure 
 
Quantitative study, 
event history 
analysis, interviews 
with founders and 
survey of R&D 
managers, demand-
side perspective 
VC investment; 
event of IPO; 
Survival 
134 USOs from MIT, 
US 
- Founder’s direct and indirect relationships with venture investors help 
new ventures to receive venture capital VC) funding and to avoid 
failure. 
- Founder team’s industry experience and patent effectiveness have 
positive effect on IPO, VC funding rate, and negative effect on failure. 
- Technology endowment increases the likelihood of IPO and decreases 
the likelihood of failure. 
Vohora et al. 
(2004) 
What phases and 
junctures characterize 
the development of 
USOs? 
Theory building Qualitative, 36 
interviews of four 
UK spin-outs, 
venture partners, 
representatives 
from the 
universities and 
venture capital 
firms 
n/a 4 USOs, UK 
 
- USOs go through five distinct phases of activity in their development: 
Research Phase, Opportunity framing Phase, Pre-Organisation Phase, 
Re-Orientation Phase, and Sustainable Returns Phase. 
- At the intersection between phases, USOs face “critical junctures” in 
terms of the resources and capabilities for the next phase. These four 
junctures are opportunity recognition, entrepreneurial commitment, 
credibility and sustainability. 
Ensley and 
Hmieleski (2005) 
What are differences 
between top 
management teams 
TMT) of university-
based and that of 
independent high-tech 
start-ups? 
Institutional 
Theory, Upper 
Echelon Theory, 
 
Quantitative, 
survey, OLS 
regression 
 
 
Net cash flow; 
Revenue growth 
217 managers from 
102 university start-
ups; 417 executives 
from 154 independent 
start-ups, US 
- TMTs of university start-ups are more homogenous and have less 
developed dynamics. 
- Link between TMT variables and firm performance is weaker in 
university start-ups than that in independent start-ups. 
- University start-ups have lower performance than independent high-
tech start-ups in terms of revenue growth and net cash flow. 
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Table 11 (Continued): Studies Exploring USO Firm Performance 
Author(s): Research Question(s): Theory (ies): Methodology: Dependent 
Variable(s): 
Sample Size and 
Context: 
Findings: 
Gompers et al. 
(2005) 
Do VC backed firms 
spawn more new firms? 
How effective are 
established firms in 
spawning new firms? 
Two views of the 
creation of 
venture-backed 
start-ups, or 
"entrepreneurial 
spawning." 
"Fairchild view": 
young firms 
prepare 
employees for 
entrepreneurship, 
educating them 
about the 
process, and 
exposing them to 
relevant 
networks. 'Xerox 
view": individuals 
become 
entrepreneurs 
when large 
bureaucratic 
employers do not 
fund their ideas. 
Quantitative, 
Secondary data, 
core data for the 
analysis come from 
VentureOne. 
Spawning Levels, 
spawning in 
technology 
industries 
Sample of 15,297 
founders of 5,112 
venture capital-
backed start-ups in 
the VentureOne data 
base of venture 
capital financing who 
received venture 
capital financing 
between 1986 and 
1999. 
- Controlling for firm size, patents, and industry, the most prolific 
spawners are originally venture-backed companies located in Silicon 
Valley and Massachusetts. 
- Undiversified firms spawn more firms. 
- Silicon Valley, Massachusetts, and originally venture-backed firms 
typically spawn firms only peripherally related to their core 
businesses. 
- Overall, entrepreneurial learning and networks appear important in 
creating venture-backed firms. 
Grandi and 
Grimaldi (2005) 
What organizational 
factors affecting the 
process through which 
new ventures are 
established by 
academics and are likely 
to affect their 
performance 
Theory building Quantitative survey, 
factor analysis of 
likert-scale 
response, OLS 
regression 
 
 
Articulation of 
business idea 
Market 
Attractiveness of 
business idea 
42 USOs, Italy - Attractiveness of business idea is positively influenced by the market 
orientation of the academic founders as well as their frequency of 
interaction with external agents. 
- Articulation of business idea is positively affected by the role-
articulation as well as prior joint experience of the academic founders. 
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Table 11 (Continued): Studies Exploring USO Firm Performance 
Author(s): Research Question(s): Theory (ies): Methodology: Dependent 
Variable(s): 
Sample Size and 
Context: 
Findings: 
Lockett and 
Wright (2005) 
What are the most 
important attributes of 
resource and 
capabilities of university 
and its technology 
transfer office TTO) in 
determining the 
creation of university 
spin-offs? 
RBV Quantitative, Mail 
questionnaire 
survey conducted 
over a 2-year 
period. Survey on 
university 
technology transfer 
activities 
comprising 
quantitative and 
qualitative 
questionnaires sent 
to the top 122 
universities in the 
UK as ranked by 
research income; 
poisson regression 
models 
The number of 
university spin-
outs; the 
number of 
equity 
investments in 
existing spin-
outs 
48 UK universities; 
Higher Education 
Statistics Agency, key 
informant: head of 
the technology 
transfer office 
- Both the number of spin-out companies created and the number of 
equity investments in existing spinouts are positively associated with 
university’s expenditure on external intellectual property protection, 
business development capabilities of TTO, and the royalty regime of 
the university. 
Lockett et al. 
(2005) 
What are the 
managerial and policy 
implications of the rise 
of spin-offs at public 
research institutions 
PRIs) based on the 
Knowledge Based View? 
RBV Conceptual n/a n/a - To understand the development of spin-offs, researchers should focus 
on knowledge gaps that spin-offs encounter. 
- Knowledge gaps can occur at various level of analysis e.g., individual, 
team, firm) and at various stages of venture development. 
Powers and 
McDougall (2005) 
Do particular resources 
predict performance of 
university technology 
transfer? 
RBV Quantitative, 
archival sources, 
Regression 
Number of USOs 
with IPO 
120 research intensive 
universities, US 
- The level of industry R&D funding, faculty quality, the age of the 
technology transfer office, and the level of VC investment in a 
university’s metropolitan statistical area are positive predictors of 
technology transfer performance: the number of start-ups and IPOs. 
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Table 11 (Continued): Studies Exploring USO Firm Performance 
Author(s): Research Question(s): Theory (ies): Methodology: Dependent 
Variable(s): 
Sample Size and 
Context: 
Findings: 
Rothaermel and 
Thursby (2005) 
How does the strength 
of the tie between the 
sponsoring university 
and incubator firms 
affect their life 
chances? 
Agency theory, 
Social Capital / 
Network Theory 
Quantitative, 
Multinomial logistic 
regression  
 
 
Failure, 
Remaining in 
incubator, 
Graduation from 
incubator 
79 USOs at Georgia 
Tech, US 
- Strong ties to the sponsoring university reduce the likelihood of firm 
failure because of the strong intellectual property protection, quality 
signalling effect, and involvement of potential investors. 
- Strong ties, however, retard graduation from the incubator. Weak ties, 
such as informal interaction with faculty, do not affect outright firm 
failure or timely graduation. 
Mosey et al. 
(2006) 
RQ1: What impact will 
commercialisation 
fellowships have upon 
academic attitudes 
towards the 
commercialisation of 
research? 
RQ2: What human and 
social capital will 
academics gain from 
commercialisation 
fellowships? 
RQ3: What impact will 
commercialisation 
fellowships have upon 
the interaction between 
academic and 
practitioner networks? 
 
 
Social Capital / 
Network Theory, 
theory building 
Qualitative, 
interviews semi-
structured open-
ended questions), 
triangulation with 
secondary data 
n/a six senior academics 
with direct experience 
of a number of 
commercialisation 
initiatives; six 
technology transfer 
staff members with 
direct responsibility 
for commercialisation 
within the host 
biomedical research 
schools and six Medici 
fellows from the first 
cohort of 20 fellows, 
UK 
 
- Fellowship programmes may have a positive impact on the 
commercialisation of research through the retraining of academics. 
- Fellows are able to act as agents of attitudinal change in their host 
departments and are seen to build bridges into external business 
networks that can provide early stage funding, market and legal 
information and help identify potential customers for nascent 
academic entrepreneurs through the enhancement of their social and 
human capital. 
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Table 11 (Continued): Studies Exploring USO Firm Performance 
Author(s): Research Question(s): Theory (ies): Methodology: Dependent 
Variable(s): 
Sample Size and 
Context: 
Findings: 
Walter et al. 
(2006) 
How does network 
capability (NC) and 
entrepreneurial 
orientation (EO) affect 
USO performance? 
Social Capital / 
Network Theory 
Quantitative, 
questionnaires, 
moderated 
hierarchical 
regression 
analyses 
 
Sales 
Growth; 
Sales per 
employee; 
Profit 
attainment; 
Perceived 
Customer 
relationship 
quality; 
Realized 
competitive 
advantages; 
Securing 
long-term 
survival 
149 USOs, (country of 
origin not disclosed) 
- Spin-off's performance is positively influenced by its network 
capability (NC), but spin-off's entrepreneurial orientation (EO) fosters 
competitive advantages. 
- Although no direct relationship is apparent between EO and sales 
growth, sales per employee, or profit attainment, moderated 
hierarchical regression analyses reveal that NC strengthens the 
relationship between EO and spin-off performance. 
- Spin-off's organizational propensities and processes that generally 
enhance innovation, constructive risk taking, and proactiveness in 
dealing with competitors per se do not enhance growth and secure 
long-term survival. 
- NC moderates the relationship between EO and organizational 
performance. 
Clarysse et al. 
(2007) 
Does the formal 
technology transfer 
from a public 
research organization 
PRO) influence the 
amount of capital a 
spin-off raises at start-
up, and does it increase 
in capital post start-up? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RBV, Pecking 
Order Theory 
Quantitative, OLS 
regression 
Capital raised 
within 18 
months of start-
up 
 
135 Spin-offs 40 x 
Belgium; 31 x 
Germany; 17 x France; 
29 x Italy; 28 x UK) 
- Spin-offs with formal technology transfer start with a larger amount of 
capital but subsequently do not raise more capital than spin-offs 
without formal technology transfer. 
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Table 11 (Continued): Studies Exploring USO Firm Performance 
Author(s): Research Question(s): Theory (ies): Methodology: Dependent 
Variable(s): 
Sample Size and 
Context: 
Findings: 
Library House 
(2007) 
What is the quality of 
USOs in the UK? 
n/a Industry report n/a 590 USOs until 2005, 
UK 
- Size and health of the UK spin-out portfolio suggests that public policy 
focus on translating research into business has been highly successful 
in reversing the UK’s historical weakness in this area. 
- UK universities are now producing spin-out companies of equivalent 
number and quality to some of the US’s top institutions. 
- Many of British USOs have achieved substantial valuations and the 
best promise to revolutionise key areas of the technology sector. 
- Anecdotal evidence suggests a mismatch between the availability of 
funding for technology transfer activity including proof of concept and 
seed funding, as well as funding for technology incubators and science 
parks) and research activity. This mismatch likely results from the 
inappropriate development and technology transfer agendas. 
- ‘The Super-Cluster Question’: the UK should aim to create a cluster of 
innovation-based businesses.. 
Rothaermel et al. 
(2007) 
What are the major 
themes of research in 
the literature on 
university 
entrepreneurship? 
Theory building Literature review of 
173 articles on 
USOs 
n/a n/a - The literature on university entrepreneurship is rapidly expanding, in 
both the United States and Europe but also fairly fragmented 
regarding the use of theories and choices of methodologies. 
-  Four major research streams emerge can be identified: 
i) The entrepreneurial research university. 
ii) Productivity of technology transfer offices. 
iii) New firm creation and development. 
iv) Environmental context and networks of innovation 
- The study of new firm creation addresses one of the most important 
questions in strategic management: Where do capabilities come 
from? 
- Need for multidisciplinary perspectives. 
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Table 11 (Continued): Studies Exploring USO Firm Performance 
Author(s): Research Question(s): Theory (ies): Methodology: Dependent 
Variable(s): 
Sample Size and 
Context: 
Findings: 
Stam and 
Garnsey (2007) 
What determines the 
emergence and growth 
of new firms in the 
knowledge based 
economy? 
n/a Literature review n/a Conceptual - Paper provides an overview of studies about scientific and 
technological knowledge as a source of business opportunities, and on 
the emergence and growth of new firms in the knowledge economy. 
- New knowledge in science and technology is an important and 
localized source of entrepreneurial opportunities. However, public and 
corporate sector players do not necessarily commercialize this 
knowledge because they lack the vision or incentives. 
- Corporate spin-offs are more likely to turn into these high growth 
firms than university spin-offs. 
- Empirical studies on new firm growth show that high levels of human, 
social and financial capital facilitate the growth of new business. 
- Direct and indirect government support is crucial to the growth of new 
technology-based firms and thus differs across countries 
Colombo and 
Piva (2008) 
What are the strengths 
and weaknesses of 
academic start-ups 
(ASUs) and other new 
technology-based firms 
NTBFs)? 
RBV Qualitative 
evidence from four 
theory-building case 
studies interviewing 
founders of four 
USOs 
n/a 4 USOs, Italy - ASUs' major relative strengths reside in the lower initial funding gap 
and greater investments in technical activities. 
- ASUs' major weakness consists of the lack of commercial knowledge: 
ASUs suffer from greater initial gaps in this field and encounter serious 
obstacles in implementing effective strategies to close them. 
- ASUs' choices as to the characteristics of external investors and 
alliance partners, and the organisation of the relations with them are 
influenced by the desire to mitigate appropriability hazards. 
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Table 11 (Continued): Studies Exploring USO Firm Performance 
Author(s): Research Question(s): Theory (ies): Methodology: Dependent 
Variable(s): 
Sample Size and 
Context: 
Findings: 
Djokovic and 
Souitaris (2008) 
What are the major 
themes and theories in 
the academic literature 
on spinouts from 
academic institutions? 
n/a Literature review n/a 63 papers on spinouts - Early literature has been mainly atheoretical and focused on 
describing the phenomenon. 
- Prominent theories: Network theory, evolutionary theory, resource 
based theory RBV), organisational theory 
- The phenomenon has been studied from different points of view 
policy level, firm level, individual level). 
- Macro- phenomenological studies focused on the effectiveness of 
spinning out as technology transfer mechanism and on spinout-
support mechanisms from industry, government and university. 
- Micro-phenomenological studies focused on human relations and 
interactions during the spinout formation process and on spinout links 
with university and industry. 
- More theory driven research required. 
O'Shea et al. 
(2008) 
Which research streams 
are prominent in the 
current literature on 
USO activities? 
Theory building Literature review of   
articles on USOs 
n/a n/a - Literature on USO performance is still in an emerging state. 
- More firm-level studies are required to identify factors leading to firm 
performance. 
Zhang (2009) What are the 
characteristics of VC 
funded USOs and do 
they perform differently 
compared to other 
firms? 
Signalling Theory Quantitative, 
Multivariate 
regression OLS, 
Logit), secondary 
data 
 
Amount of VC in 
a single round of 
financing; Total 
amount of VC; 
whether a start-
up has survived, 
has completed 
an IPO, profit; 
Employment 
size 
3,633 11% USOs), US - Venture-backed university spin-offs are concentrated in the 
biotechnology and information technology industries.  
- Spin-off tends to stay close to the university, suggesting that 
technology transfer through spin-offs is largely a local phenomenon. 
- Multivariate regression analyses show that university spin-offs have a 
higher survival rate but are not significantly different from other start-
ups in terms of the amount of venture capital raised, the probability of 
completing an initial public offering IPO), the probability of making a 
profit, or the size of employment. 
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Independent variables capturing factors affecting firm performance also vary across 
the studies presented in Table 11. There is some evidence that founders’ capabilities related 
to their education (Mosey and Wright, 2007) and managerial experience positively influence 
survival and growth of USOs (Chiesa and Piccaluga, 2000) as well as the event of achieving 
an IPO (Shane and Stuart, 2002; Powers and McDougall, 2005). Entrepreneurially 
experienced academic entrepreneurs may also increase their firms’ performance in 
accessing networks which helps them to attract financial investment and business partners 
(Mosey et al., 2006; Mosey and Wright, 2007). Firm growth can be attributed to more 
heterogeneous and experienced founding teams (Ensley and Hmieleski, 2005). 
In addition to founders’ characteristics, firms’ internal resources may also influence 
performance. Inter-firm networks in the form of strategic alliances (Walter et al., 2006). And 
effective network ties to VC investors can contribute to survival (Rothaermel and Thursby, 
2005). Patents and their effectiveness may also determine firm performance (Shane and 
Stuart, 2002). Firm performance is also associated with USOs’ ability to attract financial 
resources and VC investment in particular (Wright et al., 2006; Clarysse et al., 2007).  
The strength of the above studies is to identify a range of internal resources 
including the units of analysis of founders and their firms which can be attributed to firm 
performance. The individual findings of these resource-specific studies as shown in Table 11 
need yet to be integrated in a theoretical framework in order to derive hypotheses. These 
should than be empirically tested in by multivariate analyses to assess their relative 
importance in exploring research questions on what factors drive USO firm performance. 
An further gap in the knowledge base is that the role of VC investment on USO firm 
performance has only been conceptually discussed (Chiesa and Piccaluga, 2000) and not 
sufficiently empirically tested. VC investment is often only associated with the event of 
USOs achieving IPOs (Shane and Stuart, 2002; Zhang, 2009), but there is little empirical 
evidence on other performance indicators like employment growth. More research is 
required to identify whether VC funded USOs are successful because of the quality of their 
initial internal resources or if the financial investment and business expertise of VC investors 
makes a significant difference to firm performance. This gap can be addressed if samples of 
cross-sectional or panel data are used which contain statistics on USOs with and without VC 
investment. In order to address the identified gaps in the knowledge base the following 
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section replicates, integrates and extends theoretical insights related to firm performance. A 
joint theoretical framework is developed from which hypotheses can be derived. 
 
 
2.6 Theoretical Insights: Firm Performance 
2.6.1 Drivers of Firm Performance: External vs. Internal Factors 
 
This section discusses external and internal factors that can impact on firm 
performance. Two theoretical perspectives are contrasted. Organisational ecology relates to 
the importance of external factors and the RBV of the firm relates to the importance of 
internal factors, respectively. Thereafter, it discussed to what extent the attraction of VC 
investment as an additional resource relates to superior firm performance. 
Studies focusing on the relation of external factors to firm performance are summarized 
in Table 12. Organizational ecology theorists suggest that external environmental conditions 
shape the survival of new firms (Stinchcombe, 1965). Consequently, most studies in Table 12 
analyse the survival patterns within population of firms. They find that firms which are 
located in saturated market niches are associated with growing competition for limited 
resources (Freeman et al., 1983; Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Only firms with larger 
resource pools are thus likely to have higher survival chances (Audretsch, 1991).  
Conversely, young firms with insufficient resources and a lack of legitimacy on the 
market place are more likely to go out of business. The resulting pattern of firm survival is 
referred to as a ‘liability of newness’ which is attributed to young firms’ inability to cope 
with their external environment (Freeman et al., 1983). However, although there is evidence 
that external factors influence firm survival and performance it can also be observed that 
firms are able to adapt to their environment. In order to successfully adapt, new firms need 
to find an audience (e.g. customers, suppliers, alliances or business partners) which 
recognize their legitimacy in their market niche (Hannan et al., 2007).  
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Table 12: Firm Performance: Organisational Ecology Studies 
Author(s) Research question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent 
variable(s) 
Sample size and 
context 
Findings 
(Stinchcom
be, 1965) 
How do social structures imprint new 
organisational forms and why may new 
firms suffer from a liability of newness? 
Organisational 
Ecology 
Conceptual n/a n/a - Organisational analysis requires to systematically uncover the 
relations between society outside organisations with the internal life 
of organisations. 
- Organisational dynamics can be related to societal values, power 
structures and features of stratification. 
- Social structures comprise groups, institutions, laws, population 
characteristics, and sets of social relations that form environments of 
the organisation. 
Freeman 
et al. 
(1983) 
Do new firms suffer from a ‘liability of 
newness’? 
Organisational 
Ecology 
Quantitative, 
survival 
analysis, 
secondary data 
Survival, 
merger/ 
absorption 
Semi-conductor: 
1159 firms, US, 
1951 to 1979; 
American Local 
Newspaper 
Organizations: 
2,768, US, 1800 to 
1975; Labour 
Unions: 476, US, 
1860-1983 
- Age dependence in organizational death rates is studied using data 
on three populations of organizations: national labour unions, 
semiconductor electronics manufacturers, and newspaper publishing 
companies. 
- Both dissolution rates and merger-absorption rates vary by age for 
labour unions and newspaper firms, the pat- tern of age variation 
differs for the two kinds of organizations. 
- Liability of newness is more intense for the process of dissolution 
than for the merger-absorption process. For labour unions, the 
reverse is true.  
- Liabilities of smallness and bigness are also identified but controlling 
for them does not eliminate age dependence. 
(Hannan 
and 
Freeman, 
1984) 
What is the meaning of structural inertia? Organisational 
Ecology 
Conceptual n/a n/a - High levels of structural inertia are a consequence of a selection 
process rather than a precondition for selection. 
- Inertial forces vary with firms’ age, size and complexity. 
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Table 12 (Continued): Firm Performance: Organisational Ecology Studies 
Author(s) Research question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent 
variable(s) 
Sample size and 
context 
Findings 
Audretsch 
(1991) 
Do the technological regime and sector 
differences influence firm survival? 
Organisational 
Ecology 
Quantitative, 
secondary data 
Survival 11000 firms, 
manufacturing 
industries, US 
- New-firm survival is promoted by the extent of small-firm innovative 
activity. 
- The existence of substantial scale economies and a high capital-
labour ratio lowers the likelihood of firm survival. 
- Results vary considerably with time intervals. 
- Market concentration promotes short-run survival, but has no impact 
on long-run survival. 
(Hannan et 
al., 2007) 
How can the research on population 
ecology be integrated in a new sound 
theoretical framework? 
Organisational 
Ecology 
Conceptual n/a n/a - Ecology analysis requires new methods including non-monotonic and 
fuzzy logics to integrate notions of codes, clusters, labels, grades of 
memberships, types and categories describing organisations and 
implications on their interaction with their environment in order to 
revisit the argument for age dependency of their survival. 
- Audiences determine clusters and organisational forms. 
Hsu et al. 
(2008) 
How can typecasting and form emergence 
be integrated in a unified framework? 
Organisational 
Ecology 
Conceptual n/a n/a - Typecasting is a producer-level theory that considers the 
consequences producers face for specializing versus spanning across 
category boundaries. 
- Form emergence considers the evolution of categories and how the 
attributes of producers entering a category shapes its likelihood of 
gaining legitimacy among relevant audiences. 
- Both theory fragments emerge from the processes audiences use to 
assign category memberships to producers. 
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This argument is further developed by Hsu et al. (2008) who suggest that firms can 
successfully adapt to their environment if their internal characteristics meet the 
expectations and categories of their external audience and lead to legitimacy on the market 
place. This process shows a close resemblance to the earlier discussed signalling theory by 
Spence in Section 2.3.74. This argument shows that there is a constant interplay between 
external and internal factors which shape firms’ ability to adapt to their environment and 
relate to performance. 
The survival and performance of new firms can be shaped by several themes linked to 
internal factors of the entrepreneur and the firm (Storey, 1994). In addition to their initial 
resources, entrepreneurs can adapt to their environment if they acquire and leverage 
additional resources to ensure firm development. As discussed in Section 2.3.2, theorists of 
the RBV of the firm suggest that firms which acquire and leverage resources that are rare 
and non-imitable can obtain a sustained competitive advantage. The resource profile of firm 
and the entrepreneur can be associated with business performance, too. The themes of 
internal resources were already presented in Sections 2.3.3 to 2.3.6. Studies on internal 
factors and firm performance in Table 13 reflect these themes accordingly. Entrepreneurs 
general (Cooper et al., 1994; Gimeno et al., 1997) and specific human capital (Stam and 
Garnsey, 2007) as well as a firms networks (Stuart, 2000; Florin et al., 2003), intellectual 
capital (Garcia-Muina and Navas-Lopez, 2007) and financial resource profile (Westhead and 
Storey, 1997) have been found to be associated with superior firm performance. The next 
section shows how the attraction of VC investment can as an additional resource help new 
firms adapting to their environment and lead to superior firm performance. 
                                                            
4 I thank Mike Hannan and Glenn Carroll for discussing similarities between mechanism of how an audience 
provides legitimacy to firms in organisational ecology and the implications of signalling theory that costly 
resources can send signals of quality to an external party in their annual seminar in Durham in December 2008. 
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Table 13: Firm Performance: Resource-Based View of the Firm, Human Capital and Social Capital Studies  
Author(s) Research question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent 
variable(s) 
Sample size and 
context 
Findings 
Cooper et 
al. (1994) 
Can indicators of initial human and 
financial capital which are observed at the 
time of start-up predict the performance 
of new firms? 
RBV Quantitative, 
longitudinal, 
Discriminant 
Analysis, 
Logistic 
Regression, 
Multi-nominal 
logistic 
regression 
(1) failure, (2) 
marginal 
survival, or (3) 
high growth 
1053 new 
ventures, 
representative of 
all industry 
sectors and 
geographical 
regions, US 
- Measures of general human capital influenced both survival and 
growth (except for gender, with women-owned ventures being less 
likely to grow, but just as likely to survive). Management know-how 
variables had more limited impact. 
- Having parents who had owned a business contributed to marginal 
survival, but not to growth. 
- Number of partners contributed to growth but not to survival. 
- Management level, prior employment in non-profit organizations or 
not having been in the labour force, and the use of professional 
advisors did not have significant effects. Industry-specific know-how 
contributed to both survival and growth. The amount of initial 
financial capital also contributed to both. 
- Using a model based upon the initial human and financial capital of 
the venture, it is possible to predict the performance of new 
ventures with some degree of confidence. 
Brüderl et 
al. (1992) 
Does human capital of firms influence 
business survival? 
Human Capital 
Theory 
Quantitative, 
survival analysis 
Survival 1,849 business 
founders in 
Germany 
- Organizational characteristics, especially number of employees and 
amount of capital invested, and organizational strategies, especially 
businesses aiming at a national market, are the most important 
determinants of business survival. 
- The human capital characteristics of the founder, especially years of 
schooling and work experience and industry-specific experience, 
show strong direct and indirect effects as well. 
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Table 13 (Continued): Firm Performance: Resource-Based View of the Firm, Human Capital and Social Capital Studies 
Author(s) Research question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent 
variable(s) 
Sample size and 
context 
Findings 
Westhead 
and Storey 
(1997) 
Do problems with access to finance 
restrict the growth of the firm at any 
stage? 
 
RBV Quantitative, 
interview 
survey, logistic 
regression 
Problems with 
access to 
finance at any 
stage (yes, no); 
Problems with 
access to 
finance at any 
stage (0 = no; 1 
= yes, 
continually) 
 
188 independent 
high technology 
manufacturing 
and service firms 
located on and off 
science parks, UK 
 
- Firms obtaining income from manufactured products were much 
more likely to report a continual constraint, presumably because the 
sums they wish to borrow are greater than those of similar 
businesses in the services sector. 
- Irrespective of our measure of technological sophistication, 
technologically sophisticated high technology firms were more likely 
to report the presence of a continual financial constraint than 
generally less technologically sophisticated high technology firms. 
- Younger firms and limited companies are more likely to report having 
experienced continual financial constraints. 
- Among high technology small firms, those with the most 
sophisticated technologies are the most likely to report continual 
financial constraints on the development of their business. Given 
that these firms are also the most likely to make a major economic 
contribution, it provides support for the view that market 
imperfections characterize the supply of finance in this market-place. 
Gimeno et 
al. (1997) 
Why do some firms survive while other 
firms with equal economic performance 
do not?  
Human Capital 
Theory 
Quantitative, 
Questionnaire,  
Exit decision of 
firm; amount of 
money 
withdrawn by 
entrepreneur 
 
1,547 
entrepreneurs of 
new businesses 
,U.S 
 
- Organizational survival is not strictly a function of economic 
performance but also depends on a firm's own threshold of 
performance. 
- The threshold is determined by the entrepreneur's human capital 
characteristics, such as alternative employment opportunities, 
psychic income from entrepreneurship, and cost of switching to 
other occupations. 
- Strong support for the model by findings which suggest that firms 
with low thresholds may choose to continue or survive despite 
comparatively low performance. 
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Table 13 (Continued): Firm Performance: Resource-Based View of the Firm, Human Capital and Social Capital Studies 
Author(s) Research question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent 
variable(s) 
Sample size and 
context 
Findings 
Stuart et 
al. (1999) 
How do inte-rorganizational networks of 
young companies affect their ability to 
acquire the resources necessary for 
survival and growth? 
Social Capital / 
Network Theory 
Quantitative, 
OLS regression 
Market value of 
a firm at IPO 
301 VC backed 
biotechnology 
start-ups, US 
- VC backed and privately held biotechnology firms with prominent 
strategic alliance partners and organizational equity investors go to 
IPO faster and earn greater valuations at IPO than firms that lack 
such connections. 
-  Much of the benefit of having prominent affiliates stems from the 
transfer of status that is an inherent by-product of 
interorganizational associations.  
Stuart 
(2000) 
What is the relationship between inter-
corporate technology alliances and firm 
performance? 
Social Capital / 
Network Theory 
Quantitative, 
Poisson 
Regression, OLS 
Regression 
Patent rate, 
Sales growth 
150 
semiconductor 
start-ups, US 
- Alliances are access relationships, and therefore that the advantages 
which a focal firm derives from a portfolio of strategic coalitions 
depend upon the resource profiles of its alliance partners. 
- Alliances are both pathways for the exchange of resources and 
signals that convey social status and recognition. 
- Findings from models of sales growth and innovation rates in a large 
sample of semiconductor producers confirm that organizations with 
large and innovative alliance partners perform better than otherwise 
comparable firms that lack such partners. 
- Consistent with the status-transfer arguments, young and small firms 
benefit more from large and innovative strategic alliance partners 
than do old and large organizations. 
Florin et 
al., 2003 
How do human and social capital affect a 
venture’s ability to accumulate financial 
capital during its growth stages, and then 
leading to an IPO? 
Social Capital / 
Network Theory 
Quantitative, 
Secondary Data, 
Three-step 
moderated 
hierarchical 
regression 
analyses 
Financial 
Capital, Sales 
Growth, Return 
on Sales 
275 ventures that 
went public, US 
- The relationships between human resources and performance, and 
between financial capital and performance, both vary with the level 
of social resources. Social resources leverage the productivity of a 
venture's resource base. 
- Environmental conditions and geographic conditions did not affect 
the observed pattern of relationships. 
94 
 
Table 13 (Continued): Firm Performance: Resource-Based View of the Firm, Human Capital and Social Capital Studies 
Author(s) Research question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent 
variable(s) 
Sample size and 
context 
Findings 
Garcia-
Muina and 
Navas-
Lopez 
(2007) 
What is the relationship between 
technological capabilities and firm 
success? 
RBV Quantitative, 
survey, 
secondary data, 
univariate 
n/a 30 biotechnology 
firms, Spain 
- Technological activities oriented to knowledge exploration processes 
have more potential than those technological capabilities focused on 
the mere maintenance of a certain competitive advantage. 
- Results support criticism of certain generally accepted strategic 
resource evaluation criteria and the need to adopt a contingent view 
to the study of such issues. 
Stam and 
Garnsey 
(2007) 
What determines the emergence and 
growth of new firms in the knowledge 
based economy? 
n/a Literature 
review 
n/a Conceptual - Corporate spin-offs are more likely to turn into these high growth 
firms than university spin-offs. 
- A review of 9 empirical studies between 1994 and 2006 on new firm 
growth measured in change in employment shows that high levels of 
human, social and financial capital are enabling endowments, 
facilitate the growth of new business. 
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2.6.2 Firm Performance: VC Investment 
 
As highlighted in Section 2.6.1, a firm’s ability to acquire additional resources can shape 
firm development. Table 14 summarizes studies that have explored the link between the 
take-up of VC finance and superior business performance. Hellman and Puri (2002) show 
that VC-financed firms have superior business performance due to the business expertise of 
VC investors in addition to the financial resources provided. 
VC investors use control rights over their investees to choose experienced CEOs and 
built qualified management teams which enhance firm performance. Davila et al. (2003) find 
that the presence of VC investors attracts further resources including the human capital of 
employees, additional financing rounds and increase the value of the firm. Therefore, VC 
investment can have a positive multiplication effect on firm performance due to further 
extending the resource base (Busenitz et al., 2005; Hsu, 2007). 
It is reasonable to assume that firms with first VC investment will generally report 
superior levels of performance than firms with no VC finance to leverage. However, more 
research is required to identify whether differences among VC investors is reflected in firm 
performance. Whether investees’ performance can also be subject to their VC investors’ 
degree of sector specialisation (Knockaert et al., 2006), status or reputation (Chang, 2004). 
 
2.6.3 Themes of Resources Linked to Firm Performance 
 
Firm performance is linked to external and internal environmental factors. This study 
specifically focuses on USO performance with regard to the internal factors relating to the 
resources profiles of USOs and entrepreneurs. Private VC firms located in the external 
environment can provide additional financial and business expertise resources to supported 
firms. Only USOs that signal quality through their firm and entrepreneur resource profiles 
can obtain private sector VC investment. This study also explores whether USOs that have 
obtained first VC investment report superior levels of firm performance relative to USOs 
that have not obtained VC investment.   
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Table 14: Firm Performance: VC Investment 
Author(s) Research question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent 
variable(s) 
Sample size and 
context 
Findings 
Rosenstein 
et al. 
(1993) 
To what extent venture capitalists add 
value besides money to their portfolio 
companies? 
RBV Quantitative, 
survey, 
descriptive 
statistics 
n/a 162 venture-
capital-backed 
high-tech firms 
located in 
California, 
Massachusetts, 
and Texas, US 
- CEOs did not rate the value of the advice of venture capitalists any 
higher than that of other board members. However, those CEOs with 
a top-20 VC firm as the lead investor, on average, did rate the value 
of the advice from their venture capital board members significantly 
higher -but not outstandingly higher- than the advice from other 
outside board members. 
- CEOs with no top-20 as the lead investor found no significant 
difference between the value of the advice from venture capitalists 
and other outside board members. 
- There was a noticeable difference in the value of value-added by top-
20 boards and non-top-20 boards. The areas where CEOs rated 
outside board members (both venture capitalists and others) most 
helpful were as a sounding board, interfacing with the investor 
group, monitoring operating performance, monitoring financial 
performance, recruiting/replacing the CEO, and assistance with 
short-term crisis. That help was rated higher for early-stage than 
later-stage companies. 
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Table 14 (Continued): Firm Performance: VC Investment 
Author(s) Research question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent variable(s) Sample size and context Findings 
Hellmann 
and Puri 
(2002) 
Do VC investors play a role beyond 
traditional intermediaries such as 
professionalising start-ups with additional 
human resources? 
Financial 
intermediation 
theory, Human 
capital 
Quantitative, 
hand-collected 
data set of 
start-ups in 
Silicon Valley 
culled from a 
combination of 
survey data, 
interviews, and 
commercial 
data bases as 
well as publicly 
available data, 
secondary data 
triangulation 
 
-Firm uses business and 
professional contacts to 
recruit sales and marketing 
personnel 
-Firm’s venture capitalists 
or other financiers 
influence in shaping 
human resource 
management 
-Time from the birth of a 
company to the date of 
implementing a stock 
option plan 
-Time from the birth of a 
company to the first date 
of appointing a Vice 
President of sales and 
marketing. 
-Firm hired an outside CEO 
-Time from the birth of the 
company to the date of 
arrival of the first outside 
CEO. 
 
 
 
Stratified random 
sample with firms no 
older than 10 years and 
more than 10 employees 
173 start-up companies 
that are located in 
California’s Silicon Valley 
 
- Obtaining venture capital is related to a variety of 
organizational milestones, such as the formulation 
of human resource policies, the adoption of stock 
option plans, or the hiring of a VP of sales and 
marketing. 
- Firms with venture capital are also more likely and 
faster to replace the founder with an outsider in the 
position of the CEO. Interestingly, however, 
founders often remain with the company, even 
after the CEO transition. 
- The effect of venture capital is also particularly 
pronounced in the early stages of a company’s 
development. 
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Table 14 (Continued): Firm Performance: VC Investment 
Author(s) Research question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent 
variable(s) 
Sample size and 
context 
Findings 
Davila et 
al. (2003) 
Is there an association between the 
presence of VC investment and the 
employee growth of start-ups? 
Signalling 
Theory 
Quantitative,  
Rank regression 
Growth 
measured in 
employment 
change 
494 start-ups, US - The presence of VC investors attracts potential employees despite 
significant information asymmetry because of the lack of public 
information about start-ups. 
- Growth is not a predictor of receiving venture funding in the future. 
- Positive association between headcount growth and value creation. 
While headcount growth is an important measure of growth in itself, 
this evidence has a positive association valuing start-up companies. 
- VC may not only act as a source of financial resources, but as a 
powerful mechanism to communicate the quality of a start-up. 
Stuart and 
Sorenson 
(2003) 
Do the same factors that enable high tech 
entrepreneurship also promote firm 
performance? 
 
Social Capital / 
Network Theory 
Quantitative, 
Event history 
analysis 
Hazard of IPO 
 
399 venture-
backed biotech 
start-ups, US 
 
- Industries cluster are important because entrepreneurs find it 
difficult to leverage the social ties necessary to mobilize essential 
resources when they reside far from those resources. 
- Opportunities for high tech entrepreneurship mirror the distribution 
of critical resources. 
- The same factors that enable high tech entrepreneurship, however, 
do not necessary promote firm performance. 
- Local conditions like sources of biotechnology expertise (highly-
skilled labour), and venture capitalists on the location-specific 
founding rates and performance of biotechnology firms which 
promote new venture creation differ from those that maximize the 
performance of recently established companies. 
- Areas with large populations of biotech and VC firms have a ‘regional 
advantage’; such areas experience the highest rates of biotechnology 
entrepreneurship. However, they show on average a lower likelihood 
of IPO. 
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Table 14 (Continued): Firm Performance: VC Investment 
Author(s) Research question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent 
variable(s) 
Sample size and 
context 
Findings 
Chang 
(2004) 
How do Internet start-ups’ venture capital 
financing and strategic alliances affect 
these start-ups’ ability to acquire the 
resources necessary for growth? 
Organisational 
Ecology, Social 
Capital / 
Network Theory 
Quantitative, 
secondary data, 
proportional 
hazard model 
(Cox 
Regression) 
Time to the 
event of initial 
public offering 
(IPO) 
1106 Internet 
Start-Ups 
between 1994 
and 2000 of which 
90 achieved an 
IPO, US 
- Three factors positively influenced a start-up’s time to IPO: 
- The better the reputations of participating venture capital firms and 
strategic alliance partners were, the more money a start-up raised, 
and the larger was the size of a start-up’s network of strategic 
alliances. 
Baum and 
Silverman 
(2004) 
Do VC investors ‘pick winners’ or ‘build 
winners’ when making investments in 
high tech start-ups? 
Signalling 
Theory, Human 
Capital Theory 
Quantitative, 
secondary data, 
panel data time 
series 
Amount of pre-
IPO financing; 
year over 
revenue; R&D 
spending 
growth; 
number of 
annual patent 
applications; 
number of 
annual patents 
granted 
 
204 Biotech start-
ups, Canada 
 
- VCs finance start-ups that have strong technology, but are at risk of 
failure in the short run, and so in need of management expertise. 
- VCs also appear to make a common attribution error 
overemphasizing start-ups’ human capital when making their 
investment decisions. 
Busenitz et 
al. (2005) 
Do signal of wealth and experience of 
founding team serve as credible signals of 
the future value of a venture? 
 
Signalling 
Theory (VC 
Market and 
demand-side 
perspective) 
Quantitative, 
Event history 
analysis (Cox 
regression) 
(1) out-of-
business, (2) 
still-private, (3) 
merged or 
acquired, and 
(4) IPOs 
 
183 VC-backed 
ventures, US 
- Neither signals of value (percentage of equity held by founding team) 
nor signals of commitment (percentage of individual wealth invested 
by the founding team in their firm) have positive relationship with 
survival, M&A or IPOs. 
- Founding team’s experience with VC has no influence on 
performance. 
- Founding teams’ entrepreneurial experience has no strong influence 
on performance. 
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Table 14 (Continued): Firm Performance: VC Investment 
Author(s) Research question(s) Theory (ies) Methodology Dependent 
variable(s) 
Sample size and 
context 
Findings 
Niosi and 
Banik 
(2005) 
What drives the performance of 
biotechnology start-ups? 
Social Capital / 
Network Theory 
Quantitative, 
descriptive 
Statistics 
n/a 90 quoted bio-
technology start-ups 
(including 31 USOs), 
Canada 
- Venture capital works best when there is an active equity market 
which allows investors to exit by selling their shares. 
- Companies in the three large Canadian cities (Montreal, Toronto 
and Vancouver) performed better than companies outside clusters: 
Advantages seem to be related to the availability of venture capital 
and being located in a region (i.e., province in this case). 
- Even though other start-ups and spin-offs may have less direct 
access to knowledge and technology from universities, they 
apparently have other linkages that make up for this shortcoming 
and sustain growth. 
- USOs show high smaller average employment growth rate (19%) 
than other start-ups (84%). USOs achieve on average an IPO after 
4.8 years with an average amount of $12.2 million compared to 
other start-ups which take on average 7.2 years to achieve an IPO 
with an average amount of $14.6 million. 
Knockaert 
et al. 
(2006) 
Is there a relationship between the 
human capital and fund characteristics of 
venture capitalists and post-investment 
follow-up behaviour in early stage high-
tech investments? 
Human Capital 
Theory 
Quantitative, 
semi-structured 
interviews, 
Summated 
scale on 
Involvement in 
monitoring and 
value-adding 
activities 
 
Stratified sample of 
68 VC firms from 
seven regions 
(Cambridge/London 
(UK), Ile de France 
(France), Flanders 
(Belgium), North 
Holland (the 
Netherlands), 
Bavaria (Germany), 
Stockholm 
(Sweden), Helsinki 
(Finland)) 
- No indication that involvement in monitoring activities by the 
investment manager is determined by either fund or human capital 
characteristics. 
- Human capital variables were the most important: VC investors 
with previous consulting experience and entrepreneurial 
experience contribute to a higher involvement in value-adding 
activities. 
- The diversity of an investment manager's portfolio was negatively 
related to involvement in value-adding activities. 
- Investment managers of captive funds were less involved in value-
adding activities. 
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Drawing upon evidence from firm performance studies, Figure 14 shows that six 
themes are assumed to be associated with USO performance in 2008. The themes relate to 
entrepreneur general and specific human capital as well as firm networks, intellectual 
capital, financial resources and VC investment. Hypotheses are derived from this framework 
in the following section. 
 
Figure 14: Themes of Resources Linked to Firm Performance (Research Question 2) 
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2.7 Hypotheses Derivation: USO Firm Performance 
2.7.1 Overview 
 
Figure 15 shows the earlier identified themes of initial resource endowments of USOs 
including VC Investment. Hypotheses regarding relationships between these independent 
variables and dependent variables of firm performance are derived from this framework. 
Figure 15: Overview of Hypotheses on USO Firm Performance (Research Question 2) 
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2.7.2 General Human Capital 
 
The first resource shown in Figure 15 relates to the general human capital of USOs’ 
founders. More mature founders of firms are likely to have more knowledge and experience 
to identify and exploit business opportunities. They also have an advantage in securing 
additional resources. For instance, they will more likely succeed in convincing banks and 
investors to attract further finance to grow and maximise the performance of their firms 
(Astebro and Bernhardt, 2005). More mature entrepreneurs often have a higher level of 
education, problem solving skills and work experience which are beneficial to build up 
young firms and to enhance their performance (Brüderl et al., 1992; Cooper et al., 1994).  
In the context of USOs, older and more experienced academic entrepreneurs are likely 
to have an advantage in assessing the feasibility of new business ideas depending on their 
technology cycle and time-to-market expectations. This experience allows them to better 
assess the strengths and weaknesses of the IP which is commercially exploited in the USO. In 
consequence, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
Hypothesis 11: USOs with older founders will report superior firm performance. 
 
Academic entrepreneurs with a higher academic status can have an advantage in 
attracting additional resources to enhance their firms’ performance. Academic 
entrepreneurs who are professors can use their own reputation to attract further resources 
for their firms. Moreover, a senior academic position equips academic entrepreneurs with 
experience in managing research teams, applying for grants or conducting feasibility studies 
which are crucial skills in building up a new firm (Birley, 2002). These broad experiences are 
highly applicable and transferable in the early stages of successfully building a new venture 
and leading it to superior firm performance. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is 
suggested: 
Hypothesis 12: USOs with founders with higher levels of academic reputation will report   
  superior firm performance. 
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2.7.3 Specific Human Capital 
 
The second resource shown in Figure 15 relates to the specific human capital of USOs’ 
founders. Experienced entrepreneurs can apply their knowledge from previous businesses 
to manage the growth of new firms. Their experience facilitates building and extending the 
required resource base in order to enhance their new firms’ performance. For instance 
Florin et al (2003) suggest that habitual entrepreneurs are more successful in attracting 
additional financial resources for their firms because of their social capital. Experienced 
entrepreneurs are also often more successful in attracting VC investors as well as in 
achieving higher valuations for their firms (Hsu, 2007). 
In the context of academic entrepreneurs, Mosey and Wright (2007) suggest that less 
experienced academic entrepreneurs are disadvantaged due to a lack of effective network 
ties to attract further resources required to grow their USOs. Experienced academic 
entrepreneurs consequently benefit from their social networks in attracting business 
partners and build relationships with experienced managers and equity investors which 
should be positively associated with firm performance. Accordingly, the following 
hypothesis is derived: 
Hypothesis 13: USOs with experienced entrepreneurs will report superior firm  
                                  performance. 
 
The specific human capital of the founding team is an additional resource which can 
lead to superior firm performance. In particular, if teams can cover a wider of range of 
specific skills, expertise and experience than individual founders (Beckman, 2006). 
In the context of USOs, founding teams with a wide range of experiences, capabilities 
and skills are better equipped to develop and exploit new business ideas (Grandi and 
Grimaldi, 2003). They are more likely to overcome resource constraints of managerial 
expertise and financial resources needed for the development and superior performance of 
USOs. Beckmann et al. (2007) show that especially young high-technology firms with diverse 
founding teams have a positive influence on firm performance. Additionally, the availability 
of previous entrepreneurial experience on founding teams can help to overcome barriers to 
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firm performance such as completing product development, marketing and attracting 
additional resources (Delmar and Shane, 2004). Thus, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
Hypothesis 14: USOs with an experienced founding team will report superior firm  
        performance. 
 
2.7.4 Networks 
 
The third resource shown in Figure 15 relates to USOs’ networks. Networks can help to 
secure sought-after additional resources which are required to improve the performance of 
new firms, but not easily obtainable on the market place (Shane and Cable, 2002; Stuart and 
Sorenson, 2003). For instance, USOs can benefit from the exclusive networks of their 
university of origin to access further financing and business expertise which can ultimately 
enhance their firm performance (Grandi and Grimaldi, 2005). These networks enable a 
beneficial interplay with the business environment and shape entrepreneurial behaviour 
which ultimately generate superior firm performance if this resource is effectively used (De 
Carolis and Saparito, 2006). Therefore, the following hypothesis is derived: 
Hypothesis 15: USOs from universities that have a strong network of previously VC   
         funded USOs will report superior firm performance. 
  
Alliances have a range of advantages which are mainly associated with the direct or 
indirect access to resources, knowledge and other assets. They increase the availability of 
important resources, especially, if these are difficult to obtain. Alliances can reduce 
transaction costs and ensure a sustainable supply of required resources (Gulati, 1998). 
Market control is thus likely to benefit firm performance of alliance partners who distribute 
and share the market as well as its revenues amongst themselves. Alliances also increase 
legitimacy of new firms which helps them to continue to attract additional resources such as 
financing. Further, alliances can also increase the likelihood of launching products to the 
market place in utilising established and exclusive distribution networks or contacts to 
customers. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
Hypothesis 16: USOs with alliance partners report superior firm performance. 
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2.7.5 Intellectual Capital 
 
The fourth resource shown in Figure 15 relates to USOs’ intellectual capital. This 
resource relates to the knowledge embedded in a firm which is required to drive its business 
model. In the context of USOs, academic research presents the intellectual capital which is 
commercialised. Firm performance is thus subject to how well intellectual capital can be 
translated into a working business model targeting an attractive marketplace. In order to 
ensure a sustained competitive advantage on a marketplace intellectual capital must be 
particularly difficult to imitate and substitute (Steffensen et al., 2000; Hand, 2001). 
Patenting IP can stop competitors to infringe inventions and processes. Superior firm 
performance can thus be associated with the competitive advantage generated by patents 
(Baum and Silverman, 2004). The following hypothesis is suggested, accordingly: 
Hypothesis 17: USOs with patented IP will report superior firm performance. 
 
If the patented IP is owned by the firm rather than an individual there may be a desire 
to maximise the economic returns in best exploiting the IP within the firm. This is because 
ownership generates entitlement, commitment and value (Williamson, 1991; Kasper and 
Streit, 1998) among the parties owning the organisation which will ultimately benefit firm 
performance. Further, ownership of IP by the firm also signals the value of a new venture to 
external parties. It can increase the likelihood to attract further financing rounds. Moreover, 
employees are more likely to be attracted and commit themselves to a firm which cannot 
suddenly be stripped of its most valuable asset (Gans et al., 2002; Bercovitz and Feldman, 
2007). Consequently, the following hypothesis is suggested:  
Hypothesis 18: USOs that own their IP will report superior firm performance. 
 
The radicalness of innovation of the invention or process driving the business model of a 
firm can also influence firm performance. Radical innovation is often associated with 
uncertainty of size of the targeted market and the related demand for new product or 
service. In addition to untested business models, radical innovation attributed to new 
technologies can further increase the risks of generating returns. In consequence, 
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radicalness of innovation in a business model reflects the risk a firm’s potential performance 
is exposed to (De Coster and Butler, 2005; Marvel and Lumpkin, 2007). Firms which require 
radical innovation to compete in emerging markets are more likely to fail and depend on 
substantial resources including financing and business expertise to establish themselves on 
the market (Audretsch, 1991; Audretsch and Thurik, 2001). The unpredictable nature of new 
markets as frequently observed in the high-technology sectors indicate an inverse 
relationship between the risk to take on radical innovation and the likelihood of superior 
firm performance (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). The following hypothesis is derived accordingly: 
Hypothesis 19: USOs whose main product or service is associated with radical innovation 
                                   will report weaker firm performance. 
 
2.7.6 Financial Resources 
 
The fifth resource shown in Figure 15 relates to USOs’ financing. The major role of 
financial capital in new firms is to create a buffer against random shocks as well as being the 
driver of growth strategies (Cooper et al., 1994). New firms usually have insufficient internal 
financing to obtain the required resources for growing their firm and maximising its 
performance. However, those firms which have been successful in receiving seed and early 
stage funding from external investors can overcome this barrier to superior firm 
performance. Moreover, once first external investors has been attracted, further financing 
are rounds more likely which will continue to enhance the development and performance of 
new firms (Hsu, 2007).  
The availability of external financing is particularly relevant in the context of USOs. Their 
development and performance is highly dependent on access to financial resources to 
continuously extend their resource base (Vohora et al., 2004). Especially, USOs with long 
time-to-market intervals like in pharmacy and bio-technology sectors can only expect to 
have superior levels of performance if investors continue to back these firms over these 
periods. To encourage the exploitation of business opportunities from academic research 
public policy makers have addressed early stage financing gaps to promote an innovation 
driven transition into knowledge based economies (Wright et al., 2006). Public backed 
equity investments provide USOs the opportunity to attract early stage financing with a 
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lower risk threshold compared to private investors. They can reduce a possible equity gap 
on the supply-side of external investments and help to attract further financing rounds and 
more funding (Boadway and Tremblay, 2005). In addition to finance, public backed equity 
schemes are increasingly building up business expertise to support the development of 
USOs and enable them to launch a product or service to the market place (Mason and 
Harrison, 2004). In consequence, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
Hypothesis 20: USOs that have obtained publicly-backed equity funds will report superior  
         firm performance. 
 
2.7.7 VC Investment  
 
The final resource shown in Figure 15 relates to USOs which have attracted VC 
investment. VC-backed firms are generally assumed to have higher survival rates than non-
VC-backed businesses (Timmons and Spinelli, 2003). VC investments are particularly 
attractive to new firms with capital intensive growth strategies. This is because VC investors 
can secure substantial amounts of financing in combination with providing a strictly 
commercial business expertise in order to maximise their investees’ value and performance. 
Hsu (2007) argues that the first attraction of VC financing can lead to a ‘Matthew Effect’ 
in further funding rounds. It implies that those firms which already attracted reputable 
investments have an ongoing advantage to attract more funding to address their financing 
needs which ultimately increases their performance. Once VC investment is attracted for 
the first time, further access to finance is facilitated due to VC investors’ syndication 
networks (Lerner, 1994; Lockett and Wright, 2001). 
In the context of USOs, VC investors are generally regarded as value adding and 
performance enhancing (Lockett et al., 2005). VC investors’ dual role in adding finance and 
business expertise is particularly attractive in introducing a commercial perspective into 
firms started by academics who are often inexperienced in the business domain (Vohora et 
al., 2004). Moreover, VC investors can be helpful in appointing an experienced CEO to 
manage the growth of the firm (Hellmann and Puri, 2002). This is particularly important if 
the founding academic entrepreneurs’ expertise can be stronger utilised in optimising 
research and development (Stuart and Ding, 2006; Birchall, 2007). Consequently, Anderson 
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et al. (2007) suggest that VC investments have generally a positive impact on USO activities 
and the efficiency of technology transfer. Therefore, the following hypothesis is derived: 
Hypothesis 21: USOs with VC investment will report superior firm performance. 
 
Because VC investors are able to not only influence investees with their financial 
resources, but also with the human capital of their business expertise, a more detailed 
perspective on the characteristics of VC investors in relation to their influence on firm 
performance of their investees is important, too. Davila et al. (2003) argue that VC firms’ 
own experience and track record can influences their investees future firm performance 
related to their valuation and ability to attract employees. 
The reputation of VC investors can particularly be attributed the human capital of the 
partners in a VC firm (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005). VC investors aim to employ individuals 
with great deal-making and value-adding skills who often entered the VC industry after 
extensive work experience in their industries (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). As a result, the 
human capital can also be industry specific based on the experience of VC partners 
influencing the composition of the portfolio of investees (Knockaert et al., 2006). The 
resulting sector specialisation also allows VC firms to reduce their investment risks. 
Specialist VC investors are thus common in high-technology sectors (Lockett et al., 2002; 
Lockett et al., 2003). 
Generalist VC investors may also be beneficial to the performance of new firms. They 
often comprise expertise regarding a range of sectors and a broader experience in 
developing different types of new ventures. In addition to this capability, generalist VC 
investors are more often operating as part of larger private equity firms which can supply 
greater amounts of investments than more specific investors. However, they are also more 
risk averse and thus only choose to invest in more mature firms which are more established 
in their market place. 
Overall, generalist and specialist orientation of VC investors have beneficial 
characteristics related to superior firm performance depending on the needs of their 
investees with respect to financing and business expertise. In consequence, the following 
hypotheses are suggested: 
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Hypothesis 22: USOs with generalist VC investment will report superior firm    
                                        performance. 
Hypothesis 23: USOs with specialist VC investment will report superior firm performance. 
 
2.8 Summary of Hypotheses 
 
Presented hypotheses are summarized in Table 15. In Chapter 3, the positivist 
methodology is discussed to test the presented hypotheses. 
Table 15: Summary of Hypotheses 
Themes of 
resources: 
Hypotheses for research 
question 1 on first VC 
Investment: 
Which resource endowments of 
USOs are signals of quality and 
attract first VC investment? 
Hypotheses for research question 2 on 
firm performance: 
Do VC funded USOs report superior firm 
performance? 
General 
human 
capital  
Hypothesis 1: Older USO 
founders are more likely to 
attract first VC investment. 
Hypothesis 11: USOs with older 
founders will report superior firm 
performance. 
Hypothesis 2: USO founders with 
higher levels of academic 
reputation are more likely to 
attract first VC investment. 
Hypothesis 12: USOs with founders 
with higher levels of academic 
reputation will report superior firm 
performance. 
Specific 
human 
capital 
Hypothesis 3: USO founders who 
are experienced entrepreneurs 
are more likely to attract first VC 
investment. 
Hypothesis 13: USOs with experienced 
entrepreneurs will report superior firm 
performance. 
Hypothesis 4: USOs with an 
experienced founding team are 
more likely to attract first VC 
investment. 
Hypothesis 14: USOs with an 
experienced founding team will report 
superior firm performance. 
Networks Hypothesis 5: USOs from 
universities that have a strong 
network of previously VC funded 
USOs are more likely to attract 
first VC investment. 
Hypothesis 15: USOs from universities 
that have a strong network of 
previously VC funded USOs will report 
superior firm performance. 
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Table 15 (Continued): Summary of Hypotheses 
Themes of 
resources: 
Hypotheses for research 
question 1 on first VC 
Investment: 
Which resource endowments of 
USOs are signals of quality and 
attract first VC investment? 
Hypotheses for research question 2 on 
firm performance: 
Do VC funded USOs report superior firm 
performance? 
Networks 
(Continued) 
Hypothesis 6: USOs with alliance 
partners are more likely to 
attract first VC investment. 
Hypothesis 16: USOs with alliance 
partners report superior firm 
performance. 
Intellectual 
capital  
Hypothesis 7: USOs with 
patented IP are more likely to 
attract first VC investment. 
Hypothesis 17: USOs with patented IP 
will report superior firm performance. 
 
Hypothesis 8: USOs with IP 
ownership are more likely to 
attract first VC investment. 
Hypothesis 18: USOs that own their IP 
will report superior firm performance. 
 
Hypothesis 9: USOs whose main 
product or service is associated 
with radical innovation are less 
likely to attract first VC 
investment. 
Hypothesis 19: USOs whose main 
product or service is associated with 
radical innovation will report weaker 
firm performance. 
Financial 
resources  
Hypothesis 10: USOs that have 
obtained publicly-backed equity 
funds are more likely to attract 
first VC investment. 
Hypothesis 20: USOs that have 
obtained publicly-backed equity funds 
will report superior firm performance. 
VC 
investment  
 Hypothesis 21: USOs with VC 
investment will report superior firm 
performance. 
 Hypothesis 22: USOs with generalist VC 
investment will report superior firm 
performance. 
 Hypothesis 23: USOs with specialist VC 
investment will report superior firm 
performance. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology and Data Collection 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses issues relating to data collection and the research methodology 
used to test the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2. In Section 3.2, general issues of 
research methodology, methods and related research paradigms are presented. Further, it 
is discussed why the positivistic research paradigm was chosen for this study. Section 3.3 
discusses the research design with reference to the population of USOs which were founded 
at British universities between 1990 and 2007 and still active in 2008. Secondary data 
sources are used to identify the population of USOs. Primary data is collected from the 
owners of USOs. A structured questionnaire was designed. The questionnaire was 
administered through an online survey. Response bias tests were conducted between the 
respondents and the non-respondents to the survey. No response bias was detected. We 
have no reason to assume that the results from the survey cannot be generalised to the 
population of USOs. ‘Trustworthiness’ of the collected primary data relating to the validity 
and reliability of derived composite scales (i.e., constructs) is explored in Section 3.4. 
Operationalisation of the dependent and independent variables is summarized in Section 
3.5. Regression techniques used to test the presented hypotheses are discussed in Section 
3.6. The assumptions of regression analysis are summarized, and evidence suggests that the 
regression analysis assumptions have not been violated with reference to the survey data 
explored. An overview of the presented hypotheses and the independent variables is 
presented in Section 3.7. 
 
3.2 Research Paradigm 
 
Research relates to the search for knowledge by means of systematic investigation in 
order to establish facts. It can also be described as an organised inquiry in order to provide 
information that can be used to solve problems or help in decision making processes. Good 
research can be characterized by research questions which are purposeful and have a clear 
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focus. Further, good research needs to have plausible goals that are achieved by defensible 
and ethical methods of data collection and analysis (Blumberg et al., 2005). 
The research paradigm of a study reflects the nature and approach of how research is 
conducted. Research paradigms can first be distinguished by their research philosophy 
which is captured by its methodology (Bryman, 1984). When formulating their research 
methodology, researchers need to address what can be regarded as appropriate knowledge 
about the social world within they are exploring their research questions of interest 
(Creswell, 1994). Such considerations are referred to as epistemology. They include whether 
the events of interest are objectively observable and measurable or require a subjective 
perspective to be captured. Further, researchers need to define the relationship between 
themselves and their environment including the events, organisations or individuals of 
interest for their study. These are considerations of ontology (Bryman and Bell, 2003). They 
reflect whether researchers regard themselves as external and independent to their subject 
of interest or whether their subjective perspective influences the research. 
Research methods are the second aspect of a research paradigm (Bryman, 1984). 
They are the techniques used to gather and analyse data in a study. The choice of a research 
method relates to the above epistemological and ontological considerations as well as 
practical issues of measurement, availability and access of data. Research methods are 
subject to the choice of the research design which determines what and how data is 
collected to appropriately explore identified research questions. Research methods can 
generally be distinguished between gathering and analysing quantitative or qualitative data. 
Two prominent research paradigms with generally opposing methodologies and 
choices of methods are positivism and social constructivism5. Both are applicable to 
research in social sciences. They are discussed below. It is then argued why the paradigm of 
positivism was chosen for this study. 
The research paradigm of positivism assumes in its understanding of the world (i.e. 
ontology) that the environment and the events of interest are objective and external and 
independent of the researcher (Bryman and Bell, 2003). Accordingly, the extraction of valid 
knowledge explaining the events of interest (i.e. epistemology) requires them to be 
                                                            
5 Social constructivism can also be referred to as interpretivism in the literature. 
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objectively observable and measureable. This research philosophy is commonly referred to 
as the scientific method. It follows the principal of deduction. This implies that all premises 
and reasons must be valid in order to generate true conclusions. The deductive process 
relates to theory as the starting point which is used to derive hypotheses. To test these 
hypotheses empirically, data needs to be collected in order to generate are representative 
sample along with using with valid and reliable measurements. The findings of whether 
hypotheses are supported or rejected are used to revise and develop the present body of 
theory. As a result of these methodological considerations, positivism relies on quantitative 
research methods such as surveys. These ensure a standardised collection of data across a 
larger group of participants while minimising the subjective influence of the researcher. 
The strength of positivism is that relationships and possible causalities between 
independent and dependent variables can be tested which are hypothesised from an 
established theoretical framework. However, for exploiting the strength of the positivist 
paradigm to test hypotheses and their directions, sufficiently large and representative 
samples are required to ensure an objective perspective on the phenomena of interest in 
order to generate valid knowledge. Objectivity and generalisability demanded by a positivist 
methodology also require that methods and measurements can be replicated. However, 
positivism can be criticised that its assumptions of objectivity and quantifiable 
measurements are too artificial in a social science context. Further criticism relates to that 
the interaction of social entities is too complex and dynamic for it to be captured by 
generalisable theories and laws. In order to generate reliable and generalisable results from 
positivist research, issues of objectivity, validity, reliability, replicability and causality need 
therefore to be thoroughly addressed and justified. 
 The contrasting paradigm to positivism is social constructivism (Bryman and Bell, 
2003). Its ontology assumes that the understanding of the environment and its events are 
socially constructed and subjective from the researcher’s point of view. Valid knowledge 
depends according to the epistemological characteristic of social constructivism, on the 
researcher’s individual and subjective perceptions of the phenomena of interest. Hence, no 
objective observations and measurements of the relevant phenomena are possible. Social 
constructivism is about theory building. The resulting approach is inductive in generating 
valid knowledge. Induction is necessary to generate enough knowledge to establish a new 
theoretical perspective which can then be used to derive hypotheses and later test them 
following a positivist paradigm. The social constructivist methodology regards the 
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researcher as a necessary and involved member of the data collection and interpretation 
process. This is also reflected in the qualitative research methods of choice which are 
applied in social constructivist studies. The researcher actively engages usually through 
means of interviews with individual participants or focus groups. The aim of the researcher 
is to adapt to and interpret the subjective perspective of the participants. 
The strength of social constructivism is that complex contexts can be addressed in 
learning from the perspective of those individuals who are part of the subject being studied. 
The flexibility in capturing and processing qualitative insights of participants improves the 
understanding of a complex matters by aspects perceptions, feelings and attitudes. The 
inductive approach is suitable to build new theories which can then be used to derive 
specific hypotheses to be tested in quantitative studies. The weakness of social 
constructivism is that the subjective perspective of the researcher can be an inappropriate 
bias and very difficult to replicate. This leads to problems of generalising findings and a lack 
of transparency how these findings were established. 
This study will explore the research questions presented in Chapter 1. To explore 
them, this study replicates, integrates and extends previous theories relating to the take-up 
of first venture capital, and the firm performance of USOs. The hypotheses derived from the 
theoretical frameworks discussed in Chapter 2 are empirically tested. Using an on-line 
survey, primary data was collected from the key owners and decision-makers in USOs. The 
survey was administered to the population of USOs. The structured questionnaire 
administered to key owners and decision-makers collected information relating to several 
dependent, independent and control variables. The profiles of respondents and non-
respondents to the survey were monitored. No significant response bias was detected. A 
representative sample of respondents was collected, which enables results from the survey 
to be generalised to the population of USOs. Regression analysis is used to test the 
presented hypotheses (Gill and Johnson, 2002). A representative sample of USOs is needed 
in order to generalise findings for the population. Following these requirements and 
implications of the positivist paradigm increases the realism of this study and its findings. 
A qualitative approach was not pursued in this study as the focus and purpose of this 
study implies a positivist methodology. The aim of this study is to replicate, integrate and 
extend theories which are then used to derive hypotheses. Further, the identified research 
questions relate to explaining relationships between independent and dependent variables 
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with the goal of achieving generalisable findings. Moreover, Chapter 2 has shown that gaps 
in the knowledge base are rather related to too few quantitative studies investigating the 
take-up of VC investment and USO firm performance. However, the extensive insights from 
social constructivist studies were used to identify patters appropriate measurements for this 
study. They provided valuable information for choosing theoretical insights from which 
theoretical frameworks were built and hypotheses were derived. 
In summary, the choice of a positivist paradigm for this study is motivated by 
replicating, integrating and extending existing theories in order to derive hypotheses on 
relationships between variables which are empirically tested. In order to generalise findings 
from a sample to its population, objective, replicable and quantitative measurements are 
required. Further, because subjective perceptions and qualitative issues are not addressed 
by the research questions the positivist paradigm is chosen over social constructivism. 
  
3.3 Research Design 
3.3.1 Overview 
 
The population of USOs in Britain founded between 1990 and 2007 and still active by 
2008 was identified. The chosen time interval relates to a high USO formation period in the 
UK (Sainsbury, 2007; Abreu et al., 2008). 
Several data sources were used to identify the population of USOs that were founded 
between 1990 and 2007 and were still active by 2008. Information relating to firm names 
and addresses was collected from Library House, Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) and 
Companies House. A population of 505 USOs was identified. Information relating to key 
issues (i.e., when the USO received its first venture capital investment) is not publicly 
available. There is a need to collect primary data from the founders and key decision-makers 
in USOs. A structured questionnaire was designed. Using an on-line survey, the 
questionnaire was sent to founders and key decision-makers in the 505 USOs. In total, 
information was gathered from 125 valid respondents in USOs. Stages in the data collection 
process are discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
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3.3.2 Secondary Data 
 
Secondary data is required for determining the size of the population of USOs. Further, 
it is used to identify the contact details of the founding academic entrepreneurs required for 
an online survey. Secondary data has the advantage of being consistent and non-subjective 
when operationalising variables which can also be replicated in future studies. 
All secondary data sources are shown in Table 16. The Library House private data base 
was used to identify the population of USO6,7. This data base held data on 599 USOs from 
British Universities. In total, 515 USOs were founded between 1990 and 1997 and were still 
active by 2008. This data base covers founders’ identity and email contacts as well as a wide 
range of firm-level data such as the financing history, business models and business profiles. 
 
Table 16: Sources of Secondary Data 
  Content Description Access Link Timeframe 
of data 
collection 
Library 
House 
Identification of firms 
as USOs, funding types 
and amount over time, 
sector, business model 
and profile, Founders’ 
contact details, 
Strategic Alliances 
Private, 
access 
individually 
negotiated 
for this study 
www.Libraryhouse.net 2007-2008 
Companies 
House 
 Information on 
company status (active, 
out of business) 
registry number, sector 
 
Public online 
access 
www.companieshouse.gov.uk 2007-2008 
                                                            
6
 The chairman of the head organisation of Technology Transfer Offices at British Universities (UNICO) was 
interviewed for this research to consult the availability of public data bases with firm-level information of the 
required population of USOs. UNICO explained that they only collect aggregate information on a university-level. 
Further, they were not aware of a public source which would identify firm-level characteristics of USOs in the UK. 
7 Access to Library House Data would have not been secured without the substantial financial support by the 
Northern Leadership Academy (NLA) which awarded a Doctorial Fellowship for this research project in 2007. 
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Table 16 (Continued): Sources of Secondary Data 
  Content Description Access Link Timeframe 
of data 
collection 
FAME General annual 
accounting 
information: Balance 
Sheet, Profit and Loss, 
Cashflow Statement, 
Investor Profiles 
 
 
Durham 
University 
Subscription 
Bureau van Dijk 
(www.bvdep.com) via Durham 
University Library 
 
 
2007-2008 
BVCA 
Member 
Directory 
Data base on VC 
investors’ 
characteristics 
including their 
investment 
preferences, funding 
scope and region. 
Private, 
access 
individually 
negotiated 
for this study 
www.bvca.co.uk 2007-2008 
 
Three additional secondary data sources were used. The private FAME data base 
provides annual accounting information on firms in the UK, provided market size and firm 
performance data. The public data base Companies House contains firm registries along 
with the company status and sectors provided the registry number of each USO. The data 
base of the private association of British Venture Capital and Private Equity (BVCA) was used 
to identify investment preferences of VC investors in the UK. 
 
3.3.3 Primary Data 
 
A population of 505 USOs was identified. This population presents the sampling 
frame for the primary data collection from the founding academic entrepreneurs. The 
collection of primary data is motivated as follows. The dependent variables relating to first 
VC investment and firm performance require the collection of independent and control 
variables which predate these events. Additional information relating to the firm and the 
founding academic entrepreneurs can be gathered using a survey for the collection of 
primary data. The reliability of data from a primary survey can be verified by information 
published in secondary data bases. 
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Table 17 summarizes the initial population and the number of USOs. The online 
survey was administered between 12.2.2008 and 1.3.2008. Information was gathered from 
valid respondents in 125 USOs. Ten USOs had to be excluded due to being out of business by 
2008 or having been founded before the year 1990. The survey had a valid response rate of 
25%. A recent study by Cycyota and Harrison (2006) which compares the response rates of 
231 mailed studies contacting top executives of small and medium enterprises between 
1992 and 2003 show similar response rates. 
Table 17: Population, Sample and Response Rate of Survey 
 n 
Population of USOs founded between 1990 and 2007 in the UK 
which was still active (i.e. private, IPO or M&A) by 2008 as 
obtained from Library House. 
515 
Non valid respondents of USOs outside the sampling frame. 10 (9 USOs out of 
business by 2008; 1 USO 
founded before 1990) 
Valid sampling frame. 505 
Number of USOs whose founders could be successfully contacted 
by email. 
364 
Valid number of USOs of whose founders could be successfully 
contacted by email, corrected for 10 non valid respondents 
outside the sampling frame. 
354 
Valid respondents by number of USOs. 125 
Number of valid non-respondent USOs 515 - 10 - 125 = 380  
Valid response rate 125/505 = 25% 
 
An online format was chosen as the most useful option of delivery considering the 
difficulties in generating a sample of sufficient size and representativeness, as well as issues 
of time and costs required to collect the data (DeVaus, 1996). The online survey was 
generated and hosted on the platform ‘www.surveymonkey.com’ and invitations to 
participate in the survey were sent out by email. This option of delivery is associated with 
several advantages over traditional postal survey (Erdos, 1974; Kinnear and Taylor, 1996). 
The choice of an online survey with email invitations was also motivated by the participants 
of interest (Saunders et al., 2007). Because many academic entrepreneurs split their time 
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between working for their USO and their academic role, contacting them by email provided 
a quick and effective means to achieve a good response rate. 
 
3.3.3.1 Generalisability: Response Bias Tests 
 
Response bias tests were conducted to detect whether evidence from the survey of 
USO can be generalised to the population of USOs that were founded between 1990 and 
1997 and were still active by 2008. The profiles of the 125 valid USO respondents and the 
380 valid USO non-respondents were compared. 
With reference to continuous variables, non-parametric Mann-Whitney ‘U’ tests 
were conducted between valid respondents and non-respondents. Table 18 shows no 
significant difference between the valid respondents and non-respondents for firm age, 
total disclosed funding, funding events, year of most recent investment, total average of 
years until first external investment, number of previous USOs from university of origin as 
well as number of previous USOs from university of origin. 
With reference to categorical variables, non-parametric Chi-Square tests were 
conducted between valid respondents and non-respondents. This technique requires that 
not more than 20% of categories should have an expected frequency of less than five 
observations (Hair et al., 2006). Table 19 shows no significant differences between 
respondents and non-respondents for individual and grouped regions across the UK. The 
sector of USOs based on the FTSE index categories and the universities of origin of the USOs 
show no significant differences. No significant differences were found when grouping 
universities regarding their membership of the Russell Group (2009) which is an association 
of twenty major research-intensive universities of the UK which was formed in 1994. No 
response bias is observed for the ‘Golden Triangle’ which comprises the universities of 
Cambridge, Oxford as well as the London based ones of Imperial College, King's College 
London, University College London, University of Cambridge, University of Oxford with a 
strong worldwide reputation for academic excellence as well as frequent technology 
transfer and USO activities (Birley, 2002; Acworth, 2008). Therefore, based on the above 
evidence, there is no significant reason to suggest that information from the survey cannot 
be generalised to the population. 
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Table 18: Response Bias Test (Mann Whitney U) for Continuous Variables 
  Valid Respondents Non-Respondents Response-Bias Test 
  n Mean SD Median n Mean SD Median 
Mann-Whitney 
‘U’ statistic Significance level (p) 
Firm Age in 2008 125 6.82 2.91 7 380 6.32 3.27 6 2355 0.420 
Total Disclosed Funding 
(‘000 £) until 2008 99 24651.36 82017.17 1470 295 12540.77 32621.46 1545 14410.5 0.845 
Funding events (all types) 
until 2008 125 5.82 7.41 3 380 5.93 7.59 3 23229.5 0.423 
Year of most recent 
investment 125 2002.29 3.14 2003 380 2002.56 3.247 2003 22830 0.151 
Total Average of Years until 
first external investment 125 1.51 1.58 1 380 1.284 1.56445 1 22351.5 0.283 
Number of previous USOs 
from the university of origin 125 12.66 11.5 9 380 14.49 13.91 10 23383.5 0.493 
Number of previous USOs 
from the university of origin 
with VC funding 125 5.67 6.62 3 380 6.26 7.037 3 24245 0.928 
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Table 19: Response Bias Test (Chi-Square) for Categorical Variables 
    Valid Respondents Non-Respondents Response Bias Test 
Variable Categories n % n % Chi2 Statistic 
Significance 
level (p) 
Individual 
Regions from 
which USOs 
originated 
between 1990 
and 2007 
East Midlands 6 4.80% 27 7.11% 16.872 0.112 
Eastern 7 5.60% 49 12.89% 
London 24 19.20% 66 17.37% 
North East 6 4.80% 18 4.74% 
North West 11 8.80% 25 6.58% 
Northern Ireland 9 7.20% 10 2.63% 
Scotland 22 17.60% 57 15.00% 
South East 14 11.20% 44 11.58% 
South West 3 2.40% 25 6.58% 
Wales 2 1.60% 10 2.63% 
West Midlands 6 4.80% 18 4.74% 
Yorkshire 15 12.00% 31 8.16% 
Total 125 100.00% 380 100.00% 
Grouped Regions 
from which USOs 
originated 
between 1990 
and 2007 
Midlands 11 8.80% 39 10.26% 7.450 0.189 
Eastern 11 8.80% 56 14.74% 
London 19 15.20% 58 15.26% 
North 30 24.00% 72 18.95% 
NIR, Wales and Scotland 34 27.20% 75 19.74% 
South 20 16.00% 80 21.05% 
Total 125 100.00% 380 100.00% 
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Table 19 (Continued): Response Bias Test (Chi-Square) for Categorical Variables 
  
Valid Respondents Non-Respondents Response Bias Test 
Variable Categories n % n % 
Chi2 
Statistic 
Significance 
level (p) 
Sectors (FTSE 
Index) to which 
USOs belong 
between 1990 
and 2007 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 35 28.00% 114 30.00% 0.968 0.995 
Software & Computer Services 23 18.40% 70 18.42% 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 19 15.20% 56 14.74% 
Other 15 12.00% 35 9.21% 
Health Care Equipment & Services 13 10.40% 41 10.79% 
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 9 7.20% 28 7.37% 
Chemicals 6 4.80% 21 5.53% 
Support Services 5 4.00% 15 3.95% 
Total 125 100.00% 380 100.00% 
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Table 19 (Continued): Response Bias Test (Chi-Square) for Categorical Variables 
    Valid Respondents Non-Respondents Response Bias Test 
Variable Categories n % n % Chi2 Statistic Significance level (p) 
Universities 
of origin 
from which 
USOs 
originated 
between 
1990 and 
2007 
Imperial College a, b 14 0.11 38 10.00% 20.38 0.312 
University of Edinburgh b 10 0.02 11 2.89% 
University of Manchester b 8 0.05 9 2.37% 
University of Oxford a, b 8 0.05 7 1.84% 
University of Cambridge a, b 7 0.03 14 3.68% 
University of Sheffield b 7 0.02 19 5.00% 
Newcastle University b 6 0.06 45 11.84% 
Queen's University Belfast b 6 0.08 22 5.79% 
University College London a, b 4 0.02 13 3.42% 
University of Southampton b 4 0.06 20 5.26% 
University of Warwick b 4 0.02 13 3.42% 
University of York 4 0.06 24 6.32% 
Loughborough University 3 0.06 9 2.37% 
University of Leeds b 3 0.03 10 2.63% 
University of Bristol b 2 0.02 12 3.16% 
University of Nottingham b 2 0.03 11 2.89% 
University of Strathclyde 2 0.03 10 2.63% 
Other universities with five to ten USOs between 1990 and 2007 25 0.20 63 16.58% 
Other universities with one to four USOs between 1990 and 2007 6 0.05 30 7.89% 
Total 125 100.00% 380 100.00% 
a = University member of ‘Golden Triangle’; b = University member of Russell Group  
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Table 19 (Continued): Response Bias Test (Chi-Square) for Categorical Variables 
  
Valid Respondents Non-Respondents Response Bias Test 
Variable Categories n % n % 
Chi2 
Statistic 
Significance level 
(p) 
Grouped 
universities of origin 
from which USOs 
originated between 
1990 and 2007 
Russell Group (excluding ‘Golden Triangle’)8 58 46.40% 149 39.21% 2.106 0.349 
Golden Triangle9 35 28.00% 126 33.16% 
Other 32 25.60% 105 27.63% 
Total 125 100.00% 380 100.00% 
First Venture Capital 
Investment in USOs 
between 1990 and 
2007 
Yes 60 48.00% 166 43.68% 0.745 0.388 
No 65 52.00% 214 56.32% 
Total 125 100.00% 380 100.00% 
Attraction of Public 
Backed Equity 
between 1990 and 
2007 
Yes 54 43.20% 156 41.05% 0.184 0.688 
No 71 56.80% 224 58.95% 
Total 125 100.00% 380 100.00% 
                                                            
8 Russell Group members relate to: Cardiff University, Newcastle University, Queen's University Belfast, University of Birmingham, University of Bristol, University of Edinburgh, 
University of Glasgow, University of Leeds, University of Manchester, University of Nottingham, University of Sheffield, University of Southampton and University of Warwick. 
9 Golden Triangle members relate to: Imperial College, King's College London, University College London, University of Cambridge and the University of Oxford. 
 
 
126 
 
3.3.3.2 Questionnaire Design 
 
The questionnaire was designed to collect data from the founding academic 
entrepreneurs of USOs, who are regarded as the key informants. Information relating to the 
entrepreneur, firm, financing profile and business performance was consistently collected. 
The questionnaire was divided into several sections. The first section related to the 
founders’ characteristics, information on their founding teams and their previous 
entrepreneurial experience prior to starting the surveyed firm. Further sections covered 
firm-level information on initial resource endowments prior to receiving external equity 
funding as well as the consequences associated with receiving investment. The 
questionnaire is presented in Section 1 of the Appendix. 
To facilitate statistical analysis most questions had a closed format. Participants 
could choose between several alternative response categories (e.g. ‘no’, part-time’ or ‘full-
time’), binary choices (e.g. ‘yes’ or ‘no’) or Likert scales (i.e. an ordinal scale ranging from 
‘strongly disagree’, ‘disagree’, ‘neither’, ‘disagree’ or ‘strongly agree’). A major advantage of 
such closed questions is that they can be quickly and consistently answered by the 
participants (DeVaus, 1996). 
A pilot study considered content and face validity. For the pilot study, forty-two 
academic entrepreneurs were contacted by email. The pilot study was an online survey 
which took place between the 10th and 19th of December 2008. Ten respondents (20% 
response rate) completed the survey. Changes as a result of analysing the pilot study include 
adding additional instructions to remind participants if questions were related to the status 
of the USO before first attracting VC investment rather than the status of the USO in 2008. 
Whereas the order of the questions remained unchanged after the pilot study more 
subsections were created to avoid too many questions on one page in order to increase the 
response rate. 
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3.4 ‘Trustworthiness’ of the Data: Validity and Reliability 
3.4.1 Validity 
 
Validity implies that the phenomenon of interest is accurately captured by a 
question and their response options. A first important form of validity is face validity. Face 
validity implies that questions and their response options ‘look right’ in the sense of 
capturing the phenomenon they are supposed to measure. Useful approaches to generate 
face validity comprise the replication of previous measurements, academic and expert 
opinions as well as pilot studies. In addition, several practitioner focused conferences on 
USO and start-up financing were attended to access the views of entrepreneurs, investors 
and policy makers10. Pilot studies for this research included pilot interviews with three 
academic entrepreneurs and two technology transfer office representatives. Further, the 
previously reported online pilot study was used to ensure validity used to ensure that 
participants understand the questions and provide meaningful and valid responses.  
                                                            
10 List of practitioner workshops and conferences on academic entrepreneurship attended throughout the 
course of this research: 
Date: Event Organiser: Subject of Event: 
24/10/2006 Durham University Graduate School  The Academic Entrepreneur  
31/10/2006 Durham University Graduate School  Business Plans  
15/01/2007 Bridge Club North 
Academic Entrepreneurship...Moving Knowledge Forward 
- Steve Caughey, managing director of Arjuna Technologies 
06/02/2007 Durham University Graduate School  Running Your Own Show: a beginners guide!  
12/02/2007 Bridge Club North 
Becoming an Academic Entrepreneur 
- Are you ready to kick-start your business idea? 
20/02/2007 Durham University Graduate School  Intellectual Property? Why didn't I think of that?  
19/03/2007 Bridge Club North 
Academic Entrepreneurship...Moving Knowledge Forward 
- BioNet Sponsored Event - Gary Todd, UK Haptics 
14/05/2007 Bridge Club North 
Academic Entrepreneurship...Moving Knowledge Forward 
- In Conversation With...Dr Wenfeng Lin of Clarizon 
23/10/2007 Durham University Graduate School  The Academic Entrepreneur  
14/04/2008 Connect North East Start-ups and USOs from Sweden 
16/04 
- 
18/04/2008 
Durham University Graduate School  Durham Enterprise School  
17/11/2008 BVCA BVCA Spin-Out Event 
09/02/2009 British Library 
Research Resources on Entrepreneurship and Panel 
Discussion on USOs 
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The pilot study was also used to test whether questions using multiple items have 
construct validity. Construct validity ensures that the different dimensions which are 
suggested by the multiple items in response to a single but multifaceted question are all 
sufficiently related (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992). In this study the questions to 
measure founding team experience and reputation as well as radical innovation are based 
on scales with multiple items. The construct validity of these scales is detected by a Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA). This statistical technique shows whether all items are sufficiently 
related to the same construct. It identifies which items are highly correlated with one 
another, and can be considered a single valid construct. The results of the PCA for the used 
multi-item scales are discussed in Section 3.5. 
Two diagnostics are reported to ensure that assumptions of the PCA are met. The first 
diagnostic relates to the Bartlett test for sphericity. It determines whether the items in the 
scale are sufficiently correlated using a chi2 statistic to test significance (Hair et al. 2006). 
Significance levels of 0.1 or less ensure that correlations among the items are not due to 
sampling error. The second diagnostic relates to the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) as a measure 
of sampling adequacy based on the inter-correlations among the items in the scale. The 
KMO can take values between 0 and 1 which reflect the appropriateness of the PCA. Smaller 
values indicate that variables have too little in common to conduct a PCA. The following 
labels are rules of thumb to interpret the values of KMO: 0.00 to 0.49 = ‘unacceptable’; 0.50 
to 0.59 = ‘miserable’; 0.60 to 0.69 = ‘mediocre’; 0.70 to 0.79 = ‘middling’; 0.80 to 0.89 = 
‘meritorious’; 0.90 to 1.00 = ‘marvellous’. 
 
3.4.2 Reliability 
 
Reliability implies that questions within multi-tem scales repeatedly capture the 
same phenomenon. External reliability relates to the consistency of a measure over time 
(Bryman and Cramer, 1999). This approach to generate reliability is often impractical for 
most research in the social sciences (de Vaus, 1996). This study focuses on previously tested 
measures where possible.  
Internal reliability needs to be statistically determined when multiple items are used 
to build a scale in order to measure and capture the same construct (Bryman and Cramer, 
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1999). The internal reliability of a scale can be measured with reference to its Cronbach’s 
alpha score, which relates to the average inter-item within the scale (Oppenheim, 1992). 
Cronbach alpha scores of 0.6 are acceptable in exploratory studies. Presented scales relating 
to independent variables identified by PCA models have Cronbach alpha scores of at least 
0.6.  
 
3.4.3 Common Methods Bias 
 
Common methods bias can occur when the dependent and independent variables 
are gathered from the same data source (i.e., survey) (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). This 
problem can be reduced. The control and independent variables in all models forthcoming 
in Chapter 4 present a well balanced mix from primary and secondary data sources. The 
online survey was also designed to encourage participants to respond to all questions 
without biases. This was ensured by participants’ anonymity, a clear structure of the 
questionnaire along with factual and closed questions (Podsakoff et al., 2003). The online 
format of the survey guided the participant only through relevant questions ensured a 
sensible length of the questionnaire to prevent respondents suffering from boredom and 
fatigue (Lindell and Whitney, 2001). 
In addition, a Harman single factor test was conducted (Podsakoff et al., 2003). All 
dependent and independent variables were introduced into an exploratory factor analysis. 
The unrotated factor solution is summarized in Tables 20 to 22. Fifteen factors were 
identified. No single factor ‘explained’ the majority of the variance in the model. The 
Harman single factor test suggests this study does not suffer from common methods bias. 
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Table 20: Common Methods Bias Test (Harman Single Factor): Factors Determining First VC 
Investment 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative % 
FirmAge 2.04 0.39 0.14 13.63% 
Independent Firm 1.66 0.14 0.11 24.67% 
PharmaBiotechSector 1.51 0.10 0.10 34.77% 
OxCamLonRegion 1.41 0.24 0.09 44.20% 
RelativeMarketSize 1.18 0.16 0.08 52.04% 
AgeFounder 1.02 0.03 0.07 58.84% 
FounderProfessor 0.99 0.08 0.07 65.42% 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 0.91 0.04 0.06 71.50% 
FoundingTeamReputation 0.87 0.11 0.06 77.30% 
VCNetwork 0.76 0.05 0.05 82.35% 
StrategicAlliances 0.70 0.14 0.05 87.04% 
PatentedIP 0.56 0.01 0.04 90.76% 
FirmOwnsIP 0.55 0.06 0.04 94.40% 
InnovationRadicalness 0.49 0.14 0.03 97.66% 
PublicBackedEquity 0.35 . 0.02 100.00% 
 
Table 21: Common Methods Bias Test (Harman Single Factor): Factors Determining Firm 
Performance Including First VC Investment 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative % 
FirmAge 2.26 0.55 0.14 14.11% 
Independent Firm 1.70 0.15 0.11 24.76% 
PharmaBiotecSector 1.56 0.13 0.10 34.49% 
OxCamLonRegion 1.43 0.24 0.09 43.42% 
RelativeMarketSize 1.19 0.08 0.07 50.88% 
AgeFounder 1.12 0.13 0.07 57.85% 
FounderProfessor 0.99 0.05 0.06 64.03% 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 0.94 0.03 0.06 69.88% 
FoundingTeamReputation 0.90 0.14 0.06 75.52% 
VCNetwork 0.76 0.04 0.05 80.25% 
StrategicAlliances 0.72 0.11 0.04 84.74% 
PatentedIP 0.61 0.05 0.04 88.54% 
FirmOwnsIP 0.56 0.04 0.03 92.04% 
InnovationRadicalness 0.52 0.11 0.03 95.26% 
PublicBackedEquity 0.41 0.06 0.03 97.81% 
FirstVC 0.35 . 0.02 100.00% 
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Table 22: Common Methods Bias Test (Harman Single Factor): Factors Determining Firm 
Performance Including Types of First VC Investment 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative % 
FirmAge 2.19 0.48 0.13 12.87% 
Independent Firm 1.70 0.11 0.10 22.90% 
PharmaBiotecSector 1.59 0.16 0.09 32.26% 
OxCamLonRegion 1.43 0.05 0.08 40.68% 
RelativeMarketSize 1.38 0.20 0.08 48.78% 
AgeFounder 1.18 0.13 0.07 55.69% 
FounderProfessor 1.04 0.05 0.06 61.82% 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 0.99 0.07 0.06 67.62% 
FoundingTeamReputation 0.92 0.04 0.05 73.01% 
VCNetwork 0.88 0.12 0.05 78.18% 
StrategicAlliances 0.76 0.05 0.04 82.63% 
PatentedIP 0.71 0.14 0.04 86.80% 
FirmOwnsIP 0.56 0.01 0.03 90.12% 
InnovationRadicalness 0.56 0.05 0.03 93.39% 
PublicBackedEquity 0.50 0.17 0.03 96.35% 
GeneralistVC 0.34 0.05 0.02 98.33% 
SpecialistVC 0.28 . 0.02 100.00% 
 
 
3.5 Variable Operationalisation 
3.5.1 Dependent Variables 
3.5.1.1 Dependent Variables for First VC Investment 
 
Eight dependent variables relating to first VC investment in USOs by 2008 were 
collected, and they are summarized in Table 23. This table illustrates the name of each 
dependent variable, the data source (i.e. primary or secondary data) and a brief description 
of the variable. Further, the questions related to measurements from the survey are shown 
followed by their response categories and coding. References for replicated dependent 
variables are indicated. 
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Table 23: Dependent Variables Relating to First VC Investment by 2008 
Dependent 
Variables 
Source of Data Description Question (if Primary Data) Response Categories and Coding Used before in 
First VC 
investment 
(yes or no) 
Primary Data; 
Secondary Data: 
Library House 
Whether a USO attracted a 
first round of VC investment 
until 2008. 
Please provide the 
distribution of equity 
ownership in your company  
Time 1: Immediately after 
your company first received 
outside equity investment. 
Ownership percentage of first VC 
investment (0-100%) 
Recoded into two categories for 
the event of first VC Investment: 1 
= Yes, if ownership percentage of 
first VC investment 1% or greater; 
0 = No, if ownership percentage of 
first VC investment is 0% 
Shane and Stuart 
(2002) 
Number of 
first VC 
investment 
offers 
Primary Data Number of first VC investment 
offers attracted by a USO until 
2008. 
How many venture capitalists 
made a formal offer to invest 
in your company? 
Continuous number of first VC 
Offers 
 
Number of 
first VC 
investment 
offers 
(multinominal) 
Primary Data Nominal categories of number 
of first VC investment offers 
attracted by a USO until 2008. 
How many venture capitalists 
made a formal offer to invest 
in your company? 
Continuous number of first offers 
recoded into three categories: 0 = 
No VC; 1 = One Offer; 2 = Two or 
more offers 
 
Number of 
first VC 
investments 
Primary Data Number of first VC 
investments attracted by a 
USO until 2008. 
How many venture capitalists 
have invested in your 
company? 
Continuous number of first VC 
Investments 
Lerner (1994); 
Sorenson and 
Stuart ( 2001) 
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Table 23 (Continued): Dependent Variables Measuring First VC Investment in USOs by 2008 
Dependent 
Variables 
Source of Data Description Question (if Primary Data) Response Categories and Coding Used before in 
Number of 
first VC 
investments 
(multinominal) 
Primary Data Nominal categories of number 
of first VC investments 
attracted by a USO until 2008. 
How many venture capitalists 
have invested in your 
company? 
Continuous number of first offers 
recoded into three categories: 0 = 
No VC; 1 = One Investment; 2 = 
Two or more Investments 
 
Amount of 
first VC 
investment (£) 
Primary Data Amount of first VC 
investments attracted by a 
USO until 2008. 
 Continuous amount of first VC 
Investments 
Lerner (1994); 
Sorenson and 
Stuart ( 2001) 
Amount of 
first VC 
investments 
(£) 
(multinominal) 
Primary Data Nominal categories of amount 
of first VC investments 
attracted by a USO until 2008. 
 Continuous amount number of first 
offers recoded into three 
categories: 0 = No VC; 1 = £1 to 
£500,000; 2 = More than £500,000 
 
VC Investor 
Types 
Secondary Data: 
BVCA 
Nominal categories whether a 
USO attracted no first VC, 
Generalist or Specialist VC 
investment until 2008. 
 
VC investors are regarded as 
specialists if more than half of 
their portfolio of investees 
relates to a single sector or 
industry.  
 Three categories: 0 =No VC; 1 = 
GeneralistVC; 2 = SpecialistVC 
Murray and Lott, 
(1995); Lockett et 
al. (2002) 
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3.5.1.2 Dependent Variables for USO Firm Performance 
 
Seven dependent variables relating to USO firm performance was collected from 
secondary data sources. They are summarized in Table 24. 
Table 24: Dependent Variables Relating to USOs Firm Performance until 2008 
Dependent 
Variables 
Source of Data Description Coding Used before in 
Total Number 
of External 
Investment 
Rounds 
Secondary 
Data: Library 
House 
Total number of all funding 
rounds received from all 
types of external investors 
(incl. VC investment, public 
backed equity, business 
angels, grants and awards) 
until 2008. 
Continuous Vohora et al. 
(2004) 
Total Amount 
of External 
Investment (£) 
Secondary 
Data: Library 
House 
Total amount of all external 
funding received from all 
types of external investors 
(incl. VC investment, public 
backed equity, business 
angels, grants and awards) 
until 2008. 
Continuous  
Product 
Launch (yes or 
no) 
Secondary 
Data: Library 
House 
Whether USO has been able 
to launch the first product 
or service to the market by 
2008. 
Categories of 
Product 
Launch: 1 = 
Yes; 0 = No 
De Coster and 
Butler (2005) 
Book Value of 
Total Assets 
(£) 
Secondary 
Data: FAME 
Value of total assets in USO 
in 2008. 
Continuous Gompers and 
Lerner (2006) 
Number 
Employees  
Secondary 
Data: FAME, 
Library House 
Number of employees in 
2008. 
Continuous Davidsson et al. 
(2006) 
Employment 
Change 
Secondary 
Data: FAME, 
Library House 
Change in employment 
between founding year and 
2008. 
Continuous Davidsson et al. 
(2006); Davila et 
al. (2003) 
Composite 
Measure of 
Firm 
Performance 
Secondary 
Data: FAME, 
Library House 
Factor score: Total Number 
of Funding Rounds, Total 
Amount of Funding, Book 
Value of Total Assets, 
Number of Employees, 
Employment Change. 
Continuous  
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A composite performance variable was computed. A PCA model was computed with 
reference to six dependent variables relating to the total number of funding rounds, total 
amount of funding, product launch, total assets, employment size and employment growth. 
Table 25 shows the correlation matrix relating to the 6 dependent variables. To satisfy the 
assumptions of PCA analysis, the product launch variable had to be removed from the 
analysis. A single component that explained 65% of the variance is summarized in Table 26. 
Components scores relating to this composite performance variable were considered as an 
additional dependent variable. 
 
Table 25: Correlation Table of Dependent Variables Measuring USOs’ Firm Performance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total Number of Funding Rounds 1 
    
 
Total Amount of Funding 0.54*** 1 
   
 
Product Launch -0.22* 0 1 
  
 
Total Assets 0.35*** 0.63*** 0.16† 1 
 
 
Employment Size 0.36*** 0.65*** 0.15 0.68*** 1  
Employment Growth 0.31*** 0.62*** 0.17† 0.57*** 0.81*** 1 
 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
Table 26: PCA Model Relating to Composite Measure for USOs’ Firm Performance  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
  Component Communality (h2) 
Total Number of Funding Rounds 0.591 0.349 
Total Amount of Funding 0.859 0.738 
Total Assets 0.811 0.658 
Employment Size 0.893 0.797 
Employment Growth 0.844 0.712 
Sums of squares of the component loadings 3.255 2.242 
Percent of variance 65.080   
Cumulative percent of variance 65.080   
Diagnostics for sufficient correlations: 
Bartlett test of sphericity (Chi2) 362.27*** 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy 0.78 (Middling) 
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3.5.2 Independent Variables 
 
This section presents all independent variables which are used to test their 
hypothesised relationships with the dependent variables of USOs’ ability to attract first VC 
investment and firm performance by 2008. For this reason all independent variables of USOs 
with VC investment are measured at a point in time prior to their first VC investment. USOs 
without VC investment report their most recent measures in 2008. This approach allows 
identifying whether the same potential signals of quality which can attract first VC 
investment have a positive relationship with firm performance. 
The following subsections introduce the independent variables in blocks of their 
resource categories starting with general and specific human capital, networks, intellectual 
capital as well as finance. For independent variables with measures which are derived from 
multi-item scale their statistical tests of principal component analysis (PCA) for construct 
validity and Cronbach’s Alpha for internal robustness are reported. Where possible 
measures are replicated or extended based on previous studies. 
 
3.5.2.1 Independent Variables Measuring General Human Capital 
 
Two variables relating to founders general human capital were operationalized. The 
first variable in Table 27 relates to the age of the founding academic entrepreneur when 
they started the USO. This variable relates to previous investment in education and 
experience. The second variable relates to the academic status of the founder being a 
professor when the firm was founded. 
 
3.5.2.2 Independent Variables Measuring Specific Human Capital 
 
Two variables relating to founders specific human capital were operationalized. The 
first variable in Table 28 relates to the previous business ownership experience of 
respondents. 
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Table 27: Independent Variables Measuring General Human Capital 
Independent Variables Source of 
Data 
Description Question (if primary data) Response 
Categories and 
Coding 
Used before 
in 
AgeFounder Primary 
Data 
Age of the founder when 
they founded the firm. 
Your year of birth: 
 
Continuous (Aldrich, 
1999) 
FounderProfessor Secondary 
Data: 
Library 
House 
Academic status of the 
founder being a professor 
when they founded the firm. 
 Yes = 1, No = 0 Shane and 
Stuart (2002) 
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Table 28: Independent Variables Measuring Specific Human Capital 
Independent Variables Source of 
Data 
Description Question (if primary data) Response 
Categories and 
Coding 
Used before in 
FounderHabitual 
Entrepreneur 
Primary 
Data 
Previous business ownership 
experience. 
Did you found other companies before this one? 
Did any of your co-founders have previous 
business experience? 
 
 
Yes = 1, No = 0 Shane and Stuart 
(2002); Hsu (2007) 
Shane and Cable 
(2002); Baum and 
Silverman (2004) 
Founding 
TeamReputation 
Primary 
Data 
Founding team experience 
and reputation (valid and 
reliable multi-item construct 
relating to component 
scores. 
Please indicate how much you agree with the 
following statements concerning your founding 
team: 
 At least one member of the team had 
founded a successful company before. 
 We expected our team would be credible to 
potential investors. 
 A trusted third party believed our team 
could successfully start a company. 
 We thought that our team's experience 
would be attractive to potential investors. 
Strongly 
disagree = 1, 
Disagree = 2 , 
Neither agree 
nor disagree = 3, 
Agree = 4; 
Strongly agree = 
5 
 
Shane and Cable 
(2002) 
139 
 
Table 29: PCA Model Relating to Founding Teams’ Previous Entrepreneurial and Business Experience 
Question and items Component Communality (h2) 
Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements concerning your founding team. 1 
 At least one member of the team had founded a successful company before. 0.694 0.482 
We expected our team would be credible to potential investors. 0.963 0.927 
A trusted third party believed our team could successfully start a company. 0.93 0.865 
We thought that our team's experience would be attractive to potential investors. 0.965 0.931 
Sums of squares of the component loadings 3.205 2.706 
Percent of variance 80.121 
 Cumulative percent of variance 80.121 
 Diagnostics for sufficient correlations: 
Bartlett test of sphericity (Chi2) 544.02*** 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy 0.81 (Meritorious) 
Robustness: 
Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items 0.91 
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A distinction is made between habitual founders with prior business ownership experience 
and novice entrepreneurs with no prior business ownership experience. The second variable 
relates to the founding teams previous entrepreneurial and business experience as well as 
reputation. Respondents were presented with four questions (Cable and Shane, 2002), and 
they were asked to rank their responses to each item on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) scale. A PCA model was computed with reference to the four items. Table 
29 shows that a single valid component was identified. The latter scale had a Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.91. Component scores relating to this founding teams previous entrepreneurial 
and business experience as well as reputation component were included in the presented 
regression models. 
 
3.5.2.3 Independent Variables Measuring Networks 
 
Two variables relating to USOs’ networks were operationalized. The first variable in 
Table 30 relates to the percentage of previous USOs from the same university of origin 
which successfully attract VC investment which measures available indirect ties to VC 
investors. The second variable relates to whether USOs have inter-firm networks of strategic 
alliances or not. 
 
3.5.2.4 Independent Variables Measuring Intellectual Capital 
 
Three variables relating to USOs’ intellectual capital were operationalized. The first 
variable in Table 31 relates to whether a USO had patented IP or not. The second variable 
relates to whether the IP is owned by the firm or not. The third variable relates to the 
radicalness of innovation in USOs’ business models. The radicalness of innovation was 
measured with reference to the themes suggested by Marvel and Lumpkin (2007). The 
business model and marketing activities of each USO was ascertained with reference to 
material stored on the Library House database. 
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The following seven statements were considered with reference to the information 
relating to each USO: large group of customers already use a very similar product / service; 
product / service represents an entirely new type of product / service; product / service may 
be described as a new technology; product / service is a gradual progression upon the last 
generation; product / service is a product line extension; product / service satisfies a need 
not met by competitors; and product / service is a new twist on an old theme. With 
reference to each statement, this researcher allocated a score of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). A PCA model was computed with reference to the seven statements. To 
satisfy the assumptions of PCA three statements had to be removed. Table 29 shows that a 
single valid component was identified. The latter scale had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.65. 
Component scores relating to this innovation radicalness component were included in the 
presented regression models. 
3.5.2.5 Independent Variables Measuring Financial Resources 
 
Two variables relating to USOs’ networks were operationalized. The variable in 
Table 33 relates to financial resources of the USO. It is measured whether USOs have 
received public backed equity investment prior to attracting first VC investment or not. 
  
3.5.2.6 Independent Variables Measuring VC Investment used to Explore USO 
Performance 
 
The second research questions relates to USO performance. In addition to the 
previously introduced independent variables characterising the initial resources of USOs, 
USOs’ ability to attract first VC investment is now also included as an independent variable 
to explore the second research question. This approach has been discussed in Section 2.6.2 
leading to the theoretical framework in Figure 14. 
Three independent variables relating to whether USOs have obtained first VC 
investment by 2008 were operationalized. The first variable in Table 34 is the former binary 
dependent variable introduced in Section 3.5.1.2 relating to whether USOs have obtained 
first VC investment or not by 2008. 
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Table 30: Independent Variables Measuring Networks 
Independent 
Variables 
Source of Data Description Question (if primary data) Response Categories and Coding Used before in 
VCNetwork Secondary Data: 
Library House 
Percentage of previous USOs 
from university of origin which 
received VC funding 
 
 1 = 0-15%, 2 = 15- 30%, 3 = 30-45%, 
4 = 45-60%, 5 = 60-75%, 6 = 75-
100% 
 
Strategic 
Alliances 
Secondary Data: 
Library House 
Inter-firm networks of USO.  Yes = 1, No = 0 Baum and Silverman 
(2004) 
 
Table 31: Independent Variables Measuring Intellectual Capital 
Independent 
Variables 
Source of Data Description Question (if primary 
data) 
Response Categories and Coding Used before 
in 
PatentedIP Primary Data Number patents present 
in the USO before the 
first VC investment. 
How many patents were 
held by your company 
before receiving funding 
from an outside equity 
investor? 
Continuous recoded into 0 = no patents; 1 = one or 
more patents 
Shane and 
Stuart (2002); 
Hsu (2007) 
FirmOwnsIP Primary Data Measures whether the 
ownership of IP is 
assigned to the USO 
before the first VC 
investment. 
Who owns the 
intellectual property (IP) 
in your company? 
 
1 = Founders; 2 = Company, 3 = University; 4 = 
Other (please specify) 
Recoded into dummy variable 1 = IP ownership 
owned by USO; 0 = IP ownership not owned by USO 
 
143 
 
Table 31 (Continued): Independent Variables Measuring Intellectual Capital 
Independent 
Variables 
Source of Data Description Question (if primary data) Response 
Categories and 
Coding 
Used before 
in 
Innovation 
Radicalness 
Secondary Data: 
Library House 
Multi-tem scale 
measuring the degree 
of radical innovation 
of USOs’ business 
models 
 Large group of customers already use a very similar 
product / service 
 Product / service represents an entirely new type of 
product / service 
 Product / service may be described as a new technology 
 Product / service is a gradual progression upon the last 
generation 
 Product / service is a product line extension 
 Product / service satisfies a need not met by competitors 
 Product / service is a new twist on an old theme 
  
1 = Strongly 
Disagree; 2 = 
Disagree; 3= 
Agree; 4 = Strongly 
Agree 
Marvel and 
Lumpkin 
(2007) 
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Table 32: PCA Model Relating to Innovation Radicalness 
Items Component Communality (h2) 
 
1 
 Large group of customers already use a very similar product / service 0.760 0.577 
Product / service represents an entirely new type of product / service 0.765 0.585 
Product / service satisfies a need not met by competitors 0.428 0.183 
Product / service is a new twist on an old theme 0.814 0.663 
Sums of squares of the component loadings 2.008 1.148 
Percent of variance 50.199 
 Cumulative percent of variance 50.199 
 Diagnostics for sufficient correlations: 
Bartlett test of sphericity (Chi2) 80.76*** 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy 0.67 (Mediocre) 
Robustness: 
Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items 0.65 
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Table 33: Independent Variables Measuring Financial Resources 
Independent Variables Source of 
Data 
Description Question (if primary data) Response 
Categories and 
Coding 
Used before 
in 
PublicBackedEquity Primary Data; 
Secondary 
Data: Library 
House 
Previous investments by public backed 
equity in USO. 
Please provide the distribution of 
equity ownership in your company 
Time 1: Immediately after your 
company first received outside 
equity investment. 
 
Ownership 
percentage of 
Public Backed 
Equity (0-100%) 
Recoded into two 
categories: 1 = Yes, 
0 = No 
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Table 34: Independent Variables Measuring First VC Investment for Models on USO Firm Performance 
Independent Variables Source of 
Data 
Description Question (if primary data) Response Categories and 
Coding 
Used before 
in 
First VC investment (yes or 
no) 
Primary Data; 
Secondary 
Data: Library 
House 
Whether a USO attracted a first round 
of VC investment until 2008. 
Please provide the 
distribution of equity 
ownership in your 
company  
Time 1: Immediately after 
your company first 
received outside equity 
investment. 
Ownership percentage of 
first VC investment (0-
100%) 
Recoded into two 
categories for the event of 
first VC Investment: 1 = 
Yes, if ownership 
percentage of first VC 
investment 1% or greater; 
0 = No, if ownership 
percentage of first VC 
investment is 0% 
Shane and 
Stuart 
(2002) 
Generalist VC Secondary 
Data: BVCA 
First investment attracted from a 
generalist VC with a portfolio of 
investees of which less than half relate 
to a single sector or industry. 
 1 = Yes; 0 = No Lockett et al, 
2002 
Specialist VC Secondary 
Data: BVCA 
First investment attracted from a 
specialist VC with a portfolio of 
investees of which more than half 
relate to a single sector or industry. 
 
 1 = Yes; 0 = No Lockett et al, 
2002 
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Table 35: Control Variables 
Control Variables Source of Data Description Question (if Primary 
Data) 
Response Categories and 
Coding 
Used before in 
FirmAge Secondary 
Data: Library 
House, FAME, 
Companies 
House 
USO’s age in 2008 since 
founding year (as early as 
1990).  
 Continuous Becchetti and 
Trovato (2002) 
Lopez-Gracia and 
Sogorb-Mira (2008) 
IndependentFirm Primary Data 
and Secondary 
Data: Library 
House, FAME, 
Companies 
House  
Company status of USO in 
2008 is an independent 
private firm. 
What is the status of 
your company? 
 
Response categories in 
questionnaire: 1 = It is still in 
business; 
2= It was merged or acquired; 
3 = It is out of business 
 
Elimination of USOs out of 
business from sampling frame 
and recoding to 
1 = Independent Firm 
0 = IPO, Merged or Acquired 
Shane and Stuart, 
(2002) Busenitz et 
al. (2005) 
PharmaBiotecSector Secondary 
Data: Library 
House, FAME, 
Companies 
House 
USO is active in Pharma and 
Biotech sector 
 1 = Yes; 0 = No Stuart and 
Sorenson (2000); 
Baum Silverman 
(2004); Maurer and 
Ebers (2006) 
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Table 35 (Continued): Control Variables 
Control Variables Source of Data Description Question (if Primary 
Data) 
Response Categories 
and Coding 
Used before in 
OxCamLonRegion Secondary 
Data: Library 
House, FAME, 
Companies 
House 
USO originates from the Oxford, 
London and Cambridge cluster 
 1 = Yes; 0 = No Florida and Smith 
(1993); Mason and 
Harrison (2002); 
Gompers and 
Lerner (2006) 
RelativeMarketSize Secondary 
Data: FAME 
Relative market size measures the 
average turnover in USOs’ sector 
divided by the number of competitors 
in the sector. Data was used based on 
the four digit SIC code of the USO’s 
primary sector. 
If VC investment was attracted, the 
measure of relative market-size was 
computed for the year when this 
investment was obtained. 
If no VC investment was attracted, 
the most recent relative market size 
in 2008 was used. 
 Continuous Shane and Cable 
(2002) 
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The remaining two independent variables in Table 34 relate to the type of VC 
investor. They are operationalized as two dummy variables representing three categories 
(Hair et al., 2006). Two binary variables indicate whether USOs have received their first VC 
investment from a generalist or a specialist. As defined before in Section 3.5.1.2, generalist 
VC investors have less than half of their portfolio composed of investees from a single 
industry or sector. Specialist VC investors have a portfolio of which more than half of their 
investees relate to a single industry or sector. The group of USOs which did not obtain VC 
investment is omitted being the reference category. 
 
3.5.3 Control Variables 
 
Five variables relating to control variables for the forthcoming analysis were 
operationalized. The control variables in Table 35 relate to firm age, company status, sector, 
region and relative market size. 
 
3.6 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
3.6.1 Regression Techniques 
 
Regression analysis explores the links between selected independent variables and a 
dependent variable (binary, ordinal, categorical or continuous) (Hair et al., 2006). A 
regression model should be significant at least at the 0.1 level of analysis. The direction and 
strength of a relationship between an individual independent variable and the dependent 
variable can be summarized in a beta coefficient. The significance of each individual 
relationship can be tested with reference to a ‘t’ test. 
Logistic regression analysis can be used to explore a binary dependent variable. 
Dependent variables relating to first VC investment by 2008 (yes or no) and product launch 
(yes or no). A logarithm is used to derive the beta coefficients relating to independent and 
control variables. To facilitate interpretation, the beta coefficients are transformed using the 
constant e, which is the base of the natural logarithm, by the power of the coefficient (i.e. 
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Exp(B)). This transformation leads to log odds. For example, If the Exp(B) of an independent 
variable equals 1.5 an increase in this variable by one unit increases the positive likelihood 
of the dependent variable by 1.5 to occur. Conversely, Exp(B) coefficients which are smaller 
than zero indicate a negative likelihood of the dependent variable event. 
Tobit regression analysis can be used to explore an ordinal dependent variable. 
Three continuous dependent variables relating to number of first VC offers, number of first 
VC investment and amount of first VC investment by 2008 were explored using tobit 
regression analysis. Respondents that reported zero responses can be included in tobit 
regression models. 
Multinomial regression analysis can be used to explore categorical dependent 
variables with three or more categories. Total number of VC rounds by 2008 (i.e., ‘no offers’, 
one offer’ and two or more offers’) and total amount of VC funding by 2008 (i.e., ‘no 
investment’, ‘one investment’ and ‘two or more investments’) dependent variables were 
both transformed into three categories. Multinomial regression analysis was also used to 
explore the dependent variable relating to the type of first VC investment (no first VC 
finance obtained = 0, first VC investment from a generalist = 1, first VC investment from a 
specialist = 2) and amount of first VC investment (none = 0, 1 = £1 to £500,000, 2 = 
>£500,000). 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis can be used to explore continuous 
dependent variables that had not be transformed into categories. These include Total 
Number of External Investment Rounds Attracted Until 2008, Total Amount of External 
Investment (£’s) Attracted Until 2008Book Value of Total Assets (£’s) Until 2008, Number of 
Employees in the USOs in 2008, Absolute Employment Change between Founding Year and 
2008 and a Composite Measure of Firm Performance. These variables were standardised in 
dividing them by the age of the firm as well as normalised using the natural logarithm. 
Hierarchical regression analysis was conducted. Blocks of control and independent 
variables were considered with regression models. Finally, full models including all control 
and independent variables are presented. The statistical significance of each model is 
compared with reference to its level of statistical significance. Each models level of 
‘explanation’ is also reported. Variations in ‘explanation’ between each model are 
monitored (i.e., change in R2 between each model). The STATA 10.0 statistical software 
package was used to compute all the presented regression models in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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3.6.2 Assumptions of Statistical Techniques: Overview 
 
The assumptions of regression analysis relating to the general linear model need to 
be tested and not violated (Hair et al., 2006). Assumptions relating to normality, 
homoscedasticity, linearity and multicollinearity are discussed, in turn, below. 
 
3.6.2.1 Normality 
 
It is assumed that each continuous variable has a normal distribution (Hair et al., 
2006). Two normality tests were conducted. Skewness and a kurtosis tests (D'Agostino et al., 
1990) as well as the non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov ‘Z’ tests are shown in Table 36. 
Several variables were found not to have a normal distribution. Some variables were 
transformed. Variables indicated with the symbols ‘ # ‘ in Table 36 were included in the 
presented regression models.  
 
3.6.2.2 Homoscedasticity and Heteroscedasticity 
 
The homoscedasticity assumption is met when the variance of error terms is 
constant across the range of variables included in the regression analysis (Hair et al., 2006). 
A violation of this assumption is referred to as heteroscedacticity. Especially in cross-
sectional samples and dependent variables which are capturing temporal effects 
heteroscedacticity is a common effect (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). To reduce the problem 
of temporal effects, continuous dependent variables relating to firm performance were 
divided by the age of the firm. The standardised dependent variables of total number of 
funding rounds, total amount of funding, book value of total assets, number of employees 
and employment Change were already summarized in Table 36 Computational tests for 
heteroscedacticity were conducted using STATA 10.0’s ‘hettest’ (Breusch and Pagan, 1979; 
Cook and Weisberg, 1983). The significance of the tests for heteroscedasticity are reported 
in the presented OLS regression models. There is no strong evidence to suggest the 
regression models are distorted by heteroscedasticity 
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Table 36: Normality Tests for Continuous Variables: Skewness/Kurtosis and Kolmogorov-Smirnov ‘Z’ tests 
Variable 
Transformation 
Skewness/Kurtosis Tests for Normality Kolmogorov-Smirnov ‘Z’ Tests for Normality 
n Skewness Kurtosis Chi
2
 p Absolute Positive Negative K-S Z p 
FirmAge
#
  125 0.04 0.96 4.29 0.12 0.12 0.12 -0.06 1.28 0.07 
RelativeMarketize  125 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.42 0.42 -0.39 4.61 0.00 
LogRelativeMarketize
#
 Natural Logarithm 125 0.00 0.36 10.15 0.01 0.12 0.12 -0.08 1.29 0.07 
FounderAge
#
 Natural Logarithm 125 0.25 0.36 2.21 0.33 0.08 0.05 -0.08 0.90 0.39 
FoundingTeamReputation
#
  125 0.61 0.99 0.26 0.88 0.10 0.10 -0.08 1.11 0.17 
VCNetwork
#
  125 0.25 0.42 2.01 0.37 0.17 0.17 -0.16 1.95 0.00 
InnovationRadicalness
#
  125 0.00 0.04 11.64 0.00 0.10 0.10 -0.07 1.16 0.14 
Venture CapitalSum of Amount  125 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.38 0.37 -0.38 4.28 0.00 
LogVentureCapitalSumofAmount
#
 Natural Logarithm 125 0.09 0.84 3.14 0.21 0.18 0.18 -0.08 1.38 0.04 
NumberFundingRounds  125 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.26 0.26 -0.26 2.89 0.00 
WeighNumberFundingRounds Divided by FirmAge 125 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.25 0.25 -0.25 2.81 0.00 
Log WeighNumberFundingRounds
#
 Natural Logarithm 125 0.09 0.47 3.50 0.17 0.08 0.08 -0.05 0.85 0.47 
TotalAmountFunding  125 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.40 0.40 -0.39 4.50 0.00 
WeighTotalAmountFunding Divided by FirmAge 125 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.39 0.38 -0.39 4.39 0.00 
LogWeighTotalAmountFunding Natural Logarithm 125 0.02      0.49               5.93 0.05 0.09 0.09 -0.05 0.97 0.30 
TotalAssets  125 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.35 0.35 -0.35 3.93 0.00 
WeighTotalAssets Divided by FirmAge 125 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.34 0.33 -0.34 3.82 0.00 
LogWeighTotalAssets
#
 Natural Logarithm 125 0.00 0.02 11.71 0.00 0.06 0.03 -0.06 0.65 0.80 
NumberEmployees2008  125 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.31 0.31 -0.29 3.50 0.00 
WeighEmployees2008 Divided by FirmAge 125 0.00 0.00 68.20 0.00 0.25 0.25 -0.24 2.81 0.00 
Log WeighEmployees2008
#
 Natural Logarithm 125 0.42 0.60 0.95 0.62 0.05 0.05 -0.04 0.61 0.86 
EmploymentChange  125 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.33 0.33 -0.30 3.70 0.00 
WeighEmploymentChange Divided by FirmAge 125 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.26 0.26 -0.25 2.91 0.00 
AtanWeighEmploymentChange
#
 Radian value of arctangent 125 0.00 0.96 10.83 0.00 0.13 0.13 -0.09 1.49 0.02 
Variables marked with ‘ 
# 
’
 
were included in the regression models.
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3.6.2.3 Linearity 
 
The relationship between the dependent variable and each independent variable is 
required to be linear. Following Hair et al., (2006), residuals from the respective OLS 
regression models were plotted. These residual vs. predicted values plot and added variable 
plots (Hamilton, 2006) are shown in Section 2 of the Appendix. There is no evidence to 
suggest that the linearity assumption has been violated.  
 
3.6.2.4 Multicollinearity 
 
Multicollinearity implies that two or more independent variables are measuring the 
same phenomenon. A correlation matrix relating to all independent and control variables 
needs to be presented to test for multicollinearity. High correlations between paired 
independent variables suggest potential multicollinearity. Bivariate correlation coefficients 
below 0.7 suggest that multicollinerity is not a major problem (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). 
In addition, each variable’s Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is reported. According to Hair et 
al. (2006), the traditional rule of thumb is that no VIF score should exceed 10. They suggest 
that the value should be lower with regard to smaller samples (see also Cohen et al. (2003)). 
Control and independent variables used in regression models to explore the dependent 
variables relating to the first VC investment by 2008 are summarized in Table 37. Variables 
included in regression models relating to USO firm performance are summarized in Tables 
38 and 39. 
No signs of multicollinearity were detected as no correlation coefficient exceeded 0.50. 
Further, none of the reported VIF scores was higher than 2.00. Therefore, all control and 
independent variables can be included in the regression models. 
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Table 37: Correlation Matrix Relating to Control and Independent Variables Included in Regression Models Focusing Upon First VC Investment by 2008 
 
VIF (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
FirmAge 1.24 1 
       Independent Firm 1.22 -0.18* 1 
      PharmaBiotecSector 1.09 0.05 -0.01 1 
     OxCamLonRegion 1.43 0.04 0.01 0.13 1 
    RelativeMarketSize 1.14 0.01 -0.26** 0.05 0.04 1 
   AgeFounder 1.28 -0.03 0.00 0.15† 0.23** 0.12 1 
  FounderProfessor 1.40 0.17† -0.26** 0.09 0.24** 0.11 0.34*** 1 
 FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 1.28 0.02 0.04 -0.11 0.12 0.01 0.05 0.03 1 
FoundingTeamReputation 1.44 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.05 0.16† 0.04 -0.09 0.36*** 
VCNetwork 1.48 -0.09 -0.04 0.10 0.40*** 0.15† 0.09 0.15† 0.17† 
StrategicAlliances 1.04 0.04 0.00 0.06 -0.06 0.05 0.01 -0.05 0.00 
PatentedIP 1.22 0.00 -0.03 0.09 0.24** 0.07 -0.01 0.21† -0.08 
FirmOwnsIP 1.24 0.26** -0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.16† 
InnovationRadicalness 1.19 -0.07 0.10 -0.01 0.07 0.00 0.10 -0.01 0.11 
PublicBackedEquity 1.13 -0.22* 0.02 0.00 -0.05 0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.15† 
          Mean VIF 1.25 
         
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 37 (Continued): Correlation Matrix Relating to Control and Independent Variables Included in Regression Models Focusing Upon First VC Investment by 
2008 
 
VIF (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
FirmAge 1.24 
       Independent Firm 1.22 
       PharmaBiotecSector 1.09 
       OxCamLonRegion 1.43 
       RelativeMarketSize 1.14 
       AgeFounder 1.28 
       FounderProfessor 1.40 
       FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 1.28 
       FoundingTeamReputation 1.44 1 
      VCNetwork 1.48 0.26** 1 
     StrategicAlliances 1.04 0.02 0.06 1 
    PatentedIP 1.22 -0.15† 0.04 -0.06 1 
   FirmOwnsIP 1.24 -0.05 0.06 -0.02 -0.17† 1 
  InnovationRadicalness 1.19 -0.09 0.18* 0.09 0.02 0.22* 1 
 PublicBackedEquity 1.13 -0.02 0.09 0.07 0.09 -0.04 -0.05 1 
         Mean VIF 1.25 
        
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 38: Correlation Matrix Relating to Control and Independent Variables Included in Regression Models Focusing Upon USO Firm Performance 
 
VIF (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
FirmAge 1.25 1 
       Independent Firm 1.23 -0.18* 1 
      PharmaBiotecSector 1.10 0.05 -0.01 1 
     OxCamLonRegion 1.43 0.04 0.01 0.13 1 
    RelativeMarketSize 1.14 0.01 -0.26** 0.05 0.04 1 
   AgeFounder 1.28 -0.03 0.00 0.15† 0.23** 0.12 1 
  FounderProfessor 1.44 0.17† -0.26** 0.09 0.24** 0.11 0.34*** 1 
 FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 1.28 0.02 0.04 -0.11 0.12 0.01 0.05 0.03 1 
FoundingTeamReputation 1.52 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.05 0.16† 0.04 -0.09 0.36*** 
VCNetwork 1.57 -0.09 -0.04 0.10 0.40*** 0.15† 0.09 0.15† 0.17† 
StrategicAlliances 1.07 0.04 0.00 0.06 -0.06 0.05 0.01 -0.05 0.00 
PatentedIP 1.26 0.00 -0.03 0.09 0.24** 0.07 -0.01 0.21† -0.08 
FirmOwnsIP 1.28 0.26** -0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.16† 
InnovationRadicalness 1.20 -0.07 0.10 -0.01 0.07 0.00 0.10 -0.01 0.11 
PublicBackedEquity 1.17 -0.22* 0.02 0.00 -0.05 0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.15† 
First VC investment 1.47 -0.08 -0.16† -0.07 0.13 0.12 0.05 0.22* 0.11 
          Mean VIF 1.29 
         
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 38 (Continued): Correlation Matrix Relating to Control and Independent Variables Included in Regression Models Focusing Upon USO Firm Performance 
 
VIF (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
FirmAge 1.25 
        Independent Firm 1.23 
        PharmaBiotecSector 1.10 
        OxCamLonRegion 1.43 
        RelativeMarketSize 1.14 
        AgeFounder 1.28 
        FounderProfessor 1.44 
        FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 1.28 
        FoundingTeamReputation 1.52 1 
       VCNetwork 1.57 0.26** 1 
      StrategicAlliances 1.07 0.02 0.06 1 
     PatentedIP 1.26 -0.15† 0.04 -0.06 1 
    FirmOwnsIP 1.28 -0.05 0.06 -0.02 -0.17† 1 
   InnovationRadicalness 1.20 -0.09 0.18* 0.09 0.02 0.22* 1 
  PublicBackedEquity 1.17 -0.02 0.09 0.07 0.09 -0.04 -0.05 1 
 First VC investment 1.47 0.28** 0.37*** 0.12 0.16† 0.11 0.00 0.21* 1 
          Mean VIF 1.29 
         
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 39: Correlation Matrix Relating to Control and Independent Variables Included in Regression Models Focusing Upon Type of First VC Investment (No 
Investment, Generalist or Specialist) 
 
VIF (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
FirmAge 1.25 1 
       Independent Firm 1.23 -0.18* 1 
      PharmaBiotecSector 1.13 0.05 -0.01 1 
     OxCamLonRegion 1.48 0.04 0.01 0.13 1 
    RelativeMarketSize 1.15 0.01 -0.26** 0.05 0.04 1 
   AgeFounder 1.28 -0.03 0.00 0.15† 0.23** 0.12 1 
  FounderProfessor 1.46 0.17† -0.26** 0.09 0.24** 0.11 0.34*** 1 
 FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 1.28 0.02 0.04 -0.11 0.12 0.01 0.05 0.03 1 
FoundingTeamReputation 1.52 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.05 0.16† 0.04 -0.09 0.36*** 
VCNetwork 1.65 -0.09 -0.04 0.10 0.40*** 0.15† 0.09 0.15† 0.17† 
StrategicAlliances 1.07 0.04 0.00 0.06 -0.06 0.05 0.01 -0.05 0.00 
PatentedIP 1.29 0.00 -0.03 0.09 0.24** 0.07 -0.01 0.21† -0.08 
FirmOwnsIP 1.28 0.26** -0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.16† 
InnovationRadicalness 1.23 -0.07 0.10 -0.01 0.07 0.00 0.10 -0.01 0.11 
PublicBackedEquity 1.17 -0.22* 0.02 0.00 -0.05 0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.15† 
Generalist VC 1.78 -0.07 -0.04 -0.15† -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.03 
Specialist VC 1.67 -0.02 -0.13 0.07 0.17† 0.14 0.07 0.21* 0.09 
          Mean VIF 1.35 
        Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 39 (Continued): Correlation Matrix Relating to Control and Independent Variables Included in Regression Models Focusing Upon Type of First VC 
Investment (No Investment, Generalist or Specialist) 
 
VIF (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
FirmAge 1.25 
         Independent Firm 1.23 
         PharmaBiotecSector 1.13 
         OxCamLonRegion 1.48 
         RelativeMarketSize 1.15 
         AgeFounder 1.28 
         FounderProfessor 1.46 
         FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 1.28 
         FoundingTeamReputation 1.52 1 
        VCNetwork 1.65 0.26** 1 
       StrategicAlliances 1.07 0.02 0.06 1 
      PatentedIP 1.29 -0.15† 0.04 -0.06 1 
     FirmOwnsIP 1.28 -0.05 0.06 -0.02 -0.17† 1 
    InnovationRadicalness 1.23 -0.09 0.18* 0.09 0.02 0.22* 1 
   PublicBackedEquity 1.17 -0.02 0.09 0.07 0.09 -0.04 -0.05 1 
  Generalist VC 1.78 0.14 0.24** 0.08 0.13 0.02 -0.11 0.13 1 
 Specialist VC 1.67 0.15† 0.15† 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.09 -0.45*** 1 
           Mean VIF 1.35 
         Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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3.7 Overview of Hypotheses and Independent Variables  
 
The independent variables linked to the hypotheses relating to first VC investment by 
2008 and USO firm performance discussed in Chapter 2 are summarized in Tables 40 and 41, 
respectively. Hypotheses relating to first VC investment by 2008 are tested in Chapter 4, 
whilst hypotheses relating to USO firm performance are tested in Chapter 5. 
 
Table 40: Summary of Hypotheses and Independent Variables on Attraction of First VC 
Investment 
Themes of 
Internal 
Resources 
Independent 
Variables: 
Hypotheses: 
General 
Human Capital 
Age 
Founder 
Hypothesis 1: Older USO founders are more likely 
to attract first VC investment. 
Founder 
Professor 
Hypothesis 2: USO founders with higher levels of 
academic reputation are more likely to attract 
first VC investment. 
Specific 
Human Capital 
Founder 
Habitual Entrepreneur 
Hypothesis 3: USO founders who are experienced 
entrepreneurs are more likely to attract first VC 
investment. 
Founding 
Team Reputation 
Hypothesis 4: USOs with an experienced 
founding team are more likely to attract first VC 
investment. 
Networks VC 
Network 
Hypothesis 5: USOs from universities that have a 
strong network of previously VC funded USOs are 
more likely to attract first VC investment. 
Strategic 
Alliances 
Hypothesis 6: USOs with alliance partners are 
more likely to attract first VC investment. 
Intellectual 
Capital 
Patented 
IP 
Hypothesis 7: USOs with patented IP are more 
likely to attract first VC investment. 
FirmOwnsIP Hypothesis 8: USOs with IP ownership are more 
likely to attract first VC investment. 
Innovation 
Radicalness 
Hypothesis 9: USOs whose main product or 
service is associated with radical innovation are 
less likely to attract first VC investment. 
Finance Public 
Backed Equity 
Hypothesis 10: USOs that have obtained publicly-
backed equity funds are more likely to attract 
first VC investment. 
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Table 41: Summary of Hypotheses and Independent Variables on Firm Performance 
Themes of 
Internal 
Resources 
Independent 
Variables: 
Hypotheses: 
General 
Human Capital 
AgeFounder Hypothesis 11: USOs with older founders will 
report superior firm performance. 
Founder 
Professor 
Hypothesis 12: USOs with founders with higher 
levels of academic reputation will report superior 
firm performance. 
Specific 
Human Capital 
Founder 
Habitual Entrepreneur 
Hypothesis 13: USOs with experienced 
entrepreneurs will report superior firm 
performance. 
Founding 
Team Reputation 
Hypothesis 14: USOs with an experienced 
founding team will report superior firm 
performance. 
Networks VCNetwork Hypothesis 15: USOs from universities that have 
a strong network of previously VC funded USOs 
will report superior firm performance. 
Strategic 
Alliances 
Hypothesis 16: USOs with alliance partners 
report superior firm performance. 
Intellectual 
Capital 
PatentedIP Hypothesis 17: USOs with patented IP will report 
superior firm performance. 
FirmOwnsIP Hypothesis 18: USOs that own their IP will report 
superior firm performance. 
Innovation 
Radicalness 
Hypothesis 19: USOs whose main product or 
service is associated with radical innovation will 
report weaker firm performance. 
Finance Public 
Backed Equity 
Hypothesis 20: USOs that have obtained publicly-
backed equity funds will report superior firm 
performance. 
VC Investment FirstVC Hypothesis 21: USOs with VC investment will 
report superior firm performance. 
GeneralistVC Hypothesis 22: USOs with generalist VC 
investment will report superior firm 
performance. 
SpecialistVC Hypothesis 23: USOs with specialist VC 
investment will report superior firm 
performance. 
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Chapter 4: Ability to attract First Venture Capital (VC)    
                Investment 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter tests hypotheses derived in Chapter 2 related to research question 1: 
Which resources of university spin-outs (USOs) are signals of quality and attract first venture 
capital (VC) investment? The array of dependent variables introduced in Section 3.5.1.1 is 
used for sensitivity analysis. 
  
4.2 Hypotheses Testing 
4.2.1 Likelihood of Attracting First VC Investment: Logistic Regression Analysis 
 
This section tests hypotheses relating to whether USOs received a first round of VC 
investment or not. Respondents reporting first VC investment were allocated a value of ‘1’, 
whilst those not reporting a VC investment were allocated a value of ‘0’. Seventy-eight (i.e. 
62%) reported a first VC investment. Logistic Regression analysis was conducted. The 
reported beta coefficients are transformed to be interpreted as log-odds. A negative 
relationship between an independent variable and the dependent variable is indicated by a 
coefficient for Exp(B) < 1. A positive likelihood for the event of first VC investment to occur is 
indicated by Exp(B) > 1. 
The base model 1-1 in Table 42 relates to the control variables. This model is 
significant at the 0.10 level and has a pseudo R2 of 0.06. Independent firms 
(IndependentFirm) were significant less likely to have obtained first VC finance at the 0.10 
level. Firms located in the Oxford, Cambridge or London cluster (OxCamLonRegion) were 
significant more likely to have obtained first VC investment at the 0.10 level. 
Sets of variables were then added to the base model. Each of the models (Models 1-2 
to 1-5) was significant at the 0.05 level or lower. The full model is presented in Model 1-6. 
This model has a pseudo R2 of 0.29 and is significant at the 0.001 level. The change in R2 is 
compared to the base model (Model 1-1) is 0.23, and this change is significant at the 0.01 
level. 
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Six variables are significant in Model 1-6. Firms with more network links to VC 
investors (VCNetwork) were more likely to have obtained first VC finance at the 0.01 level. 
Founding team with more experience and reputation (FoundingTeamReputation) as well as 
firms with patented IP (PatentedIP) and owning their IP (FirmOwnsIP) were more likely to 
have obtained first VC investment at the 0.05 level. Further, firms with professors as 
founders (FounderProfessor) as well as those which had obtained previous public backed 
equity finance (PublicBackedEquity) were more likely to have obtained first VC investment 
at the 0.10 level. In consequence, Model 1-6 supports Hypotheses 2, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10.  
 
4.2.2 Number of First VC Offers: Tobit Regression Analysis 
 
This section tests hypotheses relating to the number of first VC investment offers 
which were received by USOs. Thirty-six firms (29%) did not receive a single offer. The mean 
and median number of offers were 1.8 and 1, respectively. The number of offers ranged 
from 0 to 10 offers. Tobit regression analysis was conducted. 
The base model 2-1 in Table 43 relates to the control variables. This model is not 
significant and has a pseudo R2 of 0.02. Sets of independent variables were then added to 
the base model. The full model is presented in Model 2-6. This model has a pseudo R2 of 
0.09 and is significant on the 0.001 level. The change in R2 compared with the base model is 
0.07 and this change is significant at the 0.001 level. 
Six variables are significant in Model 2-6. Firms with founding teams of higher 
experience and reputation (FoundingTeamReputation) as well as those with strategic 
alliance partners (StrategicAlliances) received more first VC offers at the 0.01 level. Further, 
firms with professors as founders (FounderProfessor) received more first VC offers at the 
0.05 level. Firms with more network links to VC investors (VCNetwork), patented IP 
(PatentedIP) and IP ownership (FirmOwnsIP) received more VC offers at the 0.10 level. 
Accordingly, Hypotheses 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are supported. 
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Table 42: Likelihood of Attracting First VC Investment: Logistic Regression Analysis 
 
Model: 1-1 
 
1-2 
 
1-3 
 
1-4 
 
1-5 
 
1-6 
 
  
Exp(B) S.E. Exp(B) S.E. Exp(B) S.E. Exp(B) S.E. Exp(B) S.E. Exp(B) S.E. 
Control Variables FirmAge 0.91 0.06 0.91 0.07 0.93 0.07 0.88† 0.07 0.94 0.07 0.92 0.08 
Independent Firm 0.29† 0.20 0.48 0.37 0.28† 0.20 0.29† 0.20 0.28† 0.20 0.50 0.40 
PharmaBiotecSector 0.64 0.27 0.70 0.33 0.53 0.24 0.59 0.26 0.62 0.27 0.47 0.26 
OxCamLonRegion 2.00† 0.83 1.86 0.86 1.17 0.56 1.71 0.74 2.14† 0.91 0.93 0.54 
RelativeMarketSize 1.10 0.11 1.05 0.12 1.04 0.12 1.10 0.12 1.09 0.11 1.01 0.13 
General Human 
Capital 
AgeFounder 
  
0.52 0.54 
      
1.10 1.36 
FounderProfessor 
  
3.28* 1.59 
      
2.84† 1.62 
Specific Human 
Capital 
FounderHabitual 
Entrepreneur 
  
0.96 0.43 
      
1.01 0.52 
FoundingTeamReputation 
  
1.92** 0.45 
      
2.01* 0.56 
Networks VCNetwork 
    
1.88*** 0.35 
    
1.86** 0.41 
StrategicAlliances 
    
1.67 0.73 
    
1.91 0.96 
Intellectual Capital PatentedIP 
      
2.21† 0.97 
  
3.86* 2.20 
FirmOwnsIP 
      
2.35* 1.03 
  
3.08* 1.64 
InnovationRadicalness 
      
0.89 0.19 
  
0.77 0.21 
Finance PublicBackedEquity 
        
2.59* 1.08 2.28† 1.13 
 n 125 125 125 125 125 125 
pseudo R2 0.06 0.14 0.16 0.09 0.09 0.29 
Change in R2  / 0.08* 0.10** 0.03 0.03* 0.23** 
LR Chi2 9.54† 23.29** 25.93*** 15.70* 15.02* 47.96*** 
Log likelihood -77.99 -71.11 -69.79 -74.91 -75.25 -58.78 
Cases correctly classified 65.60% 72.00% 68.80% 66.40% 71.20% 76.00% 
Significance levels: †p < .10; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
The beta coefficients are log odds. A negative likelihood of the event in the dependent variable to occur is Exp(B) < 1; a positive likelihood is Exp(B) > 1. 
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Table 43: Number of First VC Offers: Tobit Regression Analysis 
 
Model: 2-1 
 
2-2 
 
 2-3 
 
2-4  2-5  2-6  
  
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control 
Variables 
FirmAge -0.07 0.08 -0.05 0.08 -0.05 0.08 -0.11 0.09 -0.04 0.09 -0.06 0.08 
Independent Firm -1.19 0.72 -0.44 0.72 -1.15† 0.68 -1.23† 0.72 -1.20† 0.72 -0.57 0.67 
PharmaBiotecSector -0.43 0.55 -0.34 0.53 -0.59 0.52 -0.50 0.54 -0.44 0.55 -0.58 0.51 
OxCamLonRegion 0.76 0.50 0.69 0.51 0.16 0.52 0.55 0.51 0.80 0.51 0.23 0.54 
RelativeMarketSize 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.17 0.13 0.07 0.11 
General Human 
Capital 
AgeFounder 
  
-1.52 1.18 
  
    -1.34 1.13 
FounderProfessor 
  
1.43** 0.53 
  
    1.20* 0.51 
Specific Human 
Capital 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 
  
-0.42 0.51 
  
    -0.54 0.49 
FoundingTeamReputation 
  
0.81** 0.27 
  
    0.75** 0.27 
Networks VCNetwork 
    
0.58** 0.18     0.36† 0.18 
StrategicAlliances 
    
1.16* 0.48     1.29** 0.46 
Intellectual 
Capital 
PatentedIP 
      
0.94† 0.54   0.97† 0.51 
FirmOwnsIP 
      
0.94† 0.53   0.94† 0.49 
InnovationRadicalness 
      
0.08 0.25   0.07 0.24 
Finance PublicBackedEquity 
      
  0.67 0.50 0.47 0.46 
 Constant 2.66** 0.97 7.14 4.37 0.42 1.09 1.89† 1.02 2.19 1.03 3.99 4.27 
 Sigma 2.58 0.21 2.44 0.19 2.42 0.19 2.53 0.20 2.58 0.20 2.27 0.18 
 n 125 125 125 125 125 125 
Left-Censored 36 36 36 36 36 36 
Uncensored 89 89 89 89 89 89 
pseudo R2 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.09 
Change in R2  / 0.03** 0.03*** 0.01 0.00 0.07*** 
LR Chi2 8.83 23.43** 25.7*** 14.55† 10.62† 44.74*** 
Log likelihood -241.40 -234.10 -232.96 -238.54 -240.50 -223.45 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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4.2.3 Number of First VC Investment Offers: Multinominal Logit Regression 
Analysis 
 
A robustness test was computed relating to the number of first VC investment offers. 
The first VC investment offer variable was transformed into three categories. Firms with no 
VC investment offer were allocated a value of ‘0’, those with one offer were allocated a 
value of ‘1’, and those with two or more offers were allocated a value of ‘2’. Thirty-six firms 
(29%) did not receive an offer, 24 firms (24%) received one offer and 59 firms (47%) 
received two or more offers. Multinominal logit regression analysis was conducted. 
The base model 3-1 in Table 44 relates to the control variables. This model is not 
significant and has a pseudo R2 of 0.05. Sets of independent variables were then added to 
the base model. The full model is presented in Model 3-6. This Model has a pseudo R2 of 
0.26 and is significant at the 0.001 level. The change in R2 compared with the base model is 
0.21, and this change is significant at the 0.001 level. 
In Model 3-6 three variables are significant with one first VC offer. Firms with patents 
(PatentedIP) were more likely to attract one offer at the 0.01 level.  Founding teams of 
higher reputation and experience (FoundingTeamReputation) as well as with alliance 
partners (StrategicAlliances) were more likely to attract one offer at the 0.05 level. In 
consequence, Hypotheses 4, 6 and 7 are supported for firms which received one first VC 
investment offer. 
In Model 3-6 seven variables are significant with two or more first VC offers. Firms 
with founding teams of higher reputation and experience (FoundingTeamReputation) as 
well as with alliances partners (StrategicAlliances) were more likely to attract two or more 
offers at the 0.01 level. Firms having founders with the status of a professor 
(FounderProfessor), more network links with VC investors (VCNetwork), patented IP 
(PatentedIP) as well as IP ownership (FirmOwnsIP) were more likely to attract two or more 
offers at the 0.05 level. Further, firms which attracted public backed equity 
(PublicBackedEquity) were more likely to attract two or more offers at the 0.10 level. 
Therefore, Hypotheses 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10 are supported for firms which received two or 
more first VC investment offers. 
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Table 44: Number of First VC Investment Offers (0, 1 and 2 or more): Multinominal Logit Regression Analysis 
 
Model: 3-1 
   
3-2 
   
3-3 
   
 
Categories: One offer Two or 
more offers 
One offer Two or more 
offers 
One offer Two or more 
offers 
  
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control 
Variables 
FirmAge -0.15 0.09 -0.08 0.08 -0.13 0.10 -0.08 0.09 -0.16 0.10 -0.06 0.09 
Independent Firm -1.69† 0.91 -1.16 0.85 -1.49 0.98 -0.33 0.92 -1.69† 0.94 -1.17 0.88 
PharmaBiotecSector -0.84 0.60 -0.37 0.48 -0.61 0.63 -0.19 0.54 -1.08† 0.63 -0.65 0.52 
OxCamLonRegion 0.87 0.56 0.80† 0.48 0.96 0.61 0.88 0.55 0.93 0.62 0.37 0.55 
RelativeMarketSize 0.05 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.00 0.15 0.04 0.13 0.01 0.15 0.03 0.13 
General 
Human Capital 
AgeFounder 
    
-0.52 1.35 -2.29† 1.23 
    FounderProfessor 
    
0.09 0.66 1.64** 0.57 
    Specific 
Human Capital 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 
    
0.04 0.58 -0.43 0.52 
    FoundingTeamReputation 
    
0.55† 0.31 0.82** 0.27 
    Networks VCNetwork 
        
0.18 0.23 0.57** 0.20 
StrategicAlliances 
        
1.53* 0.62 1.37* 0.56 
Intellectual 
Capital 
PatentedIP 
            FirmOwnsIP 
            InnovationRadicalness 
            Finance PublicBackedEquity 
             Constant 2.30* 1.17 1.96† 1.07 3.84 4.94 9.25 4.51 1.39 1.38 -0.16 1.31 
 n# 30 59 30 59 30 59 
pseudo R2 0.05 0.13 0.12 
Change in R2  / 0.08* 0.07** 
LR Chi2 11.75 33.62* 31.85** 
Log likelihood -126.05 -115.11 -116.00 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001   
#
 = Base outcome: 'no VC offers' (n = 36)
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Table 44 (Continued): Number of First VC Investment Offers (0, 1 and 2 or more): Multinominal Logit Regression Analysis 
 
Model: 3-4 
   
3-5 
   
3-6 
   
 
Categories: One offer Two or more 
offers 
One offer Two or 
more offers 
One offer Two or more 
offers 
  
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control 
Variables 
FirmAge -0.18† 0.10 -0.13 0.09 -0.12 0.09 -0.04 0.08 -0.16 0.12 -0.11 0.11 
Independent Firm -1.74† 0.92 -1.18 0.85 -1.77† 0.93 -1.24 0.86 -1.36 1.05 -0.22 0.98 
PharmaBiotecSector -0.97 0.62 -0.48 0.50 -0.89 0.61 -0.43 0.49 -1.23† 0.74 -0.85 0.67 
OxCamLonRegion 0.61 0.59 0.60 0.51 0.96† 0.57 0.90† 0.50 0.85 0.76 0.45 0.72 
RelativeMarketSize 0.04 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.14 0.10 0.12 -0.08 0.17 -0.03 0.15 
General Human 
Capital 
AgeFounder 
        
-0.19 1.65 -1.95 1.56 
FounderProfessor 
        
0.15 0.77 1.66* 0.70 
Specific Human 
Capital 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 
        
0.06 0.66 -0.51 0.63 
FoundingTeamReputation 
        
0.95* 0.38 1.09** 0.35 
Networks VCNetwork 
        
0.16 0.27 0.50* 0.26 
StrategicAlliances 
        
1.89* 0.75 1.94** 0.71 
Intellectual 
Capital 
PatentedIP 1.18† 0.61 0.91† 0.49 
    
2.08** 0.79 1.55* 0.70 
FirmOwnsIP 0.57 0.58 1.04* 0.50 
    
1.13 0.71 1.56* 0.66 
InnovationRadicalness 0.06 0.28 0.04 0.24 
    
0.14 0.35 0.12 0.32 
Finance PublicBackedEquity 
    
1.13* 0.56 1.22* 0.49 0.95 0.64 1.02† 0.61 
 Constant 1.59 1.23 1.26 1.12 1.70 1.21 1.28 1.12 -0.38 6.19 4.19 5.84 
 n# 30 
 
59 
 
30 
 
59 
 
30 
 
59 
 pseudo R2 0.08 0.07 0.26 
Change in R2 0.03 0.02 0.21*** 
LR Chi2 20.74 18.90† 69.51*** 
Log likelihood -121.55 -122.47 -97.17 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001   # = Base outcome: 'no VC offers' (n = 36)
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4.2.4 Number of First VC Investments: Tobit Regression Analysis 
 
This section tests hypotheses relating to the number of first VC investment which 
were received by USOs. Forty-seven firms (38%) did not receive a VC investment. The mean 
and median number of VC investments was 1.4 and 1, respectively. The number of VC 
investments ranged from 0 to 10 investments. Tobit regression analysis was conducted. 
The base model 4-1 in Table 45 relates to the control variables. This model is 
significant at the 0.05 level and has a pseudo R2 of 0.03. Independent firms (Independent 
Firm) were less likely to attract more first VC investments at the 0.05 level. Firms located in 
the Oxford, Cambridge or London cluster (OxCamLonRegion) were more likely to have 
obtained more first VC investments at the 0.10 level. Sets of independent variables were 
then added to the base model. The full model is presented in Model 4-6. This model has a 
pseudo R2 of 0.12 and is significant on the 0.001 level. The change in R2 compared with the 
base model is 0.09 and this change is significant at the 0.001 level. 
Four variables are significant in Model 4-6. Firms with founders with the status of a 
professor (FounderProfessor), more founding team’s experience and reputation 
(FoundingTeamReputation) as well as more network links to VC investors (VCNetworks) 
obtained more first VC investments at the 0.01 level. Further, firms with owning their IP 
(FirmOwnsIP) reported more first VC investments weakly at the 0.10 level. Consequently, 
Hypotheses 2, 4, 5 and 8 are supported in Model 4-6. 
 
4.2.5 Number of First VC Investments: Multinominal Logit Regression Analysis 
 
A robustness test was computed relating to the number of first VC investments. The 
variable of number of first VC investments was transformed into three categories. Firms 
with no VC investment offer were allocated a value of ‘0’, those with one VC investment 
were allocated a value of ‘1’, and those with two or more VC investments were allocated a 
value of ‘2’. 
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Table 45: Number of First VC Investments: Tobit Regression Analysis 
 
Model: 4-1 
 
4-2 
 
 4-3 
 
4-4  4-5  4-6  
  
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control 
Variables 
FirmAge -0.07 0.08 -0.06 0.07 -0.04 0.07 -0.11 0.08 -0.05 0.08 -0.06 0.07 
Independent Firm -1.56* 0.64 -0.84 0.61 -1.50* 0.60 -1.55* 0.64 -1.57* 0.64 -0.93 0.58 
PharmaBiotecSector -0.09 0.49 0.03 0.46 -0.18 0.46 -0.16 0.49 -0.10 0.49 -0.15 0.44 
OxCamLonRegion 0.92* 0.45 0.81* 0.43 0.17 0.46 0.83† 0.45 0.95* 0.45 0.26 0.47 
RelativeMarketSize 0.18 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.17 0.11 0.17 0.11 0.08 0.10 
General 
Human Capital 
AgeFounder 
  
-1.42 1.02 
  
    -1.09 0.99 
FounderProfessor 
  
1.46** 0.46 
  
    1.21** 0.45 
Specific Human 
Capital 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 
  
-0.23 0.44 
  
    -0.27 0.43 
FoundingTeamReputation 
  
0.83*** 0.23 
  
    0.67** 0.24 
Networks VCNetwork 
    
0.65*** 0.16     0.45** 0.16 
StrategicAlliances 
    
0.32 0.42     0.46 0.40 
Intellectual 
Capital 
PatentedIP 
      
0.58 0.49   0.55 0.45 
FirmOwnsIP 
      
0.94* 0.47   0.79† 0.43 
InnovationRadicalness 
      
-0.11 0.23   -0.13 0.21 
Finance PublicBackedEquity 
      
  0.49 0.45 0.39 0.41 
 Constant 2.26** 0.86 6.39† 3.79 0.05 0.97 1.65† 0.92 1.91* 0.92 2.96 3.78 
 Sigma 2.26 0.20 2.06 0.18 2.10 0.18 2.22 0.19 2.26 0.20 1.95 0.17 
 n 125 125 125 125 125 125 
Left-Censored 47 47 47 47 47 47 
Uncensored 78 78 78 78 78 78 
pseudo R2 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.12 
Change in R2  / 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.01 0.01 0.09*** 
LR Chi2 14.90* 35.16*** 32.02*** 19.49* 16.09* 51.21*** 
Log likelihood -210.89 -200.76 -202.33 -208.60 -210.30 -192.74 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Forty-seven firms (38%) did not receive a VC investment, 37 firms (30%) received one VC 
investment and 41 firms (32%) received two or more VC investments. Multinominal logit 
regression analysis was conducted. 
The base model 5-1 in Table 46 relates to the control variables. This model is 
significant at the 0.05 level and has a pseudo R2 of 0.07. Independent firms (Independent 
Firm) and firms operating in the Pharma and Biotech Sector (PharmaBiotecSector) were 
weakly significant less likely to have more first VC investments at the 0.10 level. 
Sets of independent variables were then added to the base model. The full model is 
presented in Model 5-6. It has a pseudo R2 of 0.26 and is significant at the 0.001 level. The 
change in R2 compared with the base model is 0.19. This change is significant at the 0.001 
level. 
In Model 5-6 five variables are significant with obtaining one first VC investment. 
Firms with patents (PatentedIP) were more likely to attract one first VC investment at the 
0.01 level. Founding teams with more experience and reputation 
(FoundingTeamReputation), firm with more network links to VC investors (VCNetwork), 
firms owning their IP (FirmOwnsIP) and previously attracted public backed equity 
(PublicBackedEquity) were more likely to attract one first VC investments at the 0.01 level. 
Hypotheses 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10 are supported for firms which attracted one first VC 
investment. 
In Model 5-6 four variables are significant with obtaining two or more first VC 
investments. More network links to VC investors (VCNetwork) were more likely to attract 
two or more first VC investments at the 0.001 level. Further, founders with the status of a 
professor (FounderProfessor), founding teams with more experience and reputation 
(FoundingTeamReputation) as well as firms owning their IP (FirmOwnsIP) were more likely 
to attract two or more first VC investments at the 0.05 level. Hypotheses 2, 4, 5 and 8 are 
supported for firms which attracted two or more first VC investments. 
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Table 46: Number of First VC Investments (0, 1 and 2 or more): Multinominal Logit Regression Analysis 
 
Model: 5-1 
 
5-2 
 
5-3 
 
 
Categories: One 
investment 
Two or more 
investments 
One 
investment 
Two or more 
investments 
One 
investment 
Two or more 
investments 
  
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control 
Variables 
FirmAge -0.12 0.08 -0.06 0.08 -0.12 0.09 -0.06 0.09 -0.11 0.09 -0.04 0.09 
Independent Firm -1.44† 0.80 -1.09 0.76 -1.20 0.88 -0.41 0.84 -1.45† 0.81 -1.18 0.81 
PharmaBiotecSector -1.00† 0.57 -0.04 0.48 -0.87 0.59 0.07 0.55 -1.13* 0.58 -0.21 0.52 
OxCamLonRegion 0.66 0.49 0.75 0.47 0.54 0.53 0.78 0.54 0.38 0.55 -0.05 0.56 
RelativeMarketSize -0.08 0.13 0.22† 0.12 -0.13 0.14 0.18 0.13 -0.11 0.14 0.16 0.13 
General 
Human Capital 
AgeFounder 
    
0.35 1.19 -1.78 1.29 
    FounderProfessor 
    
0.64 0.56 1.71** 0.58 
    Specific 
Human Capital 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 
    
0.23 0.51 -0.34 0.53 
    FoundingTeamReputation 
    
0.41 0.27 0.91** 0.31 
    Networks VCNetwork 
        
0.42* 0.21 0.85*** 0.22 
StrategicAlliances 
        
0.58 0.50 0.46 0.51 
Intellectual 
Capital 
PatentedIP 
            FirmOwnsIP 
            InnovationRadicalness 
            Finance PublicBackedEquity 
             Constant 1.85† 1.02 0.96 1.01 0.01 4.35 6.37 4.70 0.46 1.18 -1.75 1.27 
 n# 37 41 37 41 37 41 
pseudo R2 0.07 0.14 0.15 
Change in R2  / 0.07** 0.08*** 
LR Chi2 19.34* 39.22** 39.71*** 
Log likelihood -127.05 -117.11 -116.87 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001    
#
 = Base outcome: 'no VC investment' (n = 47)
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Table 46 (Continued): Number of First VC Investments (0, 1 and 2 or more): Multinominal Logit Regression Analysis 
 
Model: 5-4  5-5 
 
5-6  
 
Categories: One 
investment 
Two or more 
investments 
One 
investment 
Two or more 
investments 
One 
investment 
Two or more 
investments 
  
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control 
Variables 
FirmAge -0.17† 0.09 -0.11 0.09 -0.09 0.08 -0.03 0.08 -0.12 0.10 -0.07 0.11 
Independent Firm -1.58† 0.82 -1.08 0.77 -1.50† 0.81 -1.13 0.78 -1.34 0.93 -0.41 0.86 
PharmaBiotecSector -1.21* 0.59 -0.10 0.49 -1.04† 0.57 -0.07 0.49 -1.41* 0.66 -0.23 0.63 
OxCamLonRegion 0.41 0.51 0.68 0.50 0.74 0.50 0.81† 0.48 -0.05 0.65 -0.06 0.69 
RelativeMarketSize -0.12 0.14 0.23† 0.12 -0.09 0.13 0.22† 0.12 -0.22 0.16 0.18 0.14 
General 
Human Capital 
AgeFounder 
        
1.29 1.40 -1.19 1.48 
FounderProfessor 
        
0.45 0.65 1.70* 0.68 
Specific 
Human Capital 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 
        
0.45 0.60 -0.26 0.62 
FoundingTeamReputation 
        
0.53† 0.31 0.86* 0.35 
Networks VCNetwork 
        
0.45† 0.24 0.87*** 0.27 
StrategicAlliances 
        
0.62 0.57 0.69 0.58 
Intellectual 
Capital 
PatentedIP 1.35* 0.57 0.43 0.50 
    
2.08** 0.70 0.75 0.65 
FirmOwnsIP 0.82 0.52 0.97† 0.51 
    
1.15† 0.60 1.26* 0.63 
InnovationRadicalness -0.06 0.24 -0.17 0.25 
    
-0.22 0.30 -0.34 0.32 
Finance PublicBackedEquity 
    
0.97* 0.49 0.97* 0.48 0.92† 0.56 0.82 0.59 
 Constant 1.01 1.09 0.50 1.06 1.29 1.06 0.37 1.07 -7.00 5.33 0.03 5.56 
 n# 37 41 37 41 37 41 
 
pseudo R2 0.11 0.09 0.26 
Change in R2 0.04* 0.02* 0.19*** 
LR Chi2 28.97* 24.99* 72.36*** 
Log likelihood -122.24 -124.23 -100.54 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001    
#
 = Base outcome: 'no VC investment' (n = 47)
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4.2.6 First VC Investment Amount (£’s): Tobit Regression Analysis 
 
This section tests hypotheses relating to the first VC investment amount attracted by 
USOs. Forty-seven firms (38%) did not receive first VC investment. . The mean and median 
first VC investments were £622,430 and £502,494 respectively. The first investment ranged 
from £0 to £37,240,050. Tobit regression analysis was conducted. 
The base model 6-1 in Table 47 relates to the control variables. This model is 
significant at the 0.005 level and has a pseudo R2 of 0.02. Independent firms (Independent 
Firm) attracted significant less first VC investment amount at the 0.05 level. Firms located in 
the Oxford, Cambridge or London cluster (OxCamLonRegion) were significant more likely to 
have obtained more first VC investment at the 0.10 level. 
Sets of independent variables were then added to the base model. The full model is 
presented in Model 6-6. This model has a pseudo R2 of 0.09 and is significant on the 0.001 
level. The change in R2 compared with the base model is 0.07 and this change is significant 
at the 0.001 level. 
Seven variables are significant in Model 6-6. Firms with more network links to VC 
investors (VCNetwork) attracted more first VC investment amount at the 0.01 level. 
Founding teams with more experience and reputation (FoundingTeamReputation) as well as 
firms with strategic alliances (StrategicAlliances), patented IP (PatentedIP) and firms owning 
their IP (FirmOwnsIP) attracted more first VC investment amount at the 0.05 level. Further, 
founders with the status of a professor and firms which attracted public backed equity 
attracted more first VC investment amount at the 0.10 level. Consequently, Hypotheses 2, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8 and 10 are supported in Model 6-6. 
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Table 47: First VC Investment Amount (£’s): Tobit Regression Analysis 
 
Model: 6-1 
 
6-2 
 
6-3 
 
6-4 
 
6-5 
 
6-6 
 
  
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control 
Variables 
FirmAge -0.12 0.16 -0.11 0.15 -0.07 0.15 -0.22 0.16 -0.06 0.16 -0.10 0.15 
Independent Firm -3.14* 1.36 -1.99 1.32 -3.02* 1.25 -3.08* 1.32 -3.14* 1.34 -2.17† 1.18 
PharmaBiotecSector -0.92 1.03 -0.61 0.99 -1.14 0.95 -1.13 1.00 -0.94 1.02 -1.11 0.89 
OxCamLonRegion 1.81† 0.95 1.53 0.93 0.35 0.95 1.41 0.94 1.91* 0.94 0.30 0.94 
RelativeMarketSize 0.20 0.24 0.10 0.23 0.06 0.22 0.17 0.23 0.17 0.23 -0.04 0.20 
General Human 
Capital 
AgeFounder 
  
-2.11 2.19 
      
-1.26 2.00 
FounderProfessor 
  
2.37* 0.98 
      
1.66† 0.90 
Specific Human 
Capital 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 
  
0.29 0.93 
      
0.29 0.86 
FoundingTeamReputation 
  
1.45** 0.50 
      
1.17* 0.47 
Networks VCNetwork 
    
1.30*** 0.33 
    
0.92** 0.33 
StrategicAlliances 
    
1.45† 0.87 
    
1.70* 0.81 
Intellectual 
Capital 
PatentedIP 
      
2.14* 1.00 
  
2.25* 0.91 
FirmOwnsIP 
      
2.19* 0.97 
  
1.92* 0.86 
InnovationRadicalness 
      
-0.21 0.46 
  
-0.33 0.42 
Finance PublicBackedEquity 
        
1.76† 0.93 1.43† 0.82 
 Constant 6.02** 1.81 11.68 8.12 1.36 2.00 4.13* 1.89 4.76* 1.91 2.62 7.59 
 Sigma 4.79 0.43 4.48 0.40 4.38 0.39 4.61 0.41 4.73 0.42 3.97 0.35 
 n 125 125 125 125 125 125 
Left-Censored 47 47 47 47 47 47 
Uncensored 78 78 78 78 78 78 
pseudo R2 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.09 
Change in R2  / 0.03** 0.03*** 0.01* 0.01† 0.07*** 
LR Chi2 11.35* 26.26** 29.94*** 19.28* 14.94* 52.38*** 
Log likelihood -274.38 -266.92 -265.08 -270.41 -272.58 -253.86 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
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4.2.7 First VC Investment Amount (£’s): Multinominal Logit Regression Analysis 
 
A robustness test was computed relating to the amount of first VC investment. The 
variable of first VC investment amount was transformed into three categories. Firms with no 
first VC investment were allocated a value of ‘0’, those with a first VC investments between 
£1 and £500,000 were allocated a value of ‘1’, and those with investments greater than 
£500,000 were allocated a value of ‘2’. Forty-seven firms (38%) had no first VC investment, 
39 firms (31%) attracted between £1 and £500,000 and 39 firms (31%) attracted more than 
£500,000. Multinominal logit regression analysis was conducted. 
The base model 7-1 in Table 48 relates to the control variables. This model is not 
significant and has a pseudo R2 of 0.05. Sets of independent variables were then added to 
the base model. The full model is presented in Model 7-6. It has a pseudo R2 of 0.24 and is 
significant at the 0.001 level. The change in R2 compared with the base model is 0.19 and 
this change is significant at the 0.001 level. 
In Model 7-6 four variables are significant with firms attracting up to £500,000 of first 
VC investment. Firms with more network links to VC investors (VCNetwork) were more likely 
attracting up to £500,000 of first VC investment at the 0.01 level. Founders with the status 
of a professor (FounderProfessor) and firms with public backed equity investments 
(PublicBackedEquity) were more likely attracting up to £500,000 of first VC investment at 
the 0.05 level. Founding teams with more experience and reputation 
(FoundingTeamReputation) were more likely attracting up to £500,000 of first VC 
investment at the 0.10 level. Consequently, Hypotheses 2, 4, 5 and 10 are supported for the 
group of firms attracting up to £500,000 of first VC investment. 
In Model 7-6 four variables are significant with firms attracting more than £500,000 of 
first VC investment. Firms with patents (PatentedIP) were more likely attracting more than 
£500,000 of first VC investment at the 0.001 level. Founding teams with more experience 
and reputation (FoundingTeamReputation) as well as firms owning the IP (FirmOwnsIP) 
were more likely attracting more than £500,000 of first VC investment at the 0.01 level. 
Further, firms with more network links to VC investors (VCNetwork) were more likely 
attracting more than £500,000 of first VC investment at the 0.05 level. Consequently, 
Hypotheses 4, 5, 7 and 8 are supported for the group of firms which attracted more than 
£500,000 of first VC investment. 
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Table 48: First VC Investment Amount (None = 0, £1 to £500,000 = 1 and > £500,000 = 2): Multinominal Logit Regression Analysis 
 
Model: 7-1 
   
7-2 
   
7-3 
   
 
Categories: £1 to 
£500,000 
> £500,000 £1 to 
£500,000 
> £500,000 £1 to 
£500,000 
> £500,000
  
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control 
Variables 
FirmAge -0.14† 0.08 -0.04 0.08 -0.14 0.09 -0.04 0.09 -0.12 0.09 -0.03 0.09 
Independent Firm -1.04 0.80 -1.33† 0.75 -0.47 0.88 -0.90 0.80 -1.10 0.83 -1.40† 0.77 
PharmaBiotecSector -0.54 0.51 -0.33 0.50 -0.50 0.55 -0.20 0.55 -0.72 0.54 -0.53 0.52 
OxCamLonRegion 0.72 0.48 0.67 0.48 0.60 0.52 0.68 0.53 0.13 0.55 0.18 0.55 
RelativeMarketSize -0.01 0.12 0.18 0.12 -0.06 0.13 0.14 0.13 -0.05 0.13 0.13 0.13 
General 
Human Capital 
AgeFounder 
    
-0.10 1.20 -1.20 1.23 
    FounderProfessor 
    
1.30* 0.55 1.05† 0.57 
    Specific 
Human Capital 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 
    
-0.17 0.51 0.09 0.51 
    FoundingTeamReputation 
    
0.58* 0.27 0.76* 0.30 
    Networks VCNetwork 
        
0.67*** 0.21 0.58* 0.21 
StrategicAlliances 
        
0.47 0.51 0.54 0.50 
Intellectual 
Capital 
PatentedIP 
            FirmOwnsIP 
            InnovationRadicalness 
            Finance PublicBackedEquity 
             Constant 1.60 1.01 1.10 0.99 1.09 4.42 4.67 4.46 -0.54 1.22 -0.71 1.18 
 n# 39 39 39 39 39 39 
pseudo R2 0.05 0.11 0.11 
Change in R2  / 0.06† 0.06† 
LR Chi2 14.92 31.04* 31.29** 
Log likelihood -129.36 -121.31 -121.18 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001    
#
 = Base outcome: 'no VC investment' (n = 47)
178 
 
Table 48 (Continued): First VC Investment Amount (None = 0, £1 to £500,000 = 1 and > £500,000 = 2): Multinominal Logit Regression Analysis 
 
Model: 7-4 7-5 7-6 
 
Categories: £1 to 
£500,000 
> £500,000 £1 to 
£500,000 
> £500,000 £1 to 
£500,000 
> £500,000 
  
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control 
Variables 
FirmAge -0.15† 0.09 -0.10 0.09 -0.11 0.08 -0.01 0.08 -0.11 0.11 -0.04 0.11 
Independent Firm -1.07 0.80 -1.37† 0.79 -1.12 0.82 -1.37† 0.76 -0.41 0.90 -0.92 0.87 
PharmaBiotecSector -0.56 0.52 -0.50 0.53 -0.59 0.52 -0.36 0.50 -0.75 0.62 -0.66 0.64 
OxCamLonRegion 0.66 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.82† 0.49 0.72 0.49 -0.07 0.65 0.03 0.70 
RelativeMarketSize 0.00 0.12 0.19 0.13 -0.02 0.13 0.18 0.12 -0.08 0.14 0.12 0.14 
General 
Human Capital 
AgeFounder 
        
0.61 1.36 -0.61 1.46 
FounderProfessor 
        
1.33* 0.63 0.68 0.67 
Specific 
Human Capital 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 
        
-0.04 0.58 0.07 0.60 
FoundingTeamReputation 
        
0.59† 0.31 0.93** 0.34 
Networks VCNetwork 
        
0.68** 0.24 0.58* 0.25 
StrategicAlliances 
        
0.55 0.56 0.82 0.58 
Intellectual 
Capital 
PatentedIP 0.27 0.50 1.48* 0.57 
    
0.64 0.63 2.35*** 0.72 
FirmOwnsIP 0.41 0.50 1.37* 0.54 
    
0.62 0.59 1.86** 0.65 
InnovationRadicalness 0.05 0.23 -0.33 0.26 
    
-0.04 0.30 -0.50 0.32 
Finance PublicBackedEquity 
    
1.13* 0.48 0.78 0.48 1.08* 0.56 0.61 0.58 
 Constant 1.36 1.05 -0.21 1.11 0.93 1.06 0.66 1.04 -5.10 5.25 -1.98 5.43 
 n# 39 39 39 39 39 39 
pseudo R2 0.10 0.08 0.24 
Change in R2 0.05 0.03 0.19 
LR Chi2 28.35* 21.01† 66.79*** 
Log likelihood -122.65 -126.32 -103.43 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001    
#
 = Base outcome: 'no VC investment' (n = 47)
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4.2.8 Investor Types Relating to First VC Investment: Multinominal Logit 
Regression Analysis 
 
This section tests hypotheses relating to investor types of first VC investments 
attracted by USOs. The dependent variable of investor types relating to first VC investment 
has three categories. Firms with no VC investment were allocated a value of ‘0’, those with a 
Generalist VC investor were allocated a value of ‘1’, and those with a Specialist VC investor 
were allocated a value of ‘2’. Forty-seven firms (38%) did not receive a VC investment, 31 
firms (25%) received generalist VC investment and 47 firms (37%) received Specialist VC 
investment. 
The base model 8-1 in Table 49 relates to the control variables. This model is not 
significant and has a pseudo R2 of 0.05. 
Sets of independent variables were then added to the base model. The full model is 
presented in Model 8-6. This Model has a pseudo R2 of 0.23 and is significant at the 0.001 
level. The change in R2 compared with the base model is 0.18. It is significant at the 0.001 
level. 
In Model 8-6 five variables are significant for firms attracting Generalist VC investors. 
Firms with more network links to VC investors (VCNetwork) were more likely attracting 
Generalist VC investors at the 0.001 level. Firms with patents (PatentedIP) were more likely 
attracting Generalist VC investors at the 0.01 level. Firms owning their IP (FirmOwnsIP) were 
more likely attracting Generalist VC investors at the 0.05 level. Further, founding teams with 
more experience and reputation (FoundingTeamReputation) as well as firms with less 
radical innovation (InnovationRadicalness) were more likely attracting Generalist VC 
investors at the 0.10 level. Thus, Hypotheses 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 are supported for firms which 
first attracted Generalist VC investment. 
In Model 8-6 five variables are significant for firms which first attracted Specialist VC 
investors. Founders with the status of a professor (FounderProfessor), founding teams with 
more experience and reputation (FoundingTeamReputation) as well as more network links 
to VC investors (VCNetwork) were more likely attracting Specialist VC investors at the 0.05 
level. Further, firms with patents (PatentedIP) and firms owning their IP (FirmOwnsIP) were 
more likely attracting Specialist VC investors at the 0.10 level. In consequence, Hypotheses 
2, 4, 5, 7 and 8 are supported for firms which first attracted Specialist VC investment. 
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Table 49: Investor Types Relating to First VC Investment (None = 0, Generalist = 1, Specialist = 2): Multinominal Logit Regression Analysis 
 
Model: 8-1 
   
8-2 
   
8-3 
   
  
Generalist Specialist Generalist Specialist Generalist Specialist 
  
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control 
Variables 
FirmAge -0.10 0.08 -0.08 0.08 -0.09 0.09 -0.09 0.08 -0.08 0.10 -0.07 0.08 
Independent Firm -1.21 0.82 -1.25† 0.74 -0.76 0.88 -0.75 0.81 -1.29 0.87 -1.29† 0.76 
PharmaBiotecSector -0.95 0.59 -0.16 0.47 -0.87 0.63 -0.07 0.51 -1.20† 0.63 -0.35 0.49 
OxCamLonRegion 0.37 0.52 0.89* 0.45 0.34 0.56 0.80 0.50 -0.50 0.63 0.48 0.51 
RelativeMarketSize 0.03 0.13 0.13 0.12 -0.01 0.14 0.09 0.12 -0.03 0.14 0.09 0.12 
General 
Human Capital 
AgeFounder 
    
-0.47 1.24 -0.75 1.18 
    FounderProfessor 
    
1.00† 0.59 1.31* 0.54 
    Specific 
Human Capital 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 
    
-0.15 0.53 0.04 0.49 
    FoundingTeamReputation 
    
0.70* 0.31 0.61* 0.26 
    Networks VCNetwork 
        
0.87*** 0.24 0.49* 0.20 
StrategicAlliances 
        
0.58 0.54 0.45 0.48 
Intellectual 
Capital 
PatentedIP 
            FirmOwnsIP 
            InnovationRadicalness 
            Finance PublicBackedEquity 
             Constant 1.47 1.04 1.39 0.97 2.43 4.53 3.28 4.30 -1.36 1.32 -0.12 1.12 
 n# 31 47 31 47 31 47 
pseudo R2 0.05 0.10 0.13 
Change in R2  / 0.05† 0.08** 
LR Chi2 14.09 28.25† 34.04** 
Log likelihood -128.13 -121.05 -118.15 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001    
#
 = Base outcome: 'no VC investment' (n = 47) 
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Table 49 (Continued): Investor Types Relating to First VC Investment (None = 0, Generalist = 1, Specialist = 2): Multinominal Logit Regression Analysis 
 
Model: 8-4 
 
8-5 
 
8-6 
 
  
Generalist Specialist Generalist Specialist Generalist Specialist 
  
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control 
Variables 
FirmAge -0.15† 0.09 -0.12 0.08 -0.07 0.09 -0.05 0.08 -0.09 0.11 -0.08 0.10 
Independent Firm -1.22 0.84 -1.29† 0.75 -1.27 0.84 -1.30† 0.75 -0.84 0.96 -0.67 0.82 
PharmaBiotecSector -1.16† 0.62 -0.21 0.48 -1.00† 0.60 -0.19 0.47 -1.61* 0.73 -0.43 0.58 
OxCamLonRegion 0.17 0.54 0.76 0.47 0.45 0.53 0.95* 0.46 -0.90 0.75 0.29 0.62 
RelativeMarketSize 0.01 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.03 0.13 0.13 0.12 -0.10 0.16 0.07 0.13 
General 
Human Capital 
AgeFounder 
        
0.51 1.50 -0.11 1.34 
FounderProfessor 
        
0.55 0.71 1.24* 0.60 
Specific 
Human Capital 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 
        
-0.02 0.66 0.08 0.55 
FoundingTeamReputation 
        
0.62† 0.34 0.74* 0.30 
Networks VCNetwork 
        
0.99*** 0.28 0.45* 0.23 
StrategicAlliances 
        
0.77 0.62 0.58 0.53 
Intellectual 
Capital 
PatentedIP 1.28* 0.58 0.51 0.49 
    
2.14** 0.75 0.99† 0.61 
FirmOwnsIP 0.99† 0.55 0.78† 0.49 
    
1.38* 0.66 1.01† 0.57 
InnovationRadicalness -0.31 0.26 0.02 0.23 
    
-0.63† 0.34 -0.07 0.29 
Finance PublicBackedEquity 
    
1.07* 0.51 0.87† 0.46 0.73 0.62 0.83 0.53 
 Constant 0.51 1.13 0.96 1.02 0.83 1.11 0.89 1.01 -6.45 5.73 -1.97 5.07 
 n# 31 47 31 47 31 47 
pseudo R2 0.09 0.07 0.23 
Change in R2 0.04† 0.02† 0.18*** 
LR Chi2 23.74† 19.74† 63.36*** 
Log likelihood -123.30 -125.30 -103.49 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001    
#
 = Base outcome: 'no VC investment' (n = 47) 
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4.3 Summary of Findings for USOs’ Attraction of First VC Investment 
 
Table 50 summarises which hypotheses related to USOs’ ability to attract first VC 
investment are supported among. 
Hypothesis 1 on the general human capital of founders’ age (AgeFounder) was not 
supported in any presented models. Conversely, Hypothesis 2 on the general human capital 
of founders with the status of a professor (FounderProfessor) was supported in all eight 
models. Founders with the status of a professor were more likely to attract first VC 
investment (Model 1-6), received more first VC offers (Model 2-6), received two or more VC 
offers (Model 3-6), received more first VC investments (Model 4-6) and received two or 
more first VC investments (Model 5-6). They attracted more first VC investment (Model 6-6), 
however, only up to £500,000 (Model 7-6). Further, founders with the status of a professor 
were more likely to attract Specialist VC investors (Model 8-6). 
Hypothesis 3 on the specific human capital of founders’ entrepreneurial experience 
(FounderHabitualEntrepreneur) was not supported in any presented models. In contrast, 
Hypothesis 4 on the specific human capital of founding teams’ experience and reputation 
(FoundingTeamReputation) was supported in all eight models. 
Founding teams with more experience and reputation were more likely to attract first VC 
investment (Model 1-6), received more first VC offers (Model 2-6), received one, two or 
more VC offers (Model 3-6), received more first VC investments (Model 4-6) and also 
received one, two or more first VC investments (Model 5-6). They attracted more first VC 
investment (Model 6-6) as well as up to and more than £500,000 (Model 7-6). Further, they 
were more likely to attract Generalist and Specialist VC investors (Model 8-6). 
Hypothesis 5 on the network resource of links to VC investors (VCNetwork) is 
supported in all eight models. USOs with more network links to VC investors were more 
likely to attract first VC investment (Model 1-6), received more first VC offers (Model 2-6), 
received two or more VC offers (Model 3-6), received more first VC investments (Model 4-6) 
and also received one, two or more first VC investments (Model 5-6). They attracted more 
first VC investment (Model 6-6) as well as up to and more than £500,000 (Model 7-6). 
Further, they were more likely to attract Generalist and Specialist VC investors (Model 8-6). 
Hypothesis 6 of the inter-firm network resource of strategic alliances (StrategicAlliances) 
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was only partially supported in three out of eight models. USOs with strategic alliances 
received more first VC investment offers (Model 2-6) as well as one, two or more first VC 
investment offers (Model 3-6). Further, they received a greater amount of first VC 
investment (Model 6-6). 
Hypothesis 7 on the intellectual capital of patents (PatentedIP) was supported in 
seven out of eight models. USOs with patents were more likely to attract first VC investment 
(Model 1-6), received more first VC offers (Model 2-6), received two or more VC offers 
(Model 3-6) and received one first VC investment (Model 5-6). They attracted more first VC 
investment (Model 6-6) as well as more than £500,000 (Model 7-6). Further, they were 
more likely to attract Generalist and Specialist VC investors (Model 8-6). Hypothesis 8 on the 
intellectual capital of USOs owning their IP (FirmOwnsIP) was supported in all eight models. 
USOs which own their IP were more likely to attract first VC investment (Model 1-6), 
received more first VC offers (Model 2-6), received two or more VC offers (Model 3-6), 
received more first VC investments (Model 4-6) and also received one, two or more first VC 
investments (Model 5-6). They attract more first VC investment (Model 6-6) as well as more 
than £500,000 (Model 7-6). Further, firms owning their IP were more likely to attract 
Generalist and Specialist VC investors (Model 8-6). Hypothesis 9 on the Intellectual Capital 
of USOs’ innovation radicalness (InnovationRadicalness) was only supported in one out of 
eight models. USOs with lower radicalness of innovation were more likely to attract 
Generalist VC investors (Model 8-6). 
Hypothesis 10 on the financial resource of public backed equity (PublicBackedEquity) 
was supported in five out of eight models. USOs which attracted previous investments of 
public backed equity were more likely to attract first VC investment (Model 1-6), received 
two or more first VC investment offers (Model 3-6) and received one first VC investment 
(Model 5-6). Further, they attracted a larger amount of first VC investment (Model 6-6), 
however only up to £500,000 (Model 7-6). 
Therefore, Hypotheses 4, 5, 7 and 8 were most consistently supported, followed by 
Hypotheses 2 and 10. 
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Table 50: Summary of Findings for First VC Investment 
  Model: 1-6 2-6 3-6 4-6 
  Regression Technique: Logistic Tobit Multinom Tobit 
  Dependent variable: First VC Invest-
ment (Yes, No) 
Number of 
Offers 
Number of Offers Number 
of Investments One Two and more 
General 
Human 
Capital 
Age 
Founder 
Hypothesis 1: Older USO 
founders are more likely to 
attract first VC investment. 
     
Founder 
Professor 
Hypothesis 2: USO 
founders with higher levels 
of academic reputation are 
more likely to attract first 
VC investment. 
+† +*  +* +** 
Specific 
Human 
Capital 
Founder 
Habitual 
Entre-
preneur 
Hypothesis 3: USO 
founders who are 
experienced entrepreneurs 
are more likely to attract 
first VC investment. 
     
Founding 
Team 
Reput-
ation 
Hypothesis 4: USOs with 
an experienced founding 
team are more likely to 
attract first VC investment. 
+* +** +* +** +** 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001   
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Table 50 (Continued): Summary of Findings for First VC Investment 
  Model: 1-6 2-6 3-6 4-6 
  Regression Technique: Logistic Tobit Multinom Tobit 
  Dependent variable: First VC Invest-
ment 
(Yes, No) 
Number of First 
VC Investment 
Offers 
Number of First VC Investment Offers Number of 
First VC 
Investments 
One Two and more 
Net-
works 
VC 
Network 
Hypothesis 5: USOs from 
universities that have a strong 
network of previously VC 
funded USOs are more likely 
to attract first VC investment. 
+** +†  +* +** 
Strategic 
Alliances 
Hypothesis 6: USOs with 
alliance partners are more 
likely to attract first VC 
investment. 
 +** +* +**  
Intel-
lectual 
Capital 
Patented 
IP 
Hypothesis 7: USOs with 
patented IP are more likely to 
attract first VC investment. 
+* +† +** +*  
FirmOwns 
IP 
Hypothesis 8: USOs with IP 
ownership are more likely to 
attract first VC investment. 
+* +†  +* +† 
Innovat-
ion 
Radical-
ness 
Hypothesis 9: USOs whose 
main product or service is 
associated with radical 
innovation are less likely to 
attract first VC investment. 
     
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 50 (Continued): Summary of Findings for First VC Investment 
  Model: 1-6 2-6 3-6 4-6 
  Regression Technique: Logistic Tobit Multinom Tobit 
  Dependent variable: First VC Investment 
(Yes, No) 
Number of First 
VC Investment 
Offers 
Number of First VC 
Investment Offers 
Number of 
First VC 
Investments One Two 
and more 
Finance Public 
Backed 
Equity 
Hypothesis 10: USOs that 
have obtained publicly-
backed equity funds are 
more likely to attract first 
VC investment. 
+†   +†  
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 50 (Continued): Summary of Findings for First VC Investment 
  Model: 5-6 6-6 7-6 8-6 
  Regression Technique: Multinom Tobit Multinom Multinom 
  Dependent variable: Number of First VC 
Investments 
Amount of 
First VC 
Investment 
Amount of First VC 
Investment 
Generalist 
VC 
Specialist 
VC 
One Two 
and more 
£1 to 
£500,000 
> £500,000 
General 
Human 
Capital 
Age 
Founder 
Hypothesis 1: Older USO 
founders are more likely to 
attract first VC investment. 
       
Founder 
Professor 
Hypothesis 2: USO 
founders with higher levels 
of academic reputation are 
more likely to attract first 
VC investment. 
 +* +† +*   +* 
Specific 
Human 
Capital 
Founder 
Habitual 
Entre-
preneur 
Hypothesis 3: USO 
founders who are 
experienced entrepreneurs 
are more likely to attract 
first VC investment. 
       
Founding 
Team 
Reput-
ation 
Hypothesis 4: USOs with 
an experienced founding 
team are more likely to 
attract first VC investment. 
+† +* +* +† +** +† +* 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 50 (Continued): Summary of Findings for First VC Investment 
  Model: 5-6 6-6 7-6 8-6 
  Regression Technique: Multinom Tobit Multinom Multinom 
  Dependent variable: Number of First VC 
Investments 
Amount of 
First VC 
Investment 
Amount of First VC Investment Generalist 
VC 
Specialist VC 
One Two and 
more 
£1 to £500,000 > £500,000 
Net-
works 
VC 
Network 
Hypothesis 5: USOs from 
universities that have a strong 
network of previously VC 
funded USOs are more likely to 
attract first VC investment. 
+† +*** +** +** +* +*** +* 
Strategic 
Alliances 
Hypothesis 6: USOs with 
alliance partners are more likely 
to attract first VC investment. 
  +*     
Intel-
lectual 
Capital 
Patented 
IP 
Hypothesis 7: USOs with 
patented IP are more likely to 
attract first VC investment. 
+**  +*  +*** +** +† 
FirmOwns
IP 
Hypothesis 8: USOs with IP 
ownership are more likely to 
attract first VC investment. 
+† +* +*  +** +* +† 
Innovat-
ion 
Radical-
ness 
Hypothesis 9: USOs whose main 
product or service is associated 
with radical innovation are less 
likely to attract first VC 
investment. 
     -†  
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 50 (Continued): Summary of Findings for First VC Investment 
  Model: 5-6 6-6 7-6 8-6 
  Regression Technique: Multinom Tobit Multinom Multinom 
  Dependent variable: Number of First 
VC Investments 
Amount of 
First VC 
Investment 
Amount of First VC 
Investment 
Generalist 
VC 
Specialist 
VC 
One Two 
and more 
£1 to 
£500,000 
> £ 500,000 
Finance Public 
Backed 
Equity 
Hypothesis 10: USOs that 
have obtained publicly-
backed equity funds are 
more likely to attract first 
VC investment. 
+†  +* +*    
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001  
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Chapter 5: USO Firm Performance 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter tests hypotheses derived in Chapter 2 related to research question 2: Do 
VC funded USOs report superior firm performance? Firm performance is monitored with a 
selection of well-respected firm performance indicators introduced in Section 3.5.1.2. In 
addition to USOs’ internal resources, their ability to attract first VC investment is regarded 
as an independent variable that could shape firm performance. 
Like in the previous chapter, variables are entered blockwise to build up the full 
model. In order to assess the influence of first VC investment on superior firm performance, 
three models are discussed to identify which hypotheses are supported for USOs’ firm 
performance. The first model contains the base model and all initial resource endowments. 
The second model contains the base model, all initial resource endowments as well as the 
independent variable of the first VC investment. The final model contains the base model, 
the initial resource endowments and two independent variables identifying whether the 
first round of VC investment was attracted from a Generalist or Specialist VC investor. 
 
5.2 Hypotheses Testing 
5.2.1 Total Number of External Investment Rounds Attracted Until 2008: OLS 
Regression Analysis 
 
Hypotheses were tested with regard to the total number of external investment 
rounds until 2008. This measure includes all rounds of investments which firms received 
from external sources such as VC investment, public backed equity or business angels. The 
mean and median of total number of external investment rounds was 5.82 and 3 
respectively. The total number of external investment rounds ranged from 1 to 50. The 
measure is weighted by firm age and transformed with the natural logarithm to ensure the 
normality assumption. OLS regression analysis was conducted to test the hypotheses. 
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The base model 9-1 in Table 51 relates to the control variables. This model is 
significant at the 0.001 level and has an adjusted R2 of 0.22. Older firms (FirmAge) are 
related to significant less investment rounds at the 0.001 level. Further, independent firms 
(IndependentFirm) are related to significant less investment rounds at the 0.05 level. 
Sets of independent variables were then added to the base model. The full model 
excluding VC investment variables is presented in Model 9-6. This model has an adjusted R2 
of 0.46 and is significant on the 0.001 level. The change in R2 compared with the base model 
is 0.24 and this change is significant at the 0.001 level. The full model including first VC 
investment is presented in Model 9-8. This model has an adjusted R2 of 0.54 and is 
significant at the 0.001 level. The change in R2 compared with the base model is 0.32 and 
this change is significant at the 0.001 level. The full model including the distinction of VC 
investor types is presented in Model 9-10. This model has an adjusted R2 of 0.54 and is 
significant on the 0.001 level. The change in R2 compared with the base model is 0.31 and 
this change is significant at the 0.001 level. 
Four variables are significant in Model 9-6. Firms with strategic alliances 
(StrategicAlliances) attracted more total investment rounds at the 0.001 level. Founders 
with the status of a professor (FounderProfessor) and firms with previous public backed 
equity investments (PublicBackedEquity) attracted more total investment rounds at the 0.05 
level. Rejecting the hypothesised relationship, older founders (AgeFounder) attracted less 
total investment rounds at the 0.01 level. In consequence, Hypotheses 12, 16 and 20 are 
supported, while Hypothesis 11 is rejected in Model 9-6. 
Five variables are significant in Model 9-8. Firms with strategic alliances 
(StrategicAlliances) and first VC investment (FirstVC) attracted more total investment rounds 
at the 0.001 level. Rejecting the hypothesised relationship, older founders (AgeFounder) 
attracted less total investment rounds at the 0.01 level. Founders with the status of a 
professor (FounderProfessor) and firms with previous public backed equity investments 
(PublicBackedEquity) attracted more total investment rounds at the 0.05 level. Thus, 
Hypotheses 12, 16, 20 and 21 are supported, while Hypothesis 11 is rejected in Model 9-8. 
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Table 51: Total Number of External Investment Rounds Attracted Until 2008: OLS Regression Analysis 
 
Model: 9-1 
 
9-2 
 
9-3 
 
9-4 
 
9-5 
 
  
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control 
Variables 
FirmAge -0.17*** 0.03 -0.18*** 0.03 -0.17*** 0.03 -0.18*** 0.03 -0.15*** 0.03 
Independent Firm -0.63* 0.26 -0.40 0.26 -0.64** 0.23 -0.63* 0.26 -0.63** 0.25 
PharmaBiotecSector 0.04 0.19 0.09 0.19 -0.04 0.17 0.02 0.19 0.03 0.18 
OxCamLonRegion 0.25 0.18 0.24 0.18 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.28 0.17 
RelativeMarketSize 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 
General Human 
Capital 
AgeFounder 
  
-1.02* 0.42 
      FounderProfessor 
  
0.52** 0.19 
      Specific Human 
Capital 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 
  
-0.05 0.18 
      FoundingTeamReputation 
  
0.14 0.09 
      Networks VCNetwork 
    
0.15* 0.06 
    StrategicAlliances 
    
0.76*** 0.16 
    Intellectual 
Capital 
PatentedIP 
      
0.25 0.19 
  FirmOwnsIP 
      
0.27 0.18 
  InnovationRadicalness 
      
-0.02 0.09 
  Finance PublicBackedEquity 
        
0.50** 0.17 
 FirstVC 
           GeneralistVC 
           SpecialistVC 
           Constant 1.06** 0.34 4.48** 1.55 0.34 0.37 0.84* 0.36 0.70* 0.35 
 N 125 125 125 125 125 
adjusted R2 0.22 0.26 0.37 0.22 0.26 
Change in adjusted R2 / 0.04† 0.15*** 0.00 0.04** 
F-statistic and significance level 7.84*** 5.95*** 11.48*** 5.33*** 8.41*** 
Test for Heteroscedasticity 0.02 0.35 1.52 0.13 0.23 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 51 (Continued): Total Number of External Investment Rounds Attracted Until 2008: OLS Regression Analysis 
 
Model: 9-6 
 
9-7 
 
9-8 
 
9-9 
 
9-10 
 
  
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control 
Variables 
FirmAge -0.17*** 0.03 -0.15*** 0.03 -0.16*** 0.02 -0.15*** 0.03 -0.16*** 0.02 
Independent Firm -0.42† 0.22 -0.40† 0.22 -0.33 0.21 -0.40† 0.22 -0.33 0.21 
PharmaBiotecSector 0.00 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.08 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.09 0.15 
OxCamLonRegion 0.17 0.17 0.10 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.12 0.15 0.19 0.16 
RelativeMarketSize 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 
General Human 
Capital 
AgeFounder -0.98** 0.37 
  
-0.94** 0.34 
  
-0.95** 0.34 
FounderProfessor 0.49** 0.17 
  
0.36* 0.16 
  
0.37* 0.16 
Specific Human 
Capital 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur -0.03 0.16 
  
-0.03 0.15 
  
-0.03 0.15 
FoundingTeamReputation 0.11 0.08 
  
0.03 0.08 
  
0.03 0.08 
Networks VCNetwork 0.10 0.06 
  
0.03 0.06 
  
0.03 0.06 
StrategicAlliances 0.78*** 0.15 
  
0.69*** 0.14 
  
0.69*** 0.14 
Intellectual 
Capital 
PatentedIP 0.18 0.16 
  
0.05 0.15 
  
0.04 0.16 
FirmOwnsIP 0.24 0.16 
  
0.12 0.15 
  
0.12 0.15 
InnovationRadicalness -0.03 0.08 
  
-0.01 0.07 
  
-0.01 0.07 
Finance PublicBackedEquity 0.41** 0.15 
  
0.30* 0.14 
  
0.30* 0.14 
FirstVC 
  
1.01*** 0.15 0.71*** 0.16 
    GeneralistVC 
      
1.09*** 0.19 0.78*** 0.20 
SpecialistVC 
      
0.95*** 0.17 0.68*** 0.17 
 Constant 3.36* 1.41 0.13 0.33 3.08 1.30 0.12 0.33 3.15* 1.31 
 N 125 125 125 125 125 
adjusted R2  0.46 0.42 0.54 0.42 0.53 
Change in adjusted R2 0.24*** 0.20*** 0.32*** 0.20*** 0.31*** 
F-statistic and significance level 7.95*** 15.90*** 9.96*** 13.65*** 9.33*** 
Test for Heteroscedasticity 3.38† 4.04* 3.01† 4.47* 2.97† 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Six variables are significant in Model 9-10. Firms with strategic alliances 
(StrategicAlliances) as well as with Generalist VC (GeneralistVC) or Specialist VC investors 
(SpecialistVC) investment attracted more total investment rounds at the 0.001 level. 
Rejecting the hypothesised relationship, older founders (AgeFounder) attracted less total 
investment rounds at the 0.01 level. Founders with the status of a professor 
(FounderProfessor) and firms with previous public backed equity investments 
(PublicBackedEquity) attracted more total investment rounds at the 0.05 level. In 
consequence, Hypotheses 12, 16, 20, 22 and 23 are supported, while Hypothesis 11 is 
rejected in Model 9-10. 
 
5.2.2 Total Amount of External Investment (£’s) Attracted Until 2008: OLS 
Regression Analysis 
 
Hypotheses were tested with regard to the total amount of external investment 
attracted until 2008. This measure includes all rounds of investments which firms received 
from external sources such as VC investment, public backed equity, business angels, grants 
or awards. The mean and median of the total amount of external investment was 
£19,753,730 and £1,136,000, respectively. The total amount of external investment ranged 
from £39,000 to £103,000,000. OLS regression analysis was conducted. The measure is 
weighted by firm age and transformed with the natural logarithm to ensure the normality 
assumption. OLS regression analysis was conducted to test the presented hypotheses. 
The base model 10-1 in Table 52 relates to the control variables. This model is 
significant at the 0.001 level and has an adjusted R2 of 0.21. Independent firms 
(IndependentFirm) are related to significant less investment rounds at the 0.001 level. Firms 
in the Oxford, Cambridge or London region attracted weakly significant more total amount 
of investment on the 0.10. 
Sets of independent variables were then added to the base model. The full model 
excluding VC investment variables is presented in Model 10-6. This model has an adjusted R2 
of 0.41 and is significant on the 0.001 level. The change in R2 compared with the base model 
is 0.20 and this change is significant at the 0.001 level. The full model including first VC 
investment is presented in Model 10-8. This model has an adjusted R2 of 0.55 and is 
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significant at the 0.001 level. The change in R2 compared with the base model is 0.34 and 
this change is significant at the 0.001 level. The full model including the distinction of VC 
investor types is presented in Model 10-10. This model has an adjusted R2 of 0.55 and is 
significant on the 0.001 level. The change in R2 compared with the base model is 0.34 and 
this change is significant at the 0.001 level. 
Seven variables are significant in Model 10-6. Firms with strategic alliances 
(StrategicAlliances) attracted more total investment amount at the 0.001 level. Founding 
teams with more experience and reputation (FoundingTeamReputation) and more network 
links to VC investors (VCNetwork) attracted more total investment amount at the 0.01 level. 
Rejecting the hypothesised relationship, older founders (AgeFounder) attracted significant 
less total investment rounds at the 0.05 level. Founders with the status of a professor 
(FounderProfessor), firms with patents (PatentedIP) and firms owning their IP (FirmOwnsIP) 
attracted more total investment amount at the 0.10 level. In consequence, Hypotheses 12, 
14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 are supported, while Hypothesis 20 is rejected in Model 10-6. 
Five variables are significant in Model 10-8. Firms with first VC investment (FirstVC) 
attracted significant more total investment amount at the 0.001 level. Firms with strategic 
alliances (StrategicAlliances) attracted more total investment amount at the 0.01 level. 
Firms with more network links to VC investors attracted more total investment amount at 
the 0.05 level. Rejecting the hypothesised relationship, older founders (AgeFounder) 
attracted less total investment rounds at the 0.05 level. Founding teams with more 
experience and reputation (FoundingTeamReputation) attracted more total investment 
amount at the 0.10 level. Thus, Hypotheses 14, 15, 16 and 21 are supported, while 
Hypothesis 11 is rejected in Model 10-8. 
Six variables are significant in Model 10-10. Firms with Generalist VC (GeneralistVC) or 
Specialist VC (SpecialistVC) investment attracted more total investment amount at the 0.001 
level. Firms with strategic alliances (StrategicAlliances) attracted more total investment 
amount at the 0.01 level. Firms with more network links to VC investors attracted more total 
investment amount at the 0.05 level. Rejecting the hypothesised relationship, older 
founders (AgeFounder) attracted less total investment rounds at the 0.05 level. Founding 
teams with more experience and reputation (FoundingTeamReputation) attracted more 
total investment amount at the 0.10 level. In consequence, Hypotheses 14, 15, 16, 22 and 
23 are supported, while Hypothesis 11 is rejected in Model 10-10. 
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Table 52: Total Amount of External Investment (£’s) Attracted Until 2008: OLS Regression Analysis 
 
Model: 10-1 
 
10-2 
 
10-3 
 
10-4 
 
10-5 
 
  
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control 
Variables 
FirmAge -0.11 0.06  -0.10† 0.06 -0.09† 0.05 -0.14* 0.06 -0.10 0.06 
Independent Firm -2.56*** 0.53 -2.07*** 0.52 -2.52*** 0.48 -2.54*** 0.53 -2.56*** 0.53 
PharmaBiotecSector 0.29 0.39 0.47 0.37 0.13 0.35 0.25 0.39 0.28 0.39 
OxCamLonRegion 0.70† 0.36 0.77* 0.36 0.20 0.36 0.60 0.37 0.72* 0.36 
RelativeMarketSize 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.09 
General Human 
Capital 
AgeFounder 
  
-1.87* 0.84 
      FounderProfessor 
  
0.81* 0.38 
      Specific Human 
Capital 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 
  
-0.22 0.36 
      FoundingTeamReputation 
  
0.63*** 0.18 
      Networks VCNetwork 
    
0.51*** 0.12 
    StrategicAlliances 
    
1.04** 0.33 
    Intellectual 
Capital 
PatentedIP 
      
0.46 0.39 
  FirmOwnsIP 
      
0.57 0.38 
  InnovationRadicalness 
      
-0.08 0.18 
  Finance PublicBackedEquity 
        
0.34 0.36 
 FirstVC 
           GeneralistVC 
           SpecialistVC 
           Constant 8.07*** 0.70 14.25*** 3.11 6.06*** 0.75 7.65*** 0.75 7.83*** 0.74 
 n 125 125 125 125 125 
adjusted R2  0.21 0.29 0.36 0.21 0.21 
Change in adjusted R2  / 0.08** 0.15*** 0.00 0.00 
F-statistic and significance level 7.43 6.53*** 10.8*** 5.04*** 6.34*** 
Test for Heteroscedasticity 0.28 0.06 0.81 0.21 0.32 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
197 
 
Table 52 (Continued): Total Amount of External Investment (£’s) Attracted until 2008: OLS Regression Analysis 
 
Model: 10-6 
 
10-7 
 
10-8 
 
10-9 
 
10-10 
 
  
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control 
Variables 
FirmAge  -0.11* 0.06 -0.07 0.05 -0.08† 0.05 -0.07 0.05 -0.08† 0.05 
Independent Firm -2.12*** 0.48 -1.98*** 0.42 -1.88*** 0.42 -1.99*** 0.43 -1.88*** 0.42 
PharmaBiotecSector 0.23 0.34 0.52† 0.31 0.45 0.30 0.53† 0.31 0.44 0.31 
OxCamLonRegion 0.29 0.37 0.34 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.34 0.29 0.28 0.33 
RelativeMarketSize 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.07 
General Human 
Capital 
AgeFounder -1.50† 0.78 
  
-1.39* 0.68 
  
-1.38* 0.68 
FounderProfessor 0.61† 0.35 
  
0.28 0.31 
  
0.27 0.31 
Specific Human 
Capital 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur -0.29 0.34 
  
-0.29 0.29 
  
-0.29 0.29 
FoundingTeamReputation 0.50** 0.18 
  
0.28† 0.16 
  
0.28† 0.16 
Networks VCNetwork 0.40** 0.13 
  
0.23* 0.12 
  
0.24* 0.12 
StrategicAlliances 1.14*** 0.32 
  
0.88** 0.28 
  
0.89** 0.28 
Intellectual 
Capital 
PatentedIP 0.58† 0.35 
  
0.22 0.31 
  
0.23 0.31 
FirmOwnsIP 0.58† 0.33 
  
0.26 0.29 
  
0.26 0.30 
InnovationRadicalness -0.13 0.16 
  
-0.06 0.14 
  
-0.07 0.14 
Finance PublicBackedEquity 0.11 0.32 
  
-0.19 0.28 
  
-0.19 0.28 
 FirstVC 
  
2.46*** 0.29 1.94*** 0.32 
     GeneralistVC 
      
2.52*** 0.36 1.88*** 0.40 
 SpecialistVC 
      
2.42*** 0.33 1.97*** 0.35 
 Constant 10.86*** 3.00 5.80 0.62 10.10*** 2.61 5.79*** 0.62 10.04*** 2.63 
 n 125 
 
125 
 
125 
 
125 
 
125 
 adjusted R2  0.41 
 
0.50 
 
0.55 
 
0.52 
 
0.55 
 Change in adjusted R2 0.20*** 
 
0.29*** 
 
0.34*** 
 
0.31*** 
 
0.34*** 
 F-statistic and significance level 6.69*** 
 
21.68*** 
 
10.58*** 
 
18.54*** 
 
9.88*** 
 Test for Heteroscedasticity 0.52 
 
9.52** 
 
3.32† 
 
9.91** 
 
3.10† 
 Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
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5.2.3 Likelihood of Product Launch to the Market Until 2008: Logistic 
Regression Analysis 
 
Hypotheses were tested with regard to the ability of firms to launch a product to the 
market until 2008. Respondents reporting a product launch were allocated a value of ‘1’, 
whilst those not reporting a product launch were allocated a value of ‘0’. Fifty-six USOs 
(45%) launched a product, whilst 69 (55%) did not launch a product. Logistic Regression 
analysis was conducted to test the presented hypotheses. The reported beta coefficients are 
transformed to be interpreted as log-odds. A negative relationship between an independent 
variable and the dependent variable is indicated by a coefficient for Exp(B) < 1. A positive 
likelihood for the event of first VC investment to occur is indicated by Exp(B) > 1. 
The base model 11-1 in Table 53 relates to the control variables. This model is 
significant at the 0.001 level and has a pseudo R2 of 0.23. Older firms (FirmAge) were more 
likely to launch a product at the 0.001 level. Firms operating in the Pharma and Biotech 
sector (PharmaBiotechSector) and those located in the Oxford, Cambridge or London region 
(OxCamLonRegion) were less likely to launch a product at the 0.01 level. 
Sets of independent variables were then added to the base model. The full model 
excluding VC investment variables is presented in Model 11-6. This model has a pseudo R2 of 
0.39 and is significant on the 0.001 level. The change in R2 compared with the base model is 
0.16 and this change is significant at the 0.10 level. The full model with first VC investment is 
presented in Model 11-8. This model has a pseudo R2 of 0.39 and is significant at the 0.001 
level. The change in R2 compared with the base model is 0.16 and this change is significant 
at the 0.10 level. The full model including the distinction of VC investor types is presented in 
Model 11-10. This model has a pseudo R2 of 0.40 and is significant on the 0.001 level. The 
change in R2 compared with the base model is 0.17 which is significant at the 0.10 level. 
Four variables are significant in Model 11-6. Rejecting the hypothesised relationship, 
firms with patents (PatentedIP) were less likely to launch a product at the 0.01 level. 
Conversely, firms with strategic alliances (StrategicAlliances) were more likely to launch a 
product launch at the 0.05 level. Also rejecting the hypothesised relationship, firms owning 
their IP (FirmOwnsIP) were less likely to launch a product at the 0.05 level.  
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Table 53: Likelihood of Product Launch to the Market Until 2008: Logistic Regression Analysis 
 
Model: 11-1 
 
11-2 
 
11-3 
 
11-4 
 
11-5 
 
  
Exp(B) S.E. Exp(B) S.E. Exp(B) S.E. Exp(B) S.E. Exp(B) S.E. 
Control Variables FirmAge 1.47*** 0.14 1.50*** 0.15 1.48*** 0.14 1.60*** 0.17 1.46*** 0.14 
Independent Firm 0.90 0.58 1.00 0.66 0.88 0.58 0.93 0.64 0.87 0.56 
PharmaBiotecSector 0.20** 0.10 0.18** 0.10 0.18** 0.10 0.18** 0.10 0.18*** 0.10 
OxCamLonRegion 0.26** 0.13 0.25** 0.13 0.33* 0.17 0.34 0.18 0.22*** 0.11 
RelativeMarketSize 1.01 0.11 1.00 0.11 1.01 0.11 1.03 0.12 1.01 0.11 
General Human 
Capital 
AgeFounder 
  
1.51 1.60 
      FounderProfessor 
  
1.08 0.54 
      Specific Human 
Capital 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 
  
0.58 0.28 
      FoundingTeamReputation 
  
1.14 0.29 
      Networks VCNetwork 
    
0.80 0.15 
    StrategicAlliances 
    
2.41* 1.10 
    Intellectual Capital PatentedIP 
      
0.20** 0.10 
  FirmOwnsIP 
      
0.25* 0.14 
  InnovationRadicalness 
      
0.76 0.20 
  Finance PublicBackedEquity 
        
0.42* 0.19 
 FirstVC 
           GeneralistVC 
           SpecialistVC 
           n 125 125 125 125 125 
pseudo R2 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.33 0.25 
Change in R2  / 0.01 0.03† 0.10** 0.02† 
LR Chi2 39.53*** 40.95 44.34*** 56.99*** 43.30*** 
Log likelihood -66.20 -65.49 -63.80 -57.47 -64.32 
Cases correctly classified 68.80% 69.60% 69.60% 75.20% 71.20% 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 53 (Continued): Likelihood of Product Launch to the Market Until 2008: Logistic Regression Analysis 
 
Model: 11-6 
 
11-7 
 
11-8 
 
11-9 
 
11-10 
 
  
Exp(B) S.E. Exp(B) S.E. Exp(B) S.E. Exp(B) S.E. Exp(B) S.E. 
Control Variables FirmAge 1.59*** 0.19 1.46*** 0.14 1.60*** 0.19 1.46*** 0.14 1.58*** 0.19 
Independent Firm 0.98 0.73 0.83 0.54 1.01 0.75 0.83 0.54 1.02 0.76 
PharmaBiotecSector 0.10*** 0.07 0.20** 0.10 0.10*** 0.07 0.18*** 0.09 0.09** 0.06 
OxCamLonRegion 0.30† 0.22 0.27** 0.13 0.30† 0.21 0.26** 0.13 0.28† 0.20 
RelativeMarketSize 1.07 0.13 1.01 0.11 1.07 0.13 1.00 0.11 1.06 0.13 
General Human 
Capital 
AgeFounder 1.36 1.73 
  
1.37 1.73 
  
1.67 2.18 
FounderProfessor 1.54 0.96 
  
1.49 0.95 
  
1.35 0.88 
Specific Human 
Capital 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 0.59 0.35 
  
0.58 0.34 
  
0.56 0.33 
FoundingTeamReputation 0.88 0.26 
  
0.86 0.26 
  
0.87 0.26 
Networks VCNetwork 0.80 0.19 
  
0.79 0.19 
  
0.84 0.21 
StrategicAlliances 3.55* 1.96 
  
3.44* 1.92 
  
3.67* 2.11 
Intellectual Capital PatentedIP 0.15** 0.09 
  
0.15** 0.09 
  
0.16** 0.10 
FirmOwnsIP 0.30* 0.17 
  
0.29* 0.17 
  
0.30* 0.17 
InnovationRadicalness 0.66 0.20 
  
0.66 0.20 
  
0.62 0.19 
Finance PublicBackedEquity 0.35† 0.19 
  
0.34† 0.19 
  
0.33† 0.19 
 FirstVC 
  
0.71 0.32 1.20 0.73 
     GeneralistVC 
      
0.45 0.26 0.75 0.56 
 SpecialistVC 
      
0.97 0.49 1.59 1.05 
 n 125 125 125 125 125 
pseudo R2 0.39 0.23 0.39 0.24 0.40 
Change in R2 0.16† 0.00 0.16† 0.01 0.17† 
LR Chi2 67.57*** 40.12*** 67.66*** 41.97*** 68.91*** 
Log likelihood -52.18 -65.90 -52.14 -64.98 -51.41 
Cases correctly classified 80.00% 69.60% 80% 71.20% 80.00% 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Further, USO which attracted public backed equity (PublicBackedEquity) were weakly 
less likely to launch a product at the 0.10 level. In consequence, Hypothesis 16 is supported, 
but Hypotheses 17, 18 and 20 are rejected in Model 11-6. 
The variables in Models 11-8 and 11-10 have the same direction and significance levels as 
reported in Model 11-6. Therefore, these two models also support Hypothesis 16 and reject 
Hypotheses 17, 18 and 20, irrespective of adding VC investment variables to the models. 
 
5.2.4 Book Value of Total Assets (£’s) Until 2008: OLS Regression Analysis 
 
Hypotheses were tested with regard to the book value of each firm’s total assets until 
2008. The mean and median book value of assets was £2,000,000 and £249,855, 
respectively. The book value of assets ranged from £6,000 to £34,826,000. The measure is 
weighted by firm age and transformed with the natural logarithm to ensure the normality 
assumption. OLS regression analysis was conducted to test the presented hypotheses. 
  The base model 12-1 in Table 54 relates to the control variables. This model is 
significant at the 0.01 level and has an adjusted R2 of 0.10. Independent firms 
(IndependentFirm) had significant lower book value of total assets at the 0.01 level. Firms in 
the Oxford, Cambridge or London region (OxCamLonRegion) had significant higher book 
value of total assets at the 0.05 level. 
Sets of independent variables were then added to the base model. The full model 
excluding VC investment variables is presented in Model 12-6. This model has an adjusted R2 
of 0.23 and is significant on the 0.001 level. The change in R2 compared with the base model 
is 0.13 and this change is significant at the 0.01 level. The full model including first VC 
investment is presented in Model 12-8. This model has an adjusted R2 of 0.27 and is 
significant at the 0.001 level. The change in R2 compared with the base model is 0.17 and 
this change is significant at the 0.001 level. The full model including the distinction of VC 
investor types is presented in Model 12-10. This model has an adjusted R2 of 0.26 and is 
significant on the 0.001 level. The change in R2 compared with the base model is 0.16 and 
this change is significant at the 0.001 level. 
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Table 54: Book Value of Total Assets (£’s) Until 2008: OLS Regression Analysis 
 
Model: 12-1 
 
12-2 
 
12-3 
 
12-4 
 
12-5 
 
  
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control Variables FirmAge -0.02 0.07 0.00 0.07 -0.01 0.06 -0.02 0.07 -0.03 0.07 
Independent Firm -1.68** 0.60 -1.21* 0.60 -1.68* 0.56 -1.68** 0.61 -1.68** 0.60 
PharmaBiotecSector 0.15 0.44 0.16 0.43 0.01 0.41 0.15 0.44 0.15 0.44 
OxCamLonRegion 0.92* 0.41 0.99* 0.42 0.72† 0.42 0.91* 0.43 0.92* 0.41 
RelativeMarketSize 0.15 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.16 0.10 
General Human 
Capital 
AgeFounder 
  
-0.64 0.97 
      FounderProfessor 
  
0.70 0.43 
      Specific Human 
Capital 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 
  
-0.96* 0.41 
      FoundingTeamReputation 
  
0.60* 0.21 
      Networks VCNetwork 
    
0.27† 0.15 
    StrategicAlliances 
    
1.32*** 0.39 
    Intellectual Capital PatentedIP 
      
0.04 0.44 
  FirmOwnsIP 
      
0.03 0.43 
  InnovationRadicalness 
      
0.01 0.21 
  Finance PublicBackedEquity 
        
-0.15 0.40 
 FirstVC 
           GeneralistVC 
           SpecialistVC 
           Constant 4.94*** 0.79 6.92* 3.58 3.66*** 0.89 4.91*** 0.86 5.05*** 0.84 
 n 125 125 125 125 125 
adjusted R2  0.10 0.16 0.20 0.08 0.1 
Change in adjusted R2  / 0.06* 0.10*** -0.02 0.00 
F-statistic and significance level 3.86** 3.53*** 5.41*** 2.35* 3.21** 
Test for Heteroscedasticity 0.01 2.73† 4.24* 0.01 0.00 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 54 (Continued): Book Value of Total Assets (£’s) Until 2008: OLS Regression Analysis 
 
Model: 12-6 
 
12-7 
 
12-8 
 
12-9 
 
12-10 
 
  
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control Variables FirmAge -0.03 0.07 0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.07 0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.07 
Independent Firm -1.25* 0.58 -1.34* 0.57 -1.10* 0.57 -1.34* 0.58 -1.10† 0.57 
PharmaBiotecSector -0.02 0.42 0.29 0.42 0.11 0.41 0.29 0.42 0.09 0.42 
OxCamLonRegion 0.81† 0.45 0.70† 0.39 0.81† 0.44 0.70† 0.40 0.79† 0.45 
RelativeMarketSize 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.10 
General Human 
Capital 
AgeFounder -0.52 0.95 
  
-0.46 0.92 
  
-0.44 0.93 
FounderProfessor 0.67 0.43 
  
0.48 0.42 
  
0.47 0.43 
Specific Human 
Capital 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur -1.07** 0.41 
  
-1.07** 0.40 
  
-1.07** 0.40 
FoundingTeamReputation 0.52* 0.22 
  
0.39* 0.22 
  
0.39† 0.22 
Networks VCNetwork 0.21 0.16 
  
0.11 0.16 
  
0.12 0.16 
StrategicAlliances 1.41*** 0.38 
  
1.26*** 0.38 
  
1.26*** 0.38 
Intellectual Capital PatentedIP 0.17 0.42 
  
-0.04 0.42 
  
-0.02 0.43 
FirmOwnsIP 0.24 0.40 
  
0.06 0.40 
  
0.06 0.40 
InnovationRadicalness -0.03 0.20 
  
0.00 0.19 
  
0.00 0.20 
Finance PublicBackedEquity -0.43 0.39 
  
-0.60 0.38 
  
-0.60 0.38 
 FirstVC 
  
1.45*** 0.39 1.13** 0.44 
     GeneralistVC 
      
1.44** 0.49 1.05† 0.54 
 SpecialistVC 
      
1.46*** 0.44 1.17* 0.47 
 Constant 5.62 3.63 3.59*** 0.83 5.18 3.54 3.59*** 0.84 5.10 3.57 
 n 125 125 125 125 125 
adjusted R2  0.23 0.19 0.27 0.23 0.26 
Change in adjusted R2 0.13** 0.09*** 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.16** 
F-statistic and significance level 3.43*** 5.83*** 3.80*** 4.95*** 3.55*** 
Test for Heteroscedasticity 7.97* 4.12* 11.27** 4.17* 11.53** 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Three variables are significant in Model 12-6. Firms with strategic alliances 
(StrategicAlliances) had a higher book value of total assets at the 0.001 level. Rejecting the 
hypothesised relationship, founders who are experienced entrepreneurs 
(FounderHabitualEntrepreneur) had a lower book value of total assets at the 0.01 level. 
Founding teams with more experience and reputation (FoundingTeamReputation) had a 
higher book value of total assets at the 0.05 level. In consequence, Hypotheses 14 and 16 
are supported, while Hypothesis 13 is rejected in Model 12-6. 
Four variables are significant in Model 12-8. Firms with strategic alliances 
(StrategicAlliances) had a higher book value of total assets at the 0.001 level. Firms with first 
VC investment (FirstVC) had a higher book value of total assets at the 0.01 level. Rejecting 
the hypothesised relationship, founders who are experienced entrepreneurs 
(FounderHabitualEntrepreneur) had a lower book value of total assets at the 0.01 level. 
Founding teams with more experience and reputation (FoundingTeamReputation) had a 
higher book value of total assets at the 0.05 level. Thus, Hypotheses 14, 16 and 21 are 
supported, while Hypothesis 13 is rejected in Model 12-8. 
Five variables are significant in Model 12-10. Firms with strategic alliances 
(StrategicAlliances) had a higher book value of total assets at the 0.001 level. Rejecting the 
hypothesised relationship, founders who are experienced entrepreneurs 
(FounderHabitualEntrepreneur) had a lower book value of total assets at the 0.01 level. 
Firms with Specialist VC investment (SpecialistVC) had a higher book value of total assets at 
the 0.05 level. Founding teams with more experience and reputation 
(FoundingTeamReputation) as well as firms with Generalist VC investors (GeneralistVC) had 
weakly a higher book value of total assets at the 0.10 level. In consequence, Hypotheses 14, 
16, 22 and 23 are supported, while Hypothesis 13 is rejected in Model 12-10. 
 
 
5.2.5 Number of Employees in the USOs in 2008: OLS Regression Analysis 
 
Hypotheses were tested with regard to each firm’s number of employees until 2008. 
The mean and median number of employees was 16.23 and 7, respectively. The number of 
employees ranged from 1 to 160. The measure is weighted by firm age and transformed 
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with the natural logarithm to ensure the normality assumption. OLS regression analysis was 
conducted to test the presented hypotheses. 
The base model 13-1 in Table 55 relates to the control variables. This model is 
significant at the 0.05 level and has an adjusted R2 of 0.07. Independent firms 
(IndependentFirm) had significant lower number of employees at the 0.01 level. 
 Sets of independent variables were then added to the base model. The full model 
excluding VC investment variables is presented in Model 13-6. This model has an adjusted R2 
of 0.14 and is significant on the 0.01 level. The change in R2 compared with the base model 
is 0.07 and this change is significant at the 0.05 level. The full model with first VC investment 
is presented in Model 13-8. This model has an adjusted R2 of 0.16 and is significant at the 
0.01 level. The change in R2 compared with the base model is 0.09 and this change is 
significant at the 0.05 level. The full model with the distinction of VC investor types is 
presented in Model 13-10. This model has an adjusted R2 of 0.17 and is significant on the 
0.01 level. The change in R2 compared with the base model is 0.10 and this change is 
significant at the 0.10 level. 
Two variables are significant in Model 13-6. Firms with strategic alliances 
(StrategicAlliances) had a higher number of employees at the 0.01 level. Founding teams 
with more experience and reputation (FoundingTeamReputation) had a higher number of 
employees at the 0.10 level. In consequence, Hypotheses 14 and 16 are supported in Model 
13-6. 
Two variables are significant in Model 13-8. Firms with strategic alliances 
(StrategicAlliances) and firms with first VC investment (FirstVC) had a higher number of 
employees at the 0.05 level. Thus, Hypotheses 16 and 21 are supported, while Hypothesis 
14 is no longer significantly supported in Model 13-8. 
Two variables are significant in Model 13-10. Firms with strategic alliances 
(StrategicAlliances) and firms with Generalist VC investment (GeneralistVC) had a higher 
number of employees at the 0.05 level. Thus, Hypotheses 16 and 22 are supported, while 
Hypothesis 14 is no longer significantly supported in Model 13-10. 
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Table 55: Number of Employees in the USOs in 2008: OLS Regression Analysis 
 
Model: 13-1 
 
13-2 
 
13-3 
 
13-4 
 
13-5 
 
  
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control 
Variables 
FirmAge -0.05 0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.05 0.03 
Independent Firm -1.03** 0.30  -0.84** 0.31 -1.02** 0.29 -1.03*** 0.30 -1.03*** 0.30 
PharmaBiotecSector -0.08 0.22 -0.01 0.22 -0.14 0.21 -0.08 0.22 -0.08 0.22 
OxCamLonRegion 0.23 0.20 0.25 0.21 0.10 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.20 
RelativeMarketSize 0.00 0.05 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.05 
General Human 
Capital 
AgeFounder 
  
-0.66 0.49 
      FounderProfessor 
  
0.31 0.22 
      Specific Human 
Capital 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 
  
-0.09 0.21 
      FoundingTeamReputation 
  
0.26* 0.11 
      Networks VCNetwork 
    
0.15* 0.07 
    StrategicAlliances 
    
0.53** 0.20 
    Intellectual 
Capital 
PatentedIP 
      
0.02 0.22 
  FirmOwnsIP 
      
-0.11 0.22 
  InnovationRadicalness 
      
0.03 0.10 
  Finance PublicBackedEquity 
        
-0.15 0.20 
 FirstVC 
           GeneralistVC 
           SpecialistVC 
           Constant 1.35** 0.39 3.50 1.82 0.70 0.45 1.37** 0.43 1.46*** 0.42 
 n 125 125 125 125 125 
adjusted R2  0.07 0.1 0.15 0.05 0.07 
Change in adjusted R2  / 0.03† 0.08** -0.02 0.00 
F-statistic and significance level 2.95* 2.56* 4.04*** 1.84† 2.54* 
Test for Heteroscedasticity 0.25 0.04 0.21 0.23 0.14 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 55 (Continued): Number of Employees in the USOs in 2008: OLS Regression Analysis 
 
Model: 13-6 
 
13-7 
 
13-8 
 
13-9 
 
13-10 
 
  
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control Variables FirmAge -0.05 0.04 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.04 
Independent Firm -0.86** 0.30 -0.88** 0.29 -0.80** 0.30 -0.89** 0.29 -0.80** 0.30 
PharmaBiotecSector -0.08 0.22 -0.02 0.21 -0.03 0.22 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.22 
OxCamLonRegion 0.14 0.23 0.14 0.20 0.14 0.23 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.23 
RelativeMarketSize -0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.00 0.05 -0.01 0.05 
General Human 
Capital 
AgeFounder -0.61 0.49 
  
-0.58 0.49 
  
-0.62 0.49 
FounderProfessor 0.29 0.22 
  
0.21 0.22 
  
0.24 0.22 
Specific Human 
Capital 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur -0.12 0.21 
  
-0.12 0.21 
  
-0.12 0.21 
FoundingTeamReputation 0.21† 0.11 
  
0.16 0.11 
  
0.17 0.11 
Networks VCNetwork 0.11 0.08 
  
0.07 0.08 
  
0.05 0.08 
StrategicAlliances 0.56** 0.20 
  
0.50* 0.20 
  
0.49* 0.20 
Intellectual 
Capital 
PatentedIP 0.09 0.22 
  
0.01 0.22 
  
-0.04 0.22 
FirmOwnsIP -0.08 0.21 
  
-0.15 0.21 
  
-0.16 0.21 
InnovationRadicalness 0.01 0.10 
  
0.03 0.10 
  
0.05 0.10 
Finance PublicBackedEquity -0.21 0.20 
  
-0.28 0.20 
  
-0.28 0.20 
 FirstVC 
  
0.61** 0.20 0.45* 0.23 
     GeneralistVC 
      
0.81*** 0.25 0.67* 0.28 
 SpecialistVC 
      
0.47* 0.22 0.34 0.24 
 Constant 2.95 1.89 0.78† 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.77† 0.42 2.98 1.87 
 n 125 125 125 125 125 
adjusted R2  0.14 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.17 
Change in adjusted R2 0.07* 0.06** 0.09* 0.07** 0.10* 
F-statistic and significance level 2.36** 4.16*** 2.51** 3.86*** 2.47** 
Test for Heteroscedasticity 0.01 0.38 0.19 0.60 0.18 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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5.2.6 Absolute Employment Change between Founding Year and 2008: OLS 
Regression Analysis 
 
Hypotheses were tested with regard to each firm’s absolute employment change 
between the founding year and 2008. The mean and median of absolute employment 
change was 5.4 and 1.5, respectively. Absolute employment change ranged from -0.83 to 
72.00. The measure is weighted by firm age and transformed with the natural logarithm to 
ensure the normality assumption. OLS regression analysis was conducted to test the 
presented hypotheses. 
The base model 14-1 in Table 56 relates to the control variables. This model is 
significant at the 0.01 level and has an adjusted R2 of 0.09. Independent firms 
(IndependentFirm) had a significant lower employment change rate at the 0.01 level. 
Sets of independent variables were then added to the base model. The full model 
excluding VC investment variables is presented in Model 14-6. This model has an adjusted R2 
of 0.21 and is significant on the 0.001 level. The change in R2 compared with the base model 
is 0.12 and this change is significant at the 0.01 level. The full model including first VC 
investment is presented in Model 14-8. This model has an adjusted R2 of 0.33 and is 
significant at the 0.001 level. The change in R2 compared with the base model is 0.24 and 
this change is significant at the 0.01 level. The full model with the distinction of VC investor 
types is presented in Model 12-10. This model has an adjusted R2 of 0.34 and is significant 
on the 0.01 level. The change in R2 compared with the base model is 0.25 and this change is 
significant at the 0.01 level. 
Three variables are significant in Model 14-6. Firms with strategic alliances 
(StrategicAlliances) reported more absolute employment growth at the 0.01 level. Founders 
with the status of a professor (FounderProfessor) and firms with more network links to VC 
investors (VCNetwork) reported more absolute employment growth at the 0.05 level. In 
consequence, Hypotheses 12, 15 and 16 are supported in Model 14-6. 
Five variables are significant in Model 14-8. Firms with strategic alliances 
(StrategicAlliances) reported more absolute employment growth at the 0.001 level.  
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Table 56: Absolute Employment Change in USOs Between Founding Year and 2008: OLS Regression Analysis 
 
Model: 14-1 
 
14-2 
 
14-3 
 
14-4 
 
14-5 
 
  
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control Variables FirmAge 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Independent Firm -0.39** 0.11 -0.33** 0.12 -0.39*** 0.11 -0.39** 0.11 -0.39*** 0.11 
PharmaBiotecSector 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.08 
OxCamLonRegion 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.08 
RelativeMarketSize -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 
General Human 
Capital 
AgeFounder 
  
-0.34† 0.18 
      FounderProfessor 
  
0.19* 0.08 
      Specific Human 
Capital 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 
  
0.00 0.08 
      FoundingTeamReputation 
  
-0.04 0.04 
      Networks VCNetwork 
    
0.05† 0.03 
    StrategicAlliances 
    
0.23** 0.07 
    Intellectual Capital PatentedIP 
      
0.07 0.08 
  FirmOwnsIP 
      
0.00 0.08 
  InnovationRadicalness 
      
0.01 0.04 
  Finance PublicBackedEquity 
        
-0.05 0.08 
 FirstVC 
           GeneralistVC 
           SpecialistVC 
           Constant 0.55*** 0.15 1.75* 0.69 0.33† 0.17 0.51** 0.16 0.59*** 0.16 
 n 125 125 125 125 125 
adjusted R2  0.09 0.13 0.22 0.13 0.13 
Change in adjusted R2  / 0.04† 0.13** 0.04 0.04 
F-statistic and significance level 3.52** 3.00** 4.60*** 2.25* 3.00** 
 
Test for Heteroscedasticity 0.10 0.00 0.03 1.16 1.15 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 56 (Continued): Absolute Employment Change in USOs Between Founding Year and 2008 
 
Model: 14-6 
 
14-7 
 
14-8 
 
14-9 
 
14-10 
 
  
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control Variables FirmAge 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Independent Firm -0.34** 0.11 -0.35** 0.11 -0.32** 0.11 -0.35** 0.11 -0.32** 0.11 
PharmaBiotecSector 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.08 
OxCamLonRegion -0.01 0.09 0.04 0.08 -0.01 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.09 
RelativeMarketSize -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 
General Human 
Capital 
AgeFounder -0.30 0.18 
  
-0.29 0.18 
  
-0.30 0.18 
FounderProfessor 0.18* 0.08 
  
0.15† 0.08 
  
0.16† 0.08 
Specific Human 
Capital 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur -0.01 0.08 
  
-0.01 0.08 
  
-0.01 0.08 
FoundingTeamReputation -0.07 0.04 
  
-0.08* 0.04 
  
-0.08† 0.04 
Networks VCNetwork 0.06* 0.03 
  
0.05 0.03 
  
0.04 0.03 
StrategicAlliances 0.25** 0.07 
  
0.23*** 0.07 
  
0.22** 0.07 
Intellectual Capital PatentedIP 0.04 0.08 
  
0.01 0.08 
  
0.00 0.08 
FirmOwnsIP 0.00 0.08 
  
-0.03 0.08 
  
-0.04 0.08 
InnovationRadicalness -0.02 0.04 
  
-0.01 0.04 
  
0.00 0.04 
Finance PublicBackedEquity -0.10 0.07 
  
-0.13† 0.07 
  
-0.13† 0.07 
 FirstVC 
  
0.20* 0.08 0.17* 0.08 
     GeneralistVC 
      
0.28** 0.09 0.26* 0.10 
 SpecialistVC 
      
0.14† 0.09 0.13 0.09 
 Constant 1.37* 0.69 0.37 0.16 1.31† 0.68 0.36 0.16 1.39 0.68 
 n 125 125 125 125 125 
adjusted R2  0.21 0.13 0.33 0.14 0.34 
Change in adjusted R2 0.12** 0.04* 0.24** 0.05* 0.25** 
F-statistic and significance level 3.17*** 4.18*** 3.32*** 3.94*** 3.26*** 
 
Test for Heteroscedasticity 1.02 0.62 4.19* 0.56 4.87* 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Firms with first VC investment (FirstVC) reported more absolute employment 
growth at the 0.05 level. Rejecting the hypothesised relationship, founding teams with more 
experience and reputation (FoundingTeamReputation) reported less absolute employment 
growth at the 0.05 level. Similarly, firms with public backed equity investments 
(PublicBackedEquity) reported less absolute employment growth at the 0.10 level. Founders 
with the status of a professor (FounderProfessor) reported more absolute employment 
growth at the 0.10 level. Thus, Hypotheses 12, 16 and 21 are supported, while Hypothesis 
14 and 20 are rejected in Model 14-8. 
Five variables are significant in Model 12-10. Firms with strategic alliances 
(StrategicAlliances) reported more absolute employment growth at the 0.01 level. Firms 
with Generalist VC investment (GeneralistVC) reported more absolute employment growth 
at the 0.05 level. Rejecting the hypothesised relationship, founding teams with more 
experience and reputation (FoundingTeamReputation) reported less absolute employment 
growth at the 0.05 level. Similarly, firms with public backed equity investments 
(PublicBackedEquity) reported less absolute employment growth at the 0.10 level. Founders 
with the status of a professor (FounderProfessor) reported more absolute employment 
growth at the 0.10 level. Thus, Hypotheses 12, 16 and 23 are supported, while Hypothesis 
14 and 20 are rejected in Model 14-10. 
 
5.2.7 Composite Measure of Firm Performance: OLS Regression Analysis 
 
Hypotheses were tested with regard to a composite measure of firm performance 
discussed in Section 3.5.1.2. Component scores relating to a single component generated by 
the PCA (i.e. total number of external investment rounds, total amount of external 
investment, book value of total assets, number of employees and absolute employment 
change) were considered as a dependent variable. Issues relating the construction as well as 
the validity and reliability of the composite measure of firm performance are discussed in 
Section 3.5.1.2. The mean and median of the composite measure of firm performance was 
0.00 and -0.20, respectively. The composite measure of firm performance ranged from -1.96 
to 2.70. OLS regression analysis was conducted to test the presented hypotheses. 
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The base model 15-1 in Table 57 relates to the control variables. This model is 
significant at the 0.001 level and has an adjusted R2 of 0.15. Independent firms 
(IndependentFirm) had a significant lower performance score at the 0.001 level. Firms in the 
Oxford, Cambridge or London region (OxCamLonRegion) had higher performance scores at 
the 0.05 level. 
Sets of independent variables were then added to the base model. The full model 
excluding VC investment variables is presented in Model 15-6. This model has an adjusted R2 
of 0.33 and is significant on the 0.001 level. The change in R2 compared with the base model 
is 0.18 and this change is significant at the 0.001 level. The full model including first VC 
investment is presented in Model 15-8. This model has an adjusted R2 of 0.42 and is 
significant at the 0.001 level. The change in R2 compared with the base model is 0.27 and 
this change is significant at the 0.001 level. The full model including the distinction of VC 
investor types is presented in Model 15-10. This model has an adjusted R2 of 0.42 and is 
significant on the 0.001 level. The change in R2 compared with the base model is 0.27 and 
this change is significant at the 0.001 level. 
Five variables are significant in Model 15-6. Firms with strategic alliances 
(StrategicAlliances) had higher performance scores at the 0.001 level. Founders with the 
status of a professor (FounderProfessor) and firms with more network links to VC investors 
(VCNetwork) had higher performance scores at the 0.05 level. Founding teams with more 
experience and reputation (FoundingTeamReputation) had higher performance scores at 
the 0.10 level. Rejecting the hypothesised relationship, older founders (AgeFounder) had 
lower performance scores at the 0.10 level. In consequence, Hypotheses 12, 14, 15 and 16 
are supported, while Hypothesis 11 is rejected in Model 15-6. 
Four variables are significant in Model 15-8. Firms with strategic alliances 
(StrategicAlliances) and firms with first VC investment (FirstVC) had higher performance 
scores at the 0.001 level. Founders with the status of a professor (FounderProfessor) had 
higher performance scores at the 0.10 level. However, more network links to VC investors 
(VCNetwork) and founding teams with more experience and reputation 
(FoundingTeamReputation) were no longer significant compared to the previous model. 
Rejecting the hypothesised relationship, older founders (AgeFounder) had lower 
performance scores at the 0.10 level. Thus, Hypotheses 12, 16 and 21 are supported, 
whereas Hypothesis 11 is rejected in Model 15-8 
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Table 57: Composite Measure of Firm Performance: OLS Regression Analysis 
 
Model: 15-1 
 
15-2 
 
15-3 
 
15-4 
 
15-5 
 
  
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control 
Variables 
FirmAge -0.05† 0.03 -0.05† 0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.05† 0.03 -0.05 0.03 
Independent Firm -1.09*** 0.25 -0.86*** 0.26 -1.08*** 0.23 -1.09*** 0.26 -1.09*** 0.26 
PharmaBiotecSector 0.08 0.19 0.13 0.18 0.00 0.17 0.07 0.19 0.08 0.19 
OxCamLonRegion 0.33† 0.17 0.34† 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.29 0.18 0.33† 0.17 
RelativeMarketSize 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 
General Human 
Capital 
AgeFounder 
  
-0.84* 0.41 
      FounderProfessor 
  
0.46* 0.19 
      Specific Human 
Capital 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur 
  
-0.16 0.18 
      FoundingTeamReputation 
  
0.21* 0.09 
      Networks VCNetwork 
    
0.18** 0.06 
    StrategicAlliances 
    
0.67*** 0.16 
    Intellectual 
Capital 
PatentedIP 
      
0.15 0.19 
  FirmOwnsIP 
      
0.10 0.18 
  InnovationRadicalness 
      
0.00 0.09 
  Finance PublicBackedEquity 
        
0.05 0.17 
 FirstVC 
           GeneralistVC 
           SpecialistVC 
           Constant 1.13*** 0.34 3.94* 1.53 0.33 0.36 1.02** 0.36 1.10** 0.36 
 n 125 125 125 125 125 
adjusted R2  0.15 0.20 0.31 0.13 0.18 
Change in adjusted R2  / 0.05* 0.16*** -0.02 0.03 
F-statistic and significance level 5.27*** 4.41*** 8.90*** 3.34** 4.37*** 
Test for Heteroscedasticity 0.00 0.01 0.44 0.00 0.00 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 57 (Continued): Composite Measure of Firm Performance: OLS Regression Analysis 
 
Model: 15-6 
 
15-7 
 
15-8 
 
15-9 
 
15-10 
 
  
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control Variables FirmAge -0.06† 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.04† 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.04† 0.03 
Independent Firm -0.88*** 0.24 -0.88*** 0.23 -0.79*** 0.22 -0.88*** 0.23 -0.79*** 0.22 
PharmaBiotecSector 0.02 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.10 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.12 0.16 
OxCamLonRegion 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.16 0.21 0.17 
RelativeMarketSize 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 
General Human 
Capital 
AgeFounder -0.74† 0.39 
  
-0.70† 0.36 
  
-0.72* 0.36 
FounderProfessor 0.41* 0.17 
  
0.29† 0.17 
  
0.30† 0.17 
Specific Human 
Capital 
FounderHabitualEntrepreneur -0.19 0.17 
  
-0.19 0.16 
  
-0.19 0.16 
FoundingTeamReputation 0.15† 0.09 
  
0.07 0.08 
  
0.08 0.08 
Networks VCNetwork 0.15* 0.06 
  
0.09 0.06 
  
0.08 0.06 
StrategicAlliances 0.71*** 0.16 
  
0.62*** 0.15 
  
0.61*** 0.15 
Intellectual 
Capital 
PatentedIP 0.17 0.17 
  
0.04 0.16 
  
0.02 0.17 
FirmOwnsIP 0.12 0.16 
  
0.00 0.16 
  
0.00 0.16 
InnovationRadicalness -0.03 0.08 
  
-0.01 0.08 
  
0.00 0.08 
Finance PublicBackedEquity -0.07 0.16 
  
-0.18 0.15 
  
-0.18 0.15 
 FirstVC 
  
0.90*** 0.16 0.70*** 0.17 
     GeneralistVC 
      
1.02*** 0.19 0.80*** 0.21 
 SpecialistVC 
      
0.82*** 0.18 0.65*** 0.18 
 Constant 2.83† 1.48 0.29 0.33 2.55† 1.38 0.28 0.33 2.65† 1.39 
 n 125 125 125 125 125 
adjusted R2 0.33 0.32 0.42 0.33 0.42 
Change in adjusted R2 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.27*** 0.18*** 0.27*** 
F-statistic and significance level 5.12*** 11.10*** 6.54*** 9.67*** 6.17*** 
Test for Heteroscedasticity 0.19 2.56 0.88 3.35† 1.20 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Five variables are significant in Model 15-10. Firms with strategic alliances 
(StrategicAlliances) as well as firms with investment by Generalist VC investors 
(GeneralistVC) or Specialist VC investors (SpecialistVC) had higher performance scores at the 
0.001 level. Founders with the status of a professor (FounderProfessor) had higher 
performance scores at the 0.10 level. However, more network links to VC investors 
(VCNetwork) and founding teams with more experience and reputation 
(FoundingTeamReputation) were no longer significant compared to the previous model. 
Rejecting the hypothesised relationship, older founders (AgeFounder) had lower 
performance scores at the 0.10 level. In consequence, Hypotheses 12, 16, 22 and 23 are 
supported, while Hypothesis 11 is rejected in Model 12-10. 
 
5.3 Summary of Findings for USOs’ Firm Performance 
 
Table 58 summarises the hypotheses relating to firm performance discussed in 
Chapter 2 that were empirically supported. Support for each hypothesis is discussed, in turn 
below. 
Hypothesis 11 on the general human capital of founders’ age (AgeFounder) is never 
supported for USO firm performance. However, it is rejected in the following models. Older 
founders were attracting less number of total external investment rounds (Models 9-6, 9-8 
and 9-10), less total amount of external funding (Models 10-6, 10-8 and 10-10) as well as 
lower scores for the composite firm performance measure (15-6, 15-8 and 15-10). 
Conversely, Hypothesis 12 on the general human capital of founders with the status of a 
professor (FounderProfessor) was partially supported in four out of seven models. Founders 
with the status of a professor attracted more total external investment rounds (Models 9-6, 
9-8 and 9-10) and total amount of funding, but only if VC investments are not included to 
the model (Model 10-6). Further, they are related to higher absolute employment change 
(Models, 14-6, 14-8 and 14-10) as well as higher scores for the composite firm performance 
measure (15-6, 15-8 and 15-10). 
Hypothesis 13 on the specific human capital of experienced entrepreneurs 
(FounderHabitualEntrepreneur) is never supported. However, it is rejected for the book 
value of total assets (Models 12-6, 12-8 and 12-10). Hypothesis 14 on the specific human 
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capital of the experience and reputation of founding teams (FoundingTeamReputation) is 
partially supported for three out of seven models. Founding teams with more experience 
and reputation attracted more total amount of external investment (Models 10-6, 10-8 and 
10-10) and higher book value of total assets (Models 12-6, 12-8 and 12-10). Further, they 
are related to a higher number of employees before the VC variables are introduced to the 
model (Model 13-6). Conversely, Hypothesis 14 is rejected for employment change once VC 
variables are introduced to the models. Here, more founding team’s experience and 
reputation relates to less absolute employment change (Models 14-8 and 14-10). 
Hypothesis 14 is supported for the dependent variable of composite firm performance 
measure, however, only for the model excluding the VC variables (Model 15-6). 
Hypothesis 15 on the network resource of network links to VC investors (VCNetwork) 
is only partially supported for three out of seven models. More network links to VC investors 
lead to a higher total amount of external investment (Models 10-6, 10-8 and 10-10). They 
also relate to more absolute employment change and higher scores for the composite firm 
performance measure, however, only for the respective models excluding the VC variables 
(Models 14-6 and 15-6 respectively). Hypothesis 16 on the network resource of strategic 
alliances (StrategicAlliances) is consistently supported in all seven models. Strategic alliances 
attracted more total number of external investment rounds (Models 9-6, 9-8, 9-10), more 
total amount of external investment (Models 10-6, 10-8, 10-10) and had a higher likelihood 
for product launch (Models 11-6, 11-8, 11-10). Further, they were related to a higher book 
value of total assets (Models 12-6, 12-8, 12-10), higher number of employees (Models 13-6, 
13-8, 13-10), higher absolute employment change (Models 14-6, 14-8, 14-10) as well as 
higher scores of the composite firm performance measure (Models 15-6, 15-8, 15-10). 
 Hypothesis 17 on the intellectual capital of patents (PatentedIP) is only supported in 
one out of seven models. However, patents were only related to a higher total amount of 
external investment when VC variables were not included in the models (Model 10-6). 
Conversely, Hypothesis 17 is rejected for the positive likelihood of a product launch (Models 
11-6, 11-8, 11-10). Like patents, Hypothesis 18 on the intellectual capital of IP ownership 
owned by the firm is only supported in one model. However, IP ownership was only related 
to a higher total amount of funding when VC variables were not included in the model 
(Model 10-6). Conversely, Hypothesis 18 is rejected for the positive likelihood of a product 
launch (Models 11-6, 11-8, 11-10). Hypothesis 19 on the Intellectual Capital of innovation 
radicalness (InnovationRadicalness) is never supported or rejected. 
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 Hypothesis 20 on the financial resource of public backed equity 
(PublicBackedEquity) is only supported in one out of seven models. Public backed equity 
investments attracted a higher total number of external investment rounds. However, 
Hypothesis 20 is rejected for the positive likelihood of a product launch (Models 11-6, 11-8 
and 11-10). Further, it is rejected for absolute employment change once VC variables are 
introduced. Here public backed equity relates to a lower employment change rate (Models 
14-8 and 14-10). 
Hypothesis 21 on the resource of first VC investment (FirstVC) is consistently 
supported in six out of seven models. First VC investment attracted more total number of 
external investment rounds (Models 9-6, 9-8, 9-10), more total amount of external 
investment (Models 10-6, 10-8, 10-10) and were related to a higher book value of total 
assets (Models 12-6, 12-8, 12-10). Further, it was related to higher number of employees 
(Models 13-6, 13-8, 13-10), higher absolute employment change (Models 14-6, 14-8, 14-10) 
as well as higher scores of the composite firm performance measure (Models 15-6, 15-8, 15-
10). Hypothesis 22 on the resource of Generalist VC investment (GeneralistVC) is also 
consistently supported for six out of seven models. Generalist VC investment attracted more 
total number of funding rounds (Models 9-6, 9-8, 9-10), more total amount of external 
investment (Models 10-6, 10-8, 10-10) and were related to a higher book value of total 
assets (Models 12-6, 12-8, 12-10). Further, it was related to higher number of employees 
(Models 13-6, 13-8, 13-10), higher absolute employment change (Models 14-6, 14-8, 14-10) 
as well as higher scores of the composite firm performance measure (Models 15-6, 15-8, 15-
10). Finally, Hypothesis 23 on the resource of Specialist VC investment (SpecialistVC) was 
supported for four out of seven models. Specialist VC investment attracted more total 
number of external investment rounds (Models 9-6, 9-8, 9-10), more total amount of 
external investment (Models 10-6, 10-8, 10-10) and were related to a higher book value of 
total assets (Models 12-6, 12-8, 12-10). Further, it was related to higher scores of the 
composite firm performance measure (Models 15-6, 15-8, 15-10). 
Therefore, Hypotheses 16 was the only hypotheses supported in all models. 
Hypotheses 21 and 22 were supported in all models except product launch. Hypotheses 23, 
12 and 14 were also frequently supported. 
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Table 58: Summary of Findings for Firm Performance 
  
Dependent Variable: Total Number of External 
Investment Rounds 
Total Amount of External 
Investment Attracted 
Likelihood of Product Launch 
  
Regression Technique: OLS OLS Logistic 
  
Model: 9-6 9-8 9-10 10-6 10-8 10-10 11-6 11-8 11-10 
   
Excl.VC VC Type VC Excl.VC VC Type VC Excl.VC VC Type VC 
General 
Human 
Capital 
Age 
Founder 
Hypothesis 11: USOs with older 
founders will report superior 
firm performance. 
-** -** -** -† -* -* 
   
Founder 
Professor 
Hypothesis 12: USOs with 
founders with higher levels of 
academic reputation will report 
superior firm performance. 
+** +* +* +†   
   
Specific 
Human 
Capital 
Founder 
Habitual 
Entre-
preneur 
Hypothesis 13: USOs with 
experienced entrepreneurs will 
report superior firm 
performance. 
   
   
   
Founding 
Team 
Reputation 
Hypothesis 14: USOs with an 
experienced founding team will 
report superior firm 
performance. 
   
+** +† +† 
   
Networks VC 
Network 
Hypothesis 15: USOs from 
universities that have a strong 
network of previously VC 
funded USOs will report 
superior firm performance. 
   
+** +* +* 
   
Strategic 
Alliances 
Hypothesis 16: USOs with 
alliance partners report 
superior firm performance. 
+*** +*** +*** +*** +** +** +* +* +* 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 58 (Continued): Summary of Findings for Firm Performance 
  
Dependent Variable: Total Number of External 
Investment Rounds 
Total Amount of External 
Investment Attracted 
Likelihood of Product Launch 
  
Regression Technique: OLS OLS Logistic 
  
Model: 9-6 9-8 9-10 10-6 10-8 10-10 11-6 11-8 11-10 
   
Excl.VC VC Type VC Excl.VC VC Type VC Excl.VC VC Type VC 
Intellectual 
Capital 
Patented 
IP 
Hypothesis 17: USOs with 
patented IP will report superior 
firm performance. 
   
+†   -** -** -** 
FirmOwnsIP Hypothesis 18: USOs that own 
their IP will report superior 
firm performance. 
   
+†   -* -* -* 
Innovation 
Radicalness 
Hypothesis 19: USOs whose 
main product or service is 
associated with radical 
innovation will report weaker 
firm performance. 
   
   
   
Finance Public 
Backed 
Equity 
Hypothesis 20: USOs that have 
obtained publicly-backed 
equity funds will report 
superior firm performance. 
+** +* +*    -† -† -† 
VC 
Investment 
FirstVC Hypothesis 21: USOs with VC 
investment will report superior 
firm performance. 
 
+*** 
 
 +***  
   
GeneralistVC Hypothesis 22: USOs with 
generalist VC investment will 
report superior firm 
performance. 
  
+***   +*** 
   
Specialist 
VC 
Hypothesis 23: USOs with 
specialist VC investment will 
report superior firm 
performance. 
  
+***   +*** 
   
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 58 (Continued): Summary of Findings for Firm Performance 
  
Dependent Variable: Book Value of Total Assets Number of Employees Absolute Employment 
Change 
  
Regression Technique: OLS OLS OLS 
  
Model: 12-6 12-8 12-10 13-6 13-8 13-10 14-6 14-8 14-10 
   
Excl.VC VC Type VC Excl.VC VC Type VC Excl.VC VC Type VC 
General 
Human 
Capital 
Age 
Founder 
Hypothesis 11: USOs with older 
founders will report superior firm 
performance. 
   
      
Founder 
Professor 
Hypothesis 12: USOs with founders 
with higher levels of academic 
reputation will report superior firm 
performance. 
   
   
+* +† +† 
Specific 
Human 
Capital 
Founder 
Habitual 
Entre-
preneur 
Hypothesis 13: USOs with 
experienced entrepreneurs will 
report superior firm performance. 
-** -** -** 
      
Founding 
Team 
Reputation 
Hypothesis 14: USOs with an 
experienced founding team will 
report superior firm performance. 
+* +* +† +† 
   
-* -† 
Networks VC 
Network 
Hypothesis 15: USOs from 
universities that have a strong 
network of previously VC funded 
USOs will report superior firm 
performance. 
   
   
+* 
  
Strategic 
Alliances 
Hypothesis 16: USOs with alliance 
partners report superior firm 
performance. 
+*** +*** +*** +** +* +* +** +*** +** 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 58 (Continued): Summary of Findings for Firm Performance 
  
Dependent Variable: Book Value of Total Assets Number of Employees Absolute Employment Change 
  
Regression Technique: OLS OLS OLS 
  
Model: 12-6 12-8 12-10 13-6 13-8 13-10 14-6 14-8 14-10 
   
Excl.V
C VC Type VC Excl.VC VC Type VC Excl.VC VC Type VC 
Intellectual 
Capital 
PatentedIP Hypothesis 17: USOs with 
patented IP will report superior 
firm performance. 
   
      
FirmOwnsIP Hypothesis 18: USOs that own 
their IP will report superior firm 
performance. 
   
      
Innovation 
Radicalness 
Hypothesis 19: USOs whose main 
product or service is associated 
with radical innovation will report 
weaker firm performance. 
   
      
Finance Public 
Backed 
Equity 
Hypothesis 20: USOs that have 
obtained publicly-backed equity 
funds will report superior firm 
performance. 
   
    
-† -† 
VC 
Investment 
FirstVC Hypothesis 21: USOs with VC 
investment will report superior 
firm performance. 
 +***  
 
+* 
  
+* 
 
GeneralistVC Hypothesis 22: USOs with 
generalist VC investment will 
report superior firm performance. 
  +† 
  
+* 
  
+* 
SpecialistVC Hypothesis 23: USOs with 
specialist VC investment will report 
superior firm performance. 
  +* 
      
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 58 (Continued): Summary of Findings for Firm Performance 
  
Dependent Variable: Composite Measure of Firm 
Performance 
  
Regression Technique: OLS 
  
Model: 15-6 15-8 15-10 
   
Excl.VC VC Type VC 
General 
Human 
Capital 
AgeFounder Hypothesis 11: USOs with older founders will report superior 
firm performance. 
-† -† -† 
Founder 
Professor 
Hypothesis 12: USOs with founders with higher levels of 
academic reputation will report superior firm performance. 
+* +† +† 
Specific 
Human 
Capital 
Founder 
Habitual 
Entrepreneur 
Hypothesis 13: USOs with experienced entrepreneurs will 
report superior firm performance. 
   
Founding 
Team 
Reputation 
Hypothesis 14: USOs with an experienced founding team will 
report superior firm performance. +† 
  
Networks VCNetwork Hypothesis 15: USOs from universities that have a strong 
network of previously VC funded USOs will report superior 
firm performance. 
+* 
  
Strategic 
Alliances 
Hypothesis 16: USOs with alliance partners report superior 
firm performance. 
+*** +*** +*** 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 58 (Continued): Summary of Findings for Firm Performance 
  
Dependent Variable: Composite Measure of Firm 
Performance 
  
Regression Technique OLS 
  
Model: 15-6 15-8 15-10 
   
Excl.VC VC Type VC 
Intellectual 
Capital 
PatentedIP Hypothesis 17: USOs with patented IP will report superior 
firm performance.    
FirmOwnsIP Hypothesis 18: USOs that own their IP will report superior 
firm performance.    
Innovation 
Radicalness 
Hypothesis 19: USOs whose main product or service is 
associated with radical innovation will report weaker firm 
performance. 
   
Finance Public 
Backed 
Equity 
Hypothesis 20: USOs that have obtained publicly-backed 
equity funds will report superior firm performance. 
   
VC 
Investment 
FirstVC Hypothesis 21: USOs with VC investment will report superior 
firm performance.  
+*** 
 
GeneralistVC Hypothesis 22: USOs with generalist VC investment will 
report superior firm performance.   
+*** 
SpecialistVC Hypothesis 23: USOs with specialist VC investment will report 
superior firm performance.   
+*** 
Significance levels: †p < .1; *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This study explored the factors associated with USOs that were able to attract first VC 
investment. In addition, this study explored the factors associated with superior firm 
performance of USOs. The link between first VC investment or not and superior USO 
performance was monitored. The purpose of this study was to address several gaps in the 
knowledge base in these areas of research. 
Gaps in the knowledge base relating to what factors affect USOs’ ability to attract first 
VC investment were identified and discussed in Section 2.2. Previous studies did rarely 
replicate, integrate and extend theoretical insights in order to derive hypotheses to explore 
the co-ordination between demand and supply of VC investment. There is also a lack of 
studies which empirically tested hypotheses on factors leading to first VC investment using 
representative cross-sectional samples and multivariate statistical analyses. Further, gaps in 
the knowledge base relating to what factors including the attraction of first VC investment 
can lead USOs to superior firm performance were identified and discussed in Section 2.5. 
Previous studies missed out on integrating themes of initial resource endowments into a 
theoretical framework which can be used to derive hypotheses. Only few studies are 
available which use representative cross-sectional samples and multivariate statistical 
analyses to test these hypotheses related to USO firm performance in the light of VC 
investment. 
This chapter discusses how this study and its findings reduced the identified gaps in the 
knowledge base. It points out what contributions to theory were made and reports key 
findings related to two research questions. Further, implications are derived for several 
groups of practitioners. These include academic entrepreneurs, universities and their TTOs, 
VC investors as well as public policy makers. Finally, limitations and areas of future research 
are discussed. 
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6.2 Theoretical Contribution  
 
Several new contributions to theory were made. They include theory development 
based on replicating previous theoretical insights as well as extending them to apply them 
to the context and research questions of this study. Moreover, contributions relate to a 
quantitative methodology for empirically testing hypotheses which were derived from the 
developed theoretical insights using a novel and representative data set. 
In order to explore factors related to the attraction of first VC investment the theoretical 
framework of the RBV of the firm was replicated in Section 2.3 for identifying themes of 
resources which characterize the demand side perspective of USOs seeking first VC 
investment. The resource themes of general and specific human capital of founders as well 
as firms’ networks, intellectual capital and financing were integrated by the RBV of the firm. 
This framework was then extended with signalling theory to argue why the identified 
resource themes are also meaningful from a supply side perspective. Signalling theory 
implies that VC investors can interpret initial resources of USOs as credible signals of quality 
in order to make an investment decision in spite of constraints from uncertainty and 
asymmetric information. In considering demand and supply side perspectives, the resource 
themes identified by the novel joint framework of the RBV of the firm and signalling theory 
are thus attributed with the ability to co-ordinate demand and supply on the VC financing 
market for USOs. This new contribution to theory is further applicable in studies on 
entrepreneurial finance and the co-ordination of markets in the presence of uncertainty and 
asymmetric information. 
The joint framework of the RBV of the firm and signalling theory also contributed to 
theory in deriving hypotheses related to the attraction of first VC investment in Section 2.4. 
Hypotheses on general human capital (age and academic status of founders), specific 
human capital (entrepreneurial experience of founders as well as experience and reputation 
of founding team), intellectual capital (patented IP) were replicated and extended to be 
applicable in the context of USOs. Further, novel hypotheses were derived relating to 
intellectual capital (IP owned by the firm, radicalness of innovation) and financing (public 
backed equity). 
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The role of initial resources of USOs and their founders as well as their ability to attract 
VC investment was also related to firm performance. This contribution to theory relates to 
the debate on to what extent firm performance is determined by firms’ internal factors. This 
study replicated the RBV of the firm in Section 2.6 in order to suggest that new firms’ 
performance relates to their initial resources of general and specific human capital of 
founders as well as firms’ networks, intellectual capital and financing. Moreover, in 
attracting additional resources in the form of financing and business expertise from VC 
investors, new firms may successfully adapt to their environment in achieving superior 
performance. Insights from this framework are applicable to studies in entrepreneurship 
investigating how the resources of new firms shape their performance prospects and to 
what extent they enable successful adaptation to their environment. With the help of this 
theoretical framework it was also possible to explore whether resources which attracted 
first VC investment as signals of quality also related to superior firm performance. 
The framework on firm performance also contributed to theory in deriving hypotheses 
related to superior firm performance in Section 2.7. Hypotheses on general human capital 
(age and academic status of founders), specific human capital (entrepreneurial experience 
of founders as well as experience and reputation of founding team), intellectual capital 
(patented IP) and financing (VC investment) were replicated and extended to be applicable 
in the context of USOs. Further, novel hypotheses were derived relating to intellectual 
capital (IP owned by the firm, radicalness of innovation) and financing (public backed equity, 
generalist VC and specialist VC). 
In addition to contributions of theory development, all the derived hypotheses were 
also tested empirically using a unique and novel sample of 125 British USOs which is 
representative for the population of USOs which were founded between 1990 and 2007, 
and still active in 2008. Information was gathered from founders and key decision-makers 
and a 25% response rate was reported with reference to the cross-sectional survey. Notably, 
no significant differences were detected between the valid respondents and the valid non-
respondents to the survey. Results from the survey can, therefore, be generalized to the 
population of USOs. In addition, complimentary information was gathered from reputable 
secondary data sources relating to company status, financing and performance. This study 
was the first academic research project to obtain firm level information on British USOs 
from the private VC database Library House. No evidence of a common methods bias was 
detected. 
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Further, multivariate statistical techniques were used for testing hypotheses. These 
included logistic and multinominal regression analyses for categorical dependent variables 
as well as tobit and OLS regressions for continuous dependent variables. Multivariate 
statistical analysis has the advantage that the relative importance of a group of independent 
variables can be observed relating to a dependent variable. To further strengthen the 
contribution of this study an array of dependent variables (introduced in Section 3.5.1) were 
used in order to conduct a sensitivity analysis. The dependent variable of Likelihood to 
attract First VC Investment (yes, no) was used for the first time in a cross-sectional study on 
British USOs. Further novel dependent variables included Number of First VC Offers 
(number; none, one, two or more), Number of First VC Investments (number; none, one, 
two or more), First VC Investment Amount (amount (£'); none, £1 to £500,000, > £500,000) 
and Investor Types Relating to First VC Investment (no VC, Generalist VC, Specialist VC). 
Similarly, several dependent variables were used to measure firm performance until 
2008 in order to conduct a sensitivity analysis. They included Total Number of External 
Investment Rounds Attracted Until 2008, Total Amount of External Investment (£’s) 
Attracted Until 2008, Likelihood of Product Launch to the Market Until 2008; Book Value of 
Total Assets (£’s) Until 2008, Number of Employees in the USOs in 2008, Absolute 
Employment Change between Founding Year and 2008 as well as a Composite Measure of 
Firm Performance. These dependent variables were mostly replicated from previous 
entrepreneurship studies. However, they were applied for the first time in a cross-sectional 
study on firm performance of USOs in the UK. The array of dependent variables contributes 
in generating more robust results as well as providing in deeper insights. The resulting key 
findings from testing hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework of this study are 
reported in the following sections. 
 
6.3 Key Findings 
6.3.1 Overview 
 
Table 59 summarizes how frequently hypotheses were significantly supported in the 
models in presented in Chapters 4 and 5 exploring both research questions. Key findings are 
extracted from this table and discussed in the sections relating to each research question. 
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Table 59: Overview of Supported Hypotheses for both Research Questions 
Resource 
Theme: 
Measure: Hypotheses 
relating to 
Research 
Question 1: 
Hypothesis supported in Models: Number of 
times hypo-
thesis was 
supported: 
Hypotheses 
relating to 
Research 
Question 2: 
Hypothesis supported in Models: Number of times hypothesis 
was supported: 
Excl.VC VC Type VC 
General 
Human 
Capital 
Age 
Founder 
H 1: Older USO 
founders are more 
likely to attract first 
VC investment. 
 0/12 H 11: USOs with 
older founders 
will report 
superior firm 
performance. 
 0/7 0/7 0/7 
  Founder 
Professor 
H 2: USO founders 
with higher levels 
of academic 
reputation are 
more likely to 
attract first VC 
investment. 
First VC Investment (Yes, No) 
Number of First VC Investment Offers 
Two and more First VC Investment Offers 
Number of First VC Investments 
Two and more First VC Investments 
Amount of First VC Investment 
£1 to £500,000 of First VC Investment 
Specialist VC Investment 
8/12 H 12: USOs with 
founders with 
higher levels of 
academic 
reputation will 
report superior 
firm performance. 
Total Number of External Investment Rounds 
(Excl. VC, VC, Type VC) 
Total Amount of External Investment 
Attracted (Excl. VC) 
Absolute Employment Change (Excl. VC, VC, 
Type VC) 
Composite Measure of Firm Performance 
(Excl. VC, VC, Type VC) 
4/7 3/7 3/7 
Specific 
Human 
Capital 
Founder 
Habitual 
Entrepreneur 
H 3: USO founders 
who are 
experienced 
entrepreneurs are 
more likely to 
attract first VC 
investment. 
 0/12 H 13: USOs with 
experienced 
entrepreneurs will 
report superior 
firm performance. 
  0/7 0/7 0/7 
  Founding 
Team 
Experience 
H 4: USOs with an 
experienced 
founding team are 
more likely to 
attract first VC 
investment. 
First VC Investment (Yes, No) 
Number of First VC Investment Offers 
One First VC Investment Offer 
Two and more First Investment Offers 
Number of First VC Investments 
One First VC Investment 
Two and more First VC Investments 
Amount of First VC Investment 
£1 to £500,000 of First VC Investment 
More than £500,000 of First VC Investment 
Generalist VC Investment 
Specialist VC Investment 
 
12/12 H 14: USOs with 
an experienced 
founding team 
will report 
superior firm 
performance. 
Total Amount of External Investment 
Attracted (Excl. VC, VC, Type VC) 
Book Value of Total Assets (Excl. VC, VC, Type 
VC) 
Number of Employees (Excl.VC) 
Composite Measure of Firm Performance 
(Excl. VC) 
4/7 2/7 2/7 
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Table 59 (Continued): Overview of Supported Hypotheses for both Research Questions 
Resource 
Theme: 
Measure: Hypotheses 
relating to 
Research 
Question 1: 
Hypothesis supported in Models: Number of 
times hypo-
thesis was 
supported: 
Hypotheses relating to 
Research 
Question 2: 
Hypothesis supported in 
Models: 
Number of times hypothesis 
was supported: 
Excl.VC VC Type 
VC 
Networks VC 
Network 
H 5: USOs from 
universities that 
have a strong 
network of 
previously VC 
funded USOs are 
more likely to 
attract first VC 
investment. 
First VC Investment (Yes, No) 
Number of First VC Investment Offers 
Two and more First Investment Offers 
Number of First VC Investments 
One First VC Investment 
Two and more First VC Investments 
Amount of First VC Investment 
£1 to £500,000 of First VC Investment 
More than £500,000 of First VC Investment 
Generalist VC Investment 
Specialist VC Investment 
11/12 H 15: USOs from 
universities that have a 
strong network of 
previously VC funded 
USOs will report superior 
firm performance. 
Total Amount of External 
Investment Attracted (Excl. VC, 
VC, Type VC) 
Absolute Employment Change 
(Excl.VC) 
Composite Measure of Firm 
Performance (Excl. VC) 
3/7 1/7 1/7 
 
  Strategic 
Alliances 
H 6: USOs with 
alliance partners 
are more likely to 
attract first VC 
investment. 
Number of First VC Investment Offers 
One First VC Investment Offer 
Two and more First Investment Offers 
Amount of First VC Investment 
4/12 H 16: USOs with alliance 
partners report superior 
firm performance. 
Total Number of External 
Investment Rounds (Excl. VC, VC, 
Type VC) 
Total Amount of External 
Investment Attracted (Excl. VC, 
VC, Type VC) 
Likelihood of Product Launch 
(Excl. VC, VC, Type VC) 
Book Value of Total Assets (Excl. 
VC, VC, Type VC) 
Number of Employees (Excl. VC, 
VC, Type VC) 
Absolute Employment Change 
(Excl. VC, VC, Type VC) 
Composite Measure of Firm 
Performance (Excl. VC, VC, Type 
VC) 
 
 
 
7/7 7/7 7/7 
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Table 59 (Continued): Overview of Supported Hypotheses for both Research Questions 
Resource 
Theme: 
Measure: Hypotheses 
relating to 
Research 
Question 1: 
Hypothesis supported in Models: Number of 
times hypo-
thesis was 
supported: 
Hypotheses relating to 
Research 
Question 1: 
Hypothesis supported in Models: Number of times hypothesis 
was supported: 
Excl.VC Excl.VC Excl.VC 
Intellectual 
Capital 
PatentedIP H 7: USOs with 
patented IP are 
more likely to 
attract first VC 
investment. 
First VC Investment (Yes, No) 
Number of First VC Investment Offers 
One First VC Investment Offer 
Two and more First Investment Offers 
One First VC Investment 
Amount of First VC Investment 
More than £500,000 of First VC Investment 
Generalist VC Investment 
Specialist VC Investment 
9/12 H 17: USOs with patented 
IP will report superior 
firm performance. 
 Total Amount of External 
Investment Attracted (Excl. VC) 
1/7 0/7 0/7 
  FirmOwnsIP H 8: USOs with IP 
ownership are 
more likely to 
attract first VC 
investment. 
First VC Investment (Yes, No) 
Number of First VC Investment Offers 
Two and more First Investment Offers 
Number of First VC Investments 
One First VC Investment 
Two and more First VC Investments 
Amount of First VC Investment 
More than £500,000 of First VC Investment 
Generalist VC Investment 
Specialist VC Investment 
10/12 H 18: USOs that own 
their IP will report 
superior firm 
performance. 
Total Amount of External Investment 
Attracted (Excl. VC) 
 
1/7 0/7 0/7 
  Innovation 
Radicalness 
H 9: USOs whose 
main product or 
service is 
associated with 
radical innovation 
are less likely to 
attract first VC 
investment. 
 
 
 
 
Generalist VC Investment 1/12 H 19: USOs whose main 
product or service is 
associated with radical 
innovation will report 
weaker firm 
performance. 
 0/7 0/7 0/7 
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Table 59 (Continued): Overview of Supported Hypotheses for both Research Questions 
Resource 
Theme: 
Measure: Hypotheses for 
Research 
Question 1: 
Hypothesis supported in Models: Number of 
times hypo-
thesis was 
supported: 
Hypotheses for 
Research 
Question 2: 
Hypothesis supported in Models: Number of times 
hypothesis 
was supported: 
Excl.VC Excl.VC Excl.VC 
Finance Public 
Backed 
Equity 
H 10: USOs that 
have obtained 
publicly-backed 
equity funds are 
more likely to 
attract first VC 
investment. 
First VC Investment (Yes, No) 
Two and more First Investment Offers 
One First VC Investment 
Amount of First VC Investment 
£1 to £500,000 of First VC Investment 
5/12 H 20: USOs that have 
obtained publicly-backed 
equity funds will report 
superior firm 
performance. 
Total Number of External Investment 
Rounds (Excl. VC, VC, Type VC) 
1/7 1/7 1/7 
VC 
Investment 
FirstVC 
Investment 
  
  
H 21: USOs with VC 
investment will report 
superior firm 
performance. 
Total Number of External Investment 
Rounds (VC) 
Total Amount of External Investment 
Attracted (VC) 
Book Value of Total Assets (VC) 
Number of Employees (VC) 
Absolute Employment Change (VC) 
Composite Measure of Firm Performance 
(VC) 
  6/7   
  Generalist 
VC 
  
  
H 22: USOs with 
generalist VC investment 
will report superior firm 
performance. 
Total Number of External Investment 
Rounds (Type VC) 
Total Amount of External Investment 
Attracted (Type VC) 
Book Value of Total Assets (Type VC) 
Number of Employees (Type VC) 
Absolute Employment Change (Type VC) 
Composite Measure of Firm Performance 
(Type VC) 
    6/7 
  Specialist 
VC 
  
  
H 23: USOs with 
specialist VC investment 
will report superior firm 
performance. 
Total Number of External Investment 
Rounds (Type VC) 
Total Amount of External Investment 
Attracted (Type VC) 
Book Value of Total Assets (Type VC) 
Composite Measure of Firm Performance 
(Type VC) 
    4/7 
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6.3.2 Key Findings Relating to the Ability to Attract First VC Investment 
 
The following key findings relate to the first research question: Which resources of USOs 
are signals of quality and attract first VC investment? Hypotheses for exploring this research 
question were derived from the joint theoretical framework of the RBV of the firm and 
signalling theory. Key findings relate to the hypotheses tested in Chapter 4 and their 
overview in Table 59. They are summarized in Table 60 and discussed below. 
Table 60: Key Findings on the Ability to Attract First VC Investment (Research Question 1) 
Key Findings relating to: Key Findings (* = new finding, # = replicated finding): 
Internal factors of USOs 
as signals of quality to 
attract first VC 
investment: 
 
 New evidence confirmed the implications of the novel 
theoretical framework of the RBV of the firm and signalling 
theory that initial resource endowments of USOs can be 
signals of quality which attract VC investment.* 
 At least one hypothesis relating to each resource themes of 
USOs’ general and specific human capital, networks, 
intellectual capital and finance was supported in attracting 
first VC investment.* 
Relative importance of 
signals of quality to 
attract first VC 
investment: 
 
 Initial resource endowments of USOs differed in their strength 
of being signals of quality to attract first VC investment.* 
 The strongest signals of quality related to:  
1. Experienced and reputable team (specific human capital)# 
2. Network links to VC investors (networks)# 
3. Firm owns IP (intellectual capital)* 
4. Patented IP (intellectual capital)# 
5. Founder Professor (general human capital)# 
6. Public backed equity (finance)* 
 Public backed equity reduced an ‘equity gap’ for USOs seeking 
less than £500,000 of first VC investment.* 
 Strategic alliances (networks) were only weak signals of 
quality which did not increase the likelihood of attracting first 
VC investment.* 
 USOs with radical innovation (intellectual capital) were 
unlikely to receive investment from a generalist VC firm.* 
 Older founders (general human capital) or founders with 
previous entrepreneurial experience (specific human capital) 
were not more likely to attract first VC investment.* 
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Table 60 (Continued): Key Findings on the Ability to Attract First VC Investment (Research 
Question 1) 
Key Findings relating to: Key Findings (* = new finding, # = replicated finding): 
Other factors related to 
attract first VC 
investment 
 Control variables of firm age, region, relative market size and 
industry showed overall no significant influence on the take-
up of first VC investment. 
 
The first key finding is that at least one hypothesis of each resource theme related to 
the attraction of first VC investment was supported. There is overall strong evidence that 
initial resource endowments of USOs can serve as signals of quality which attract first VC 
investment. Accordingly, the novel joint framework of the RBV of the firm and signalling 
theory is an appropriate perspective to explore the factors coordinating demand and supply 
on the VC financing market for USOs. 
The second key finding is that signals of quality differ in their importance to attract first 
VC investment. Using the array of dependent variables related to first VC investment for a 
sensitivity analysis reveals a hierarchy of importance among signals of quality which is 
reported below with reference to whether findings are novel or replicated. 
The strongest signal of quality was the experience and reputation of USOs’ founding 
teams (specific human capital). This finding confirms earlier studies which highlight that VC 
investors strongly associate the quality of the founding team with the prospects of 
investment opportunities (MacMillan et al., 1985; Zacharakis and Meyer, 1998). USOs with 
highly experienced and reputable founding teams were more likely to attract VC investment 
and generally attracted more first VC investment offers, more investments, higher 
investment amounts as well as received investment from all types of VC investors. 
The second strongest signal of quality was if USOs had strong network links to VC 
investors (networks). This finding also confirms earlier studies that VC investors rely on the 
social capital of networks to identify credible investment opportunities (Shane and Stuart, 
2002). USOs from universities with a strong network of previously VC financed USOs were 
also more likely to attract VC investment and generally attracted more first VC investment 
offers, more investments, higher investment amounts as well as received investment from 
both types of VC investors. 
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The third strongest signal of quality was if USOs owned the IP (intellectual capital). This 
is a new finding and shows that VC investors have a strong preference for keeping the 
valuable resource of IP in control of the firm they invest in. USOs which owned the IP were 
also more likely to attract VC investment and generally attracted more first VC investment 
offers and more investments. However, this signal of quality relates particularly for USOs 
which attracted more than £500,000 of first VC investment. USOs which owned their IP 
attracted investment from both types of VC investors. 
The fourth strongest signal of quality was if USOs had patented IP (intellectual capital). 
This finding confirms earlier studies that firms with patented IP are more preferred by VC 
investors (Shane, 2001; Hsu, 2007). USOs with patented IP were more likely to attract first 
VC investment and received more first VC investment offers. However, this signal of quality 
related only to attracting one first VC investment while then attracting more than £500,000. 
USOs with patented IP attracted investment from both types of VC investors. 
The fifth strongest signal of quality was if USOs’ founders had the status of a professor 
(general human capital). This finding confirms earlier studies that VC investors infer from 
the education and qualification of founders to the performance prospect of investment 
opportunities (Shane and Stuart, 2002; Levie and Gimmon, 2008). USOs with founders being 
professors were more likely to attract first VC investment and received more first VC 
investment offers as well as actual investments. They were more likely to attract up to 
£500,000 of first VC investment. However, they were only more likely to attract first VC 
investment from specialist VC firms. 
The sixth strongest signal of quality was if USOs had previously attracted public backed 
equity investment (finance). This new finding using evidence of a cross-sectional study of 
USOs shows for the first time that public policy schemes to support USOs in attracting VC 
can have a positive effect. USOs with public backed equity investment were more likely to 
attract first VC investment, two or more offers as well as one investment. They were also 
more likely to attract first VC investment up to £500,000. This finding reflects that public 
backed equity schemes can fulfil their assigned role in helping USOs to bridge an ‘equity gap’ 
of attracting equity investment of less than £500,000 (Wright et al., 2006). 
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Strategic alliances were only a weak signal of quality (network)11. Only three models in 
this study confirmed previous findings that this resource helped USOs to attract VC 
investment (Baum and Silverman, 2004). USOs with strategic were not more likely to attract 
first VC investment although they received more first VC investment offers. 
USOs with radical innovation (intellectual capital) were only significantly less likely to 
attract investment from generalist VC investors. This novel finding adds to anecdotal 
evidence that generalist VC investors tend to be risk averse and thus avoid investing in firms 
with radical innovation (Lockett et al., 2002). However, there was no significant evidence in 
this study that USOs with radical innovation would generally struggle nor have an advantage 
in attracting first VC investment. 
There was no evidence that USOs with more mature founders (general human capital) 
and previous entrepreneurial experience (specific human capital) could use these resources 
as signals of quality to attract first VC investment. 
The array of control variables was overall not significant. Hence, the findings can be 
interpreted in being independent of external factors like relative market size, industry and 
region. Company status and firm age also showed overall no significant influence. 
In summary, the presented replicated and new key findings contribute to closing the 
identified gaps in the knowledge base identified in Section 2.2. The novel joint framework of 
the RBV of the firm and signalling theory offers a theoretical insight in exploring demand 
and supply side issues of VC financing of USOs. A comparable theory driven approach has 
been missing in previous studies. Moreover, the quantitative methodology and the 
representative cross-sectional sample ensured generalisable findings which complement the 
predominantly anecdotal evidence and qualitative character of earlier studies on barriers 
USOs face when attracting fist VC investment. Consequently, the developed theoretical 
insights, derived hypotheses and applied quantitative methodology can be replicated and 
extended in future studies. 
 
                                                            
11 This issue was recently discussed with a VC investor. The concern was raised that strategic alliances prior to 
first VC investment might spoil attractive exit options for future mergers and acquisitions. This new insight is an 
interesting lead into future research on the importance and impact of strategic alliances on the development on 
young firms and their need to secure external financing. 
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6.3.3 Key Findings Relating to USO Firm Performance and the Role of First VC 
Investment 
 
The following key findings relate to the second research question: Do VC funded USOs 
report superior firm performance? Hypotheses for exploring this research question were 
derived from the RBV of the firm in order to determine to what extent firm performance is 
subject to firms’ internal factors as well as their ability to attract first VC investment help 
them to adapt to their environment. Key findings relate to the hypotheses tested in Chapter 
5 and their overview in Table 59. They are summarized in Table 61 and discussed below. 
 
Table 61: Key Findings Relating to USO Firm Performance and the Role of First VC 
Investment (Research Question 2) 
Key Findings relating to: Key Findings (* = new finding, # = replicated finding): 
Influence of internal 
factors on superior firm 
performance: 
 This study provided new evidence that internal factors relate 
to superior firm performance as implied by the RBV of the 
firm.# 
 
Relative importance of 
internal factors related 
to superior firm 
performance: 
 The importance of internal factors being related to superior 
firm performance varies. The most important were: 
1. Strategic alliances (networks)# 
2. First VC investment / First VC investment from Generalist 
VC Firms* 
3. Founder Professor (general human capital); This influence 
was reduced in the presence of First VC Investment# 
4. First VC Investment from Specialist VC Firms* 
5. Experienced and Reputable Founding Teams (specific 
human capital); This influence was reduced in the 
presence of First VC Investment# 
 
 Patented IP, Firm owns IP and radical innovation (intellectual 
capital) as well as public backed equity (finance) were weakly 
or not related to superior firm performance.* 
 Older founders (general human capital) and founders with 
previous entrepreneurial experience (specific human capital) 
were not related to superior firm performance.* 
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Table 61 (Continued): Key Findings Relating to USO Firm Performance and the Role of First VC 
Investment (Research Question 2) 
Key Findings relating to: Key Findings (* = new finding, # = replicated finding): 
The attraction of first VC 
investment and its 
influence on superior 
firm performance: 
 USOs which attracted first VC investment were always 
reporting superior firm performance with the exception of 
launching a product to the market place.* 
 USOs which received investment from Generalist VC investors 
performed better than those which received it from Specialist 
VC investors.* 
 Presence of first VC investment reduced the importance of 
general human capital in the form of founders being 
professors and specific human capital in the form of 
experienced and reputable founding teams being related to 
superior firm performance.# 
Comparison whether 
resources which 
attracted first VC 
investment as signals of 
quality also related to 
superior firm 
performance: 
 Among the six strongest signals of quality to attract first VC 
investment only experienced and reputable team (specific 
human capital) and USOs with founder being professors 
(general human capital) were related to superior firm 
performance. However, their influence was further reduced in 
the presence of first VC investment.* 
Other factors related to 
USO firm performance: 
 Older USOs were strongly related to superior firm 
performance. # 
 No strong evidence was found that region, sector or relative 
market size determined superior firm performance.* 
 
The first key finding is that several hypotheses on USOs’ internal factors of resource 
themes as well as the attraction of first VC investment were supported in being related to 
superior firm performance. Accordingly, there is new evidence that USOs’ internal initial 
resource endowments and their ability to attract first VC investment were related to 
superior firm performance as implied by the RBV of the firm. 
The next key finding is that USOs’ initial resources differ in their importance of being 
related to superior firm performance. Moreover, the attraction of first VC investment also 
influenced the importance of initial resources leading to superior firm performance. An 
array of dependent variables measuring superior firm performance was used for a sensitivity 
analysis. Starting with the most important, the resources of USOs which are related with 
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superior firm performance are reported below as well as with reference to whether findings 
are new or confirm earlier studies. 
Strategic alliances were the most prominent initial resource endowment in this study 
which related to superior firm performance. Whereas strategic alliances were only weakly 
related to attract first VC investment, they were always related to superior firm 
performance. They attracted more total rounds and larger amounts of external investment, 
reported a higher book value of total assets, more employees, a greater absolute change in 
employment as well as higher scores of the composite measure of firm performance. The 
resource of strategic alliances was also the only internal factor in this study which had a 
higher likelihood of launching a product to the market place. Moreover, this finding is 
independent of whether USOs were able to attract investment from first VC investors or 
not. This finding relates to previous studies on the importance of new firms to build inter-
firm networks to generate a competitive advantage related to superior firm performance 
(Stuart, 2000; Baum and Silverman, 2004). 
USOs which attracted first VC investment were second most related to superior firm 
performance. While USOs with first VC investment were not more likely to launch a product 
to the market, they attracted more total rounds and larger amounts of external investment, 
reported a higher book value of total assets, more employees, a greater absolute change in 
employment as well as higher scores of the composite measure of firm performance. Apart 
from being directly related to superior firm performance, the presence of first VC 
investment also influenced the relationship between other internal firm resources and firm 
performance. Notably, the presence of first VC investment weakened the direct influence of 
the founding team’s specific human capital related to superior firm performance. This 
finding is consistent with earlier studies which argue that VC investors make use of their 
managerial control in influencing and optimising the quality and performance of their 
investees’ management teams (Hellmann and Puri, 2002). 
Distinguishing between types of VC investors revealed novel differences in their 
influence on their investees’ firm performance. USOs which obtained investment from 
generalist VC investors were more often related to superior performance in the models of 
this study than USOs with investments from specialist VC investors. USOs with generalist VC 
investment attracted more total rounds and larger amounts of external investment, 
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reported a higher book value of total assets, more employees, a greater absolute change in 
employment as well as higher scores of the composite measure of firm performance.  
USOs whose founders had the status of a professor also reported superior firm 
performance. They attracted more total rounds and larger amounts of external investment, 
reported a higher book value of total assets, more employees, a greater absolute change in 
employment as well as higher scores of the composite measure of firm performance. 
However, once first VC investment was included in the models, the direct influence of this 
resource on superior firm performance was reduced in significance (Total Number of 
External Investment Rounds, Absolute Employment Change, Composite Measure of Firm 
Performance) or no longer significant (Total Amount of External Investment Attracted). 
USOs with experienced founding teams partially reported superior firm performance. 
They attracted larger amounts of external investment and reported a higher book value of 
total assets, more employees and higher scores of the composite measure of firm 
performance. However, once first VC investment was included in the models, the direct 
influence of this resource on superior firm performance was reduced related to number of 
employees and the composite measure of firm performance. 
Networks of USOs in the form of links to VC investors were one of the most important 
signals of quality leading to the attraction of first VC investment. However, new evidence on 
the importance of this resource related to superior firm performance is weak. With the 
exception of attracting larger amounts of external investment, all other dimensions of firm 
performance were not influenced by network links to VC investors. In particular, once first 
VC investment was attracted. 
Finance of USOs in the form of public backed equity was only related to superior firm 
performance in securing more rounds of external investment. Conversely, it reduced the 
likelihood of a product launch. There was also evidence that public backed equity in the 
presence of VC investment reduced absolute employment growth. This evidence suggests 
that public backed equity may attract VC investors to invest in USOs which still require 
extensive time to get to the marketplace and face moderate growth due to their early stage 
and new technologies (Wright et al., 2006). However, the finding of poor performance of 
USOs with public backed equity investments contributes to the debate that public policy 
schemes still need to better address issues of investment and market readiness (Mason and 
Harrison, 2001, 2004). 
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Intellectual capital of USOs in the form of patents and IP ownership of the firm did 
hardly relate to superior firm performance, in particular, not in the presence of VC 
investment. It also reduced the likelihood of a product launch. This new evidence reflects 
that these resources were only necessary as signals of quality to attract VC investors. This 
finding is consistent with studies which argue that patented IP leading to superior firm 
performance cannot be generalised. There was also no evidence of radical innovation being 
significantly related to firm performance. However, it is notable that radical innovation 
always had a negative relationship with performance in all tested models in Chapter 5. 
Radical innovation could thus be an important indicator of the risk of new firms. 
General human capital of USOs in the form founders’ age was never related to superior 
firm performance. There was no evidence that more mature academic entrepreneurs are 
more successful. Similarly, specific human capital of USOs in the form founders’ previous 
entrepreneurial experience did not relate to superior firm performance. 
A further important key finding is that those resources which were strong signals of 
quality to attract first VC investment were not necessarily strongly related to superior firm 
performance, too. Table 59 shows that hypotheses related to the same resource themes 
were more frequently supported for the attraction of first VC investment rather than being 
related to first VC investment. This is the case for founders’ academic status, experienced 
founding teams, VC network, patented IP, IP owned by the firm and public backed equity 
investments. Accordingly, USOs with a strong initial resource base alone are less likely to 
report superior firm performance than those firms which attracted first VC investment. 
Another important key finding is in spite of the presented evidence that internal 
resource characteristics along with first VC investment were significantly related to superior 
firm performance, other factors should be considered, too. It is notable in all presented 
models in Chapter 5 that the control variable of firm age was throughout significantly 
related to superior firm performance. Older USOs were thus more likely to be related to 
superior firm performance. In particular, they were more likely to launch a product. This 
finding indicates that new firms have to prove and establish themselves constantly on the 
market place to achieve superior firm performance. Whereas USOs’ initial internal resources 
as well as their attraction of first VC investment can contribute significantly the ability to 
adapt to external factors affecting firm performance, adaptation is subject to an ongoing 
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process. However, there was no strong evidence in this study that other external factors 
such as region, industry or relative market size would relate to superior firm performance. 
In summary, the presented replicated and new key findings contribute to closing the 
identified gaps in the knowledge base identified in Section 2.5 as summarized in Table 61. 
The replicated framework of the RBV of the firm offers a theoretical insight in exploring 
what factors including USOs’ internal initial resources and their ability to attract first VC 
investment relate to superior firm performance. A comparable theory driven perspective 
has been missing in previous studies. Moreover, the quantitative methodology and the 
unique cross-sectional sample enables this study to be the first to explore the firm 
performance of British USOs using firm and founder level data as units of analysis. The 
presented generalisable findings complement to previous studies which relate to 
predominantly anecdotal evidence from qualitative research and those studies which 
explore USO formation and development on an aggregated national level measuring the 
quantitative output of new USOs per university. Consequently, the developed theoretical 
insights, derived hypotheses and applied quantitative methodology can be replicated and 
extended in future studies. 
 
 
6.4 Implications for Practitioners 
6.4.1 Groups of Practitioners in the Context of USOs 
 
The findings of this study have important implications for several groups of practitioners 
which are concerned about barriers USOs face in attracting first VC investment and 
achieving superior firm performance. Recommendations, best practices and related changes 
to behaviour are discussed for each of the following practitioner groups in the next sections. 
The first group of practitioners are academic entrepreneurs. Relating to their role as 
firm founders and owners recommendations are made how they can increase their 
likelihood of attracting first VC investment as well as what resources their firms require for 
successfully adapting to their environment and achieve superior firm performance. 
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The second group of practitioners are universities and their TTOs. Their role is to 
administer and encourage academic entrepreneurship in order to generate financial returns 
from commercialising IP generated at their research departments. Findings in this study are 
used to recommend how universities and their TTOs can help USOs to attract first VC 
investment as well as to build a resource base which is leading them to superior firm 
performance. 
The third group of practitioners are VC investors. Their role is to identify and invest in 
USOs with high performance prospects in order to generate substantial returns. Findings in 
this study are used to help VC investors to review and revise their investment strategies in 
USOs regarding what signals of quality were also related to superior firm performance. 
Moreover, implications are made to what extent VC investment and the type of VC investor 
influence USOs firm performance. 
Finally, public policy makers are addressed in their role of providing incentives on a 
national and regional scale to encourage the formation of knowledge based businesses in 
order to generate economic growth and employment. Findings in this study can help public 
policy makers to develop best practices on how they can influence the VC market for USOs 
from a demand side (i.e. USOs, founders, universities and their TTOs) as well as the supply 
side (i.e. VC firms) in order to ensure that sufficient financing is available while promoting 
USOs with superior firm performance. 
 
6.4.2 Academic Entrepreneurs 
 
Best practices for academic entrepreneurs to attract first VC investment and lead their 
USOs to superior firm performance are summarized in Table 62. They are discussed below. 
 
Table 62: Implications for Academic Entrepreneurs 
Best practices for 
academic 
entrepreneurs in order 
to attract first VC 
investment: 
 Building an experienced and reputable founding team. 
 Make best use of network links to VC investors which have 
been built up by previous USOs from the same university of 
origin. 
243 
 
Table 62 (Continued): Implications for Academic Entrepreneurs 
Best practices for 
academic 
entrepreneurs in order 
to attract first VC 
investment 
(Continued): 
 Costs and benefits analysis with university and TTO regarding 
patenting IP and assigning IP ownership to the firm in order to 
increase the likelihood of attracting first VC investment. 
 Professors had an advantage in attracting first VC investment. 
 Public backed equity is effective as early stage financing in 
order to continue to attract first VC investment. 
 Attracting public backed equity reduces the ‘equity gap’ and 
helps to attract first VC investment of less than £500,000. 
 Generalist VC firm were less likely to invest in USOs with 
radical innovation. 
Best practices for 
academic 
entrepreneurs in order 
to lead their firms to 
superior performance: 
 The attraction of first VC investment related to superior firm 
performance with the exception of a higher likelihood for 
launching a product to the market place. 
 Patenting IP and assigning IP ownership to the firm showed no 
direct influence on superior firm performance. They only lead 
to superior firm performance in attracting first VC investment. 
 VC investors make strong use of their control rights and 
influence managerial decision making despite experienced and 
reputable founding teams or founders of high academic 
status. 
 Generalist VC investors were more likely to lead USOs to 
superior firm performance than sector and industry specialist 
VC firms. 
 Building strategic alliances was commonly associated with 
superior firm performance irrespective of attracting first VC 
investment. 
 
Academic entrepreneurs who are concerned about barriers to attract first VC 
investment can learn from the identified signals of quality in this study in order to increase 
their likelihood for the take-up of VC. The most important signal of quality which academic 
entrepreneurs can directly influence is building an experienced and reputable founding 
team. Academic entrepreneurs should also make best use of network links to VC investors 
which have been built up by previous USOs from the same university of origin. According to 
this study, such networks can even help to attract first VC investment in regions in the UK 
with a weaker presence of VC firms. Academic entrepreneurs need to discuss with their 
university, department and TTO the costs and benefits of patenting IP and assigning IP 
ownership to the firm in order to increase the likelihood of attracting first VC investment. 
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Academic entrepreneurs should also make best use of their academic status, as VC investors 
infer from this signal of quality to the capabilities and potential of their investment 
opportunities. Academic entrepreneurs who are not professors can compensate this in 
attracting an academic of higher status to become a member of the founding team. Finally, 
academic entrepreneurs should search for public backed equity schemes which can help 
their USOs to attract early stage financing. Moreover, according to this study they avoid an 
‘equity gap’ and can attract first VC investment of less than £500,000 if they previously 
attracted public backed equity investment. 
In addition to the presented recommendations for attracting first VC investment, 
academic entrepreneurs need to carefully consider internal factors leading to superior firm 
performance. Although the attraction of first VC investment generally relates to superior 
firm performance, potential costs and benefits need to be assessed. VC investment is costly, 
as academic entrepreneurs, their universities and TTOs need to patent their IP, as well as 
sign the control rights of the IP over to the firm. It thus needs to be carefully considered 
whether these costs are justified giving the expected future benefits and returns from 
commercialising IP. Moreover, academic entrepreneurs need to be prepared that VC 
investors will have strong control over the management decisions in the firm. Despite 
experienced and reputable founding teams and academic status of their investees, VC 
investors will impose their own objectives on the firm. To avoid a conflict of interest, 
academic entrepreneurs need to carefully assess whether the expertise and track-record of 
VC investors meet their requirements. This study showed that generalist VC investors were 
more likely to lead USOs to superior firm performance than sector and industry specialist VC 
firms. Moreover, there was no evidence that VC investors were likely to help USOs 
launching their product to the market place. 
Academic entrepreneurs are strongly advised to build strategic alliances which were 
commonly associated with superior firm performance. Academic entrepreneurs should also 
consider radicalness of innovation as an important measure of risk of their business model. 
They should seek advice from their TTO and related agencies which can help to assess the 
feasibility of new business ideas in order to achieve investment and market readiness. 
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6.4.3 Universities and their TTOs 
 
Best practices for universities and their TTOs in order to help their USOs attracting first VC 
investment and leading them to superior firm performance are summarized in Table 63. 
They are discussed below. 
 
Table 63: Implications for Universities and their TTOs 
Best practices in order 
to help USOs to 
overcome barriers to 
attract first VC 
investment: 
 All founders should be supported in building reputable and 
experienced founding teams to increase the likelihood of 
attracting first VC investment. 
 Universities and their TTOs need to build and maintain 
network links to VC investors who have already invested in 
previous USOs. Such networks are to the benefit of future 
USOs seeking first VC investment. 
 Need to educate academic entrepreneurs about the costs, 
benefits and conflicts of patenting IP and assigning IP 
ownership to firms in order to attract first VC investment. 
 Regional disadvantages in access to VC investment can be 
compensated by network to VC investors. 
 USOs with radical innovation may need additional support in 
attracting external financing. 
 USOs seeking less than £500,000 of external equity 
investment should be linked up with public backed equity 
funds before considering first VC investment. 
Best practices in order 
to help USOs in order to 
develop and achieve 
superior firm 
performance: 
 Academics irrespective of their age or previous 
entrepreneurial experience should be encouraged to start 
USOs. 
 VC investment generally related to superior firm 
performance. 
 TTOs need to build up expertise whether and what type of 
VC investor is likely to best serve the interest of their USOs. 
 Support USOs in attracting strategic alliance partner. 
 TTOs need to assess whether the expertise and due 
diligence offered by public backed equity schemes meet the 
requirements of USOs to become investment and market 
ready. 
 
Universities and their TTOs need to be aware that academic entrepreneurs of higher 
academic status also have a higher likelihood to attract VC investment. Founders who lack 
higher academic status should particularly be supported in building reputable and 
experienced founding teams to increase the likelihood of attracting first VC investment. To 
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effectively reduce barriers to VC investment, Universities and their TTOs need to build and 
maintain network links to VC investors who have already invested in previous USOs. Such 
networks are to the benefit of future USOs seeking first VC investment. Moreover, regional 
disadvantages in access to VC investment can be compensated in building active networks 
and clusters between universities, TTOs, USOs as well as present and future academic 
entrepreneurs. Further, universities and their TTOs can play a vital role in assisting their 
USOs to find attractive alliance partners which are likely to lead firms to superior 
performance. Universities and their TTOs should encourage USOs which seek less than 
£500,000 of external equity investment to consider public backed equity funds. However, 
the providers and due diligence schemes of these funds also prepare USOs to become 
investment ready leading them to first VC investment as well as to become market ready in 
order to achieve superior firm performance. 
Universities and their TTOs should consider that VC investment is often related to 
superior firm performance. However, universities and their TTOs need to educate academic 
entrepreneurs about the costs, benefits and conflicts of patenting IP and assigning IP 
ownership to firms in order to attract first VC investment. Because these issues of managing 
IP were more likely to affect the attraction of VC than directly lead to superior firm 
performance a thoughtful decision is required whether attracting VC investments is an 
important strategic objective. Moreover, universities and their TTOs should seek the 
dialogue with VC investors, academic entrepreneurs and public policy makers to discuss best 
practices of IP management and avoid conflicts. Further, TTOs need to build up expertise 
whether and what type of VC investor is likely to best serve the interest of their USOs. 
Universities and their TTOs should encourage academics irrespective of age or previous 
entrepreneurial experience to start USOs. 
 
6.4.4 VC Investors 
 
Best practices for VC investors to review their investment strategies of choosing USOs and 
leading them to superior firm performance are summarized in Table 64. They are discussed 
below. 
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Table 64: Implications for VC Investors 
Best practices in 
order to help VC 
investors to 
screen for signals 
of quality among 
investment 
opportunities: 
 Initial resources of USOs can be signals of quality which reduce risk 
and uncertainty in order to separate ‘good’ from ‘bad’ investment 
opportunities. 
 The most commonly observed signals of quality were reputable 
and experienced founding teams, strong network links to VC 
investors, firms with patented IP, IP owned by the firm, founders 
being professors and the previous attraction of public backed 
equity investment. 
 Radicalness of innovation in USOs is a major risk factor which may 
require specialist VC expertise to be assessed. 
Best practices in 
order to help VC 
investors to lead 
their investees to 
superior firm 
performance: 
 Initial resources used as signals of quality do not necessarily 
directly relate to superior firm performance. 
 VC investors need to frequently review and update their beliefs 
what initial resources of USOs are related with superior firm 
performance. 
 Failure to update beliefs on what resources qualify as signals of 
quality can lead to biases in decision making and inferior 
outcomes. 
 The requirements that investees patent IP and assign IP ownership 
to the firm in order to attract first VC investment can lead to 
conflicts if VC investors fail to deliver superior firm performance. 
 The promotion of VC investors’ interest can require reducing the 
influence of founding teams and founders on managerial decision 
making. 
 VC investors should promote and help USOs to build strategic 
alliances. 
 VC investors need to thoroughly assess whether their expertise 
and funding scope meet the needs of their investees and their own 
goals to generate substantial returns. 
 Specialist VC investors may need to consider to build up more 
expertise bringing their investees to the market place and turning 
them into mature firms. 
 
This study offers VC investors new insights on interpreting initial resources of USOs as 
signals of quality in order to reduce risk and uncertainty when seeking to separate ‘good’ 
from ‘bad’ investment opportunities. Prominent initial resources of USOs which attracted 
VC investors were reputable and experienced founding teams, strong network links to VC 
investors, with patented IP as well as the firm owning the IP. Further important signals of 
quality included USOs with founders being professors and the previous attraction of public 
backed equity investment. 
However, this study showed that initial resources used as signals of quality do not 
necessarily directly relate to superior firm performance. It is rather the presence of the VC 
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investor which made a difference in influencing investees’ development after the 
investment was made. For instance, resources of patented IP and IP owned by the firm were 
not directly related with firm performance. VC investors thus need to be aware that their 
demands for patented IP and IP owned by the firm may lead to conflicts with academic 
entrepreneurs, their universities and TTOs. In particular, if VC-funded USOs fail to deliver 
superior firm performance. Moreover, general and specific human capital of founders and 
founding teams was only partially and weakly related with superior firm performance. In 
contrast, VC investors appeared not to have a preference for USOs with strategic alliance 
partners, although this resource showed the strongest relationship with superior firm 
performance. Therefore, VC investors need to update their beliefs about which signals of 
quality are likely to lead to superior firm performance. Otherwise they risk making judgment 
errors in the form of an availability bias if they restrict themselves to follow the same 
investment criteria (Levie and Gimmon, 2008). 
Overall, VC investors were a crucial factor in leading USOs to superior firm performance. 
There was also evidence that heterogeneity of VC firm types can make a difference. USOs 
which attracted generalist VC investors generally outperformed those firms which attracted 
specialist VC investors. However, recent developments show that generalist VC investors are 
increasingly pulling out of investing in USOs, other new high technology firms and those 
ventures with radical innovation. This reflects that the risks associated with commercialising 
academic research are a severe challenge for private investors (Lockett et al., 2002; Connell, 
2007). This challenge is likely to increase in times of economic turmoil and recession. In 
particular, VC investors which are not solely financed with equity from institutional 
investors, but also rely on debt, will withdraw from investing in high risk ventures such as 
USOs. Specialist VC investors which rely on their sector and industry expertise enabling 
them to identify successful investment opportunities are also forced away from investing in 
USOs if they fail to convince their own institutional investors regarding their abilities to 
generate substantial returns from new high risk ventures. Further, a successful performance 
record is also required to keep up support schemes by public policy schemes which aim to 
reduce the risk of VC investors. 
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6.4.5 Public Policy Makers 
 
Best practices for universities and their TTOs in order to help their USOs attracting first VC 
investment and leading them to superior firm performance are summarized in Table 65. 
They are discussed below. 
Table 65: Implications for Public Policy Makers 
Best practices in 
order to 
facilitate USOs’ 
access to VC 
investment: 
 The availability of sufficient VC investment to USOs is a matter of 
incentivising as well as supporting supply and demand. 
 Supply-side: 
o Public backed equity schemes can reduce an equity gap on the 
financing market for USOs seeking less than £500,000 of first VC 
investment. 
o USOs with radical innovation are likely to need public support 
schemes as generalist VC investors increasingly pull out of this 
market.  
 Demand-side: 
o Public backed equity schemes need to be reviewed in order to 
improve the investment readiness of USOs. 
o Support in helping to build networks between academic 
entrepreneurs, universities TTOs and VC investors. 
o Educate about the costs and benefits of VC investment. 
o Development of national best practices for managing IP 
including issues of patenting and ownership.  
Best practices for 
reducing barriers 
of development 
in order to help 
USOs to achieve 
superior firm 
performance: 
 VC investment should be continued to be regarded as a crucial 
resource which can lead USOs to superior firm performance and 
therefore promote the growth of a knowledge based economy. 
 Public backed equity schemes need to be reviewed in order to 
improve the market readiness of USOs. 
 Adopt a resource-based perspective in order to develop 
benchmarking and diagnostic tools for conducting firm level 
analyses on USO firm performance and the role of VC investment. 
 More firm and founder level data needs to be collected and 
systematically analysed to trace the formation, development and 
performance of USOs. 
 
The evidence in this study generally recommends public policy makers that VC 
investment remains a crucial resource which can lead USOs to superior firm performance 
and therefore promote the growth of a knowledge based economy. However, public policy 
makers need to be aware that the availability of sufficient VC investment to USOs should 
take into account demand and supply side issues. 
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From a VC supply side perspective, public policy makers should continue to implement 
public backed equity schemes in order to avoid an equity gap on the financing market. USOs 
which attracted public backed equity investment were more likely to continue to take-up 
first VC investment of less than £500,000. However, in spite of the public backed equity 
schemes USOs with radical innovation were less likely to attract VC investment from general 
VC firms. This finding shows policy makers that USOs at the forefront of innovation depend 
on the supply of specialised VC investment or public backed funding schemes to satisfy their 
financial needs. Moreover, public policy makers are strongly advised to review not only 
whether public backed equity schemes increase the supply of first VC investment for USOs, 
but also whether these funding schemes relate to superior firm performance. Findings in 
this study show that USOs which received public backed equity investment performed 
poorly related to launching products to the market place and absolute employment change. 
Moreover, this poor performance was also observed for USOs which attracted first VC 
investment. Consequently, public policy makers are recommended to review due diligence 
processes and business expertise provided by public backed equity investors in order to 
improve the investment and market readiness of USOs. 
The criticism that public backed equity funds can fail to lead USOs towards superior firm 
performance leads to recommendations on how public policy makers can address the 
demand side perspective on VC investment (i.e. academic entrepreneurs, universities and 
their TTOs). The presented evidence in this study on what resources USO require to send 
signals of quality to VC investors can be used to review national and regional public policy 
schemes promoting the start and development of USOs and leading them towards 
investment readiness. Public policy makers can also have an important role helping to build 
networks between academic entrepreneurs, universities TTOs and VC investors. This study 
showed that once such links were established and maintained the attraction of VC 
investment is less likely to be influenced by region or clusters. Notably, this network effect is 
even effective for USOs from universities which are not based in regions with a strong 
presence of VC investment such as London and the South East. Further, USOs should be 
educated be prepared for the levels of equity demanded by VC investors or the extent to 
which they execute their managerial control in order to avoid conflicts of interest which can 
harm firm performance. Public policy makers should also take on the role of developing best 
practices for managing IP including patenting and ownership for reducing conflicts between 
all interest groups. 
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Finally, the resource-based perspective of this study offers an important step towards 
developing benchmarking and diagnostic tools to study the development of USOs, their 
ability to attract first VC investment and their performance in light of this investment. 
Accordingly, public policy makers are strongly recommended to adopt a firm level 
perspective on assessing the performance of USOs rather than relying on studies only 
reporting the quantity of USOs launched from UK universities (Sainsbury, 2007). Further, 
they should facilitate access to firm level information on USOs for academic researchers to 
generate further valuable insights. Accordingly, efforts to improve data sources collecting 
firm and founder level data along with accurately identifying the population of USOs are 
urgently required. 
 
6.5 Limitations and Future Research 
 
This study has used a quantitative methodology to explore what internal factors of USOs 
were related to attracting first VC investment as well as superior firm performance in light of 
this investment. Although this approach was able to reduce gaps in the knowledge base and 
produce novel findings, possible limitations are discussed in this section. Furthermore, 
recommendations are made for fruitful areas of future research. 
In choosing a quantitative approach, established theories were replicated, 
integrated and extended in order to derive and test hypotheses. Accordingly, phenomena 
which lie outside the identified theoretical lenses cannot be captured. However, in 
reviewing available qualitative studies on VC financing and firm performance of USOs this 
study ensured that the replicated and extended theoretical perspectives were best suited to 
capture the phenomena of interest. 
Limitations due to measurement errors and biases relate to the collection of 
secondary and primary data. Data on USOs’ initial resource endowments were solely 
collected from the demand-side. However, the supply-side perspective in incorporating an 
array of studies identifying prominent criteria in VC decision-making. Because the VC 
investors themselves who invested in the USOs in the sample were not individually 
identifiable, more specific investment criteria were not possible to explore. However, this 
study was able to ensure the accuracy and relevance of the collected primary data with the 
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obtained secondary data from Library House which was the most reputable data base at the 
time providing information on USOs specifically to VC investors. 
Secondary data obtained from Library House was used to identify the population of 
USOs which were founded between 1990 and 2007, and still active in 2008. This data could 
only be accessed due to an individually negotiated agreement. Public sources were not 
available to provide firm level information. Interestingly, all public sources exclusively cited 
the obtained data from Library House as the most reliable source to identify firm level 
information on British USOs (Sainsbury, 2007). Obtaining this data has been the central 
obstacle for this research. In overcoming this obstacle, it was possible to conduct the first 
quantitative and cross-sectional study on British USOs using firm as well as founder specific 
data.  
Given the relatively small population of 505 British USOs which were founded 
between 1990 and 2007 as well as still active in 2008, the sample size of 125 is modest. The 
response rate of 25% is in line with comparable studies. Extensive response bias tests 
ensure sufficient representativeness in order to generalise the presented findings as 
reported in Section 3.3.3.1. Nevertheless, future studies on British USOs should aim for 
larger sample sizes as the overall population of USOs further increases. 
The accuracy of the collected primary data highly depends on the recollection ability 
of the identified and successfully contacted key informant. Only founding academic 
entrepreneurs of USOs were contacted to participate on in the questionnaire in this study in 
order to minimise measurement errors and response biases. However, information on 
founding teams was inferred from the key informant rather than other members of the 
founding team. Where possible, information from primary data was compared with 
available secondary data to reduce measurement errors and minimise a common methods 
bias. 
The design of the questionnaire was instrumental in reducing possible limitations 
from selective recall-biases, measurement errors and to facilitate straight forward responses 
by the key informants to achieve a high response rate. Previous pilot interviews and pilot 
study ensured content and face validity as reported in Section 3.3.3. Further, questions were 
limited and mostly asked in closed format. As a result most of the collected data was 
operationalised using categorical variables. Because this study was the first of its kind to test 
hypotheses using cross-sectional data on a firm and founder level, categorical variables 
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facilitate the interpretation of novel findings. This limitation was also taken into account in 
order to use measures which can be easier replicated and extended in future research. In 
addition, multi-item scales were used for measuring the specific human capital of the 
founding team as well as for determining radicalness of innovation. Both scales were 
replicated and applied for the first time in the context of USOs and should be further 
developed. 
The findings, implications and limitations of this study also raise potentially 
interesting avenues for future research. The novel theoretical framework of the RBV of the 
firm and signalling theory and its derived hypotheses should be replicated in future studies. 
Replication is crucial for theory development as it requires a feedback loop in order to verify 
earlier findings (Whetten, 1989). Apart from its application in the context of USOs, this 
framework can be generally applied and extended to others markets of entrepreneurial 
finance and types of firms. 
Because this study on VC financing and firm performance of British USOs is the first 
to use a quantitative approach, measures operationalised for independent, dependent and 
control variables should be further replicated, extended and refined in future studies to 
improve their validity. In particular novel multi-item scales like the nature and extent of 
radical innovation should be further developed. For instance, more research is required to 
analyse the relationship between radical innovation of new firms, their ability to attract 
external investment such as VC finance and subsequent performance. Future studies on 
innovation should also take closer into account R&D input and output measures. Two 
examples of related research questions are does radical innovation influence the take-up of 
VC finance and firm performance of high-technology start-ups and USOs?, and does R&D 
input increase firm performance? 
Future studies can also add further dependent variables measuring productivity of 
new firms in order to complement the firm performance measures used in this study. 
Furthermore, firm performance measures should also be monitored over time. Longitudinal 
studies ensure that adaptation processes of new firms can be better monitored and related 
to performance outputs. Longitudinal studies are also helpful to establish causal links rather 
than on associations between initial resources of new firms, their ability to attract VC 
investment and relationship with superior firm performance. For instance, the firms in the 
dataset for this study should be continued to be monitored over the next years to generate 
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the first panel data study on USO firm performance in the UK. Moreover, studies on the 
likelihood of survival, IPOs and M&As can be added to the insights of the present study and 
reduce a survivor bias. This panel data would also be ideal to consider longitudinal impacts 
from external factors such as the credit crunch and the recent recession and their influence 
on USO firm performance. Future studies can also strengthen the causality of observed 
relationships in using control groups (e.g. USOs and other high-technology ventures). 
Accordingly, research question like do USOs and other high-technology start-ups suffer from 
a liability of newness?, and does VC financing reduce liability of newness for USOs and other 
high-technology start-ups?, could be explored. 
In addition, qualitative studies can also be important to further explore new insights 
on USOs, their VC financing and performance. For instance, case studies should be 
conducted to explore the paths of development which the few USOs and their founders 
undertook that successfully achieved IPOs. Further, exploratory studies could relate to the 
experience of founding teams of USOs and their experience of working with VC investors. 
Qualitative research should be also undertaken to explore heterogeneity of VC investors. 
For instance, comparative case studies on generalist and specialist VC firms could provide 
further insights how their decision making is structured and what factors determine their 
portfolio of investees. Related examples of research questions are what does it take to float 
an USO on the stock market?, what differences between generalist and specialist VC 
decision making?, or how to founding teams cope with the presence of VC investors?, could 
be explored.  
The evidence provided in this study can also encourage theory development in 
areas of behavioural economics and psychology. The finding that resources of new ventures 
which VC investors often frame as important investment criteria and signals of quality fail to 
deliver superior firm performance demands for further research. Related studies could 
utilise an array of methods including experimental, field-studies, focus groups or interviews 
in order to investigate reasons for this mismatch in VC decision making. Accordingly, 
research questions such as are VC investors overconfident? or do VC investors have an 
availability bias in their decision making?, could be explored. 
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Appendix 2: Linearity Diagnostic Plots for OLS Analyses 
2.1 Total Number of External Investment Rounds Attracted Until 2008 
Graph 1: Residual vs. Predicted Values Plot for Model 9‐6 (No VC) 
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Graph 2: Added Variable Plots for Model 9‐6 (No VC) 
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Graph 3: Residual vs. Predicted Values Plot for Model 9‐8 (VC) 
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Graph 4: Added Variable Plots for Model 9‐8 (VC) 
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Graph 5: Residual vs. Predicted Values Plot for Model 9‐10 (Type VC) 
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Graph 6: Added Variable Plots for Model 9‐10 (Type VC) 
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2.2 Total Amount of External Investment (£’s) Attracted Until 2008 
Graph 7: Residual vs. Predicted Values Plot for Model 10‐6 (No VC) 
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Graph 8: Added Variable Plots for Model 10‐6 (No VC) 
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Graph 9: Residual vs. Predicted Values Plot for Model 10‐8 (VC) 
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Graph 10: Added Variable Plots for Model 10‐8 (VC) 
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Graph 11: Residual vs. Predicted Values Plot for Model 10‐10 (Type VC) 
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Graph 12: Added Variable Plots for Model 10‐10 (Type VC) 
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2.3 Book Value of Total Assets (£’s) Until 2008 
Graph 13: Residual vs. Predicted Values Plot for Model 12‐6 (No VC) 
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Graph 14: Added Variable Plots for Model 12‐6 (No VC) 
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Graph 15: Residual vs. Predicted Values Plot for Model 12‐8 (VC) 
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Graph 16: Added Variable Plots for Model 12‐8 (VC) 
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Graph 17: Residual vs. Predicted Values Plot for Model 12‐10 (Type VC) 
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Graph 18: Added Variable Plots for Model 12‐10 (Type VC) 
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2.4 Number of Employees in the USOs in 2008 
Graph 19: Residual vs. Predicted Values Plot for Model 13‐6 (No VC) 
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Graph 20: Added Variable Plots for Model 13‐6 (No VC) 
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Graph 21: Residual vs. Predicted Values Plot for Model 13‐8 (VC) 
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Graph 22: Added Variable Plots for Model for Model 13‐8 (VC) 
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Graph 23: Residual vs. Predicted Values Plot for Model 13‐10 (Type VC) 
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Graph 24: Added Variable Plots for Model for Model 13‐10 (Type VC) 
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2.5 Absolute Employment Change between Founding Year and 2008 
Graph 25: Residual vs. Predicted Values Plot for Model 14‐6 (No VC) 
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Graph 26: Added Variable Plots for Model for Model 14‐6 (No VC) 
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Graph 27: Residual vs. Predicted Values Plot for Model 14‐8 (VC) 
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Graph 28: Added Variable Plots for Model for Model 14‐8 (VC) 
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Graph 29: Residual vs. Predicted Values Plot for Model 14‐10 (Type VC) 
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Graph 30: Added Variable Plots for Model for Model 14‐10 (Type VC) 
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2.6 Composite Measure of Firm Performance 
Graph 31: Residual vs. Predicted Values Plot for Model 15‐6 (No VC) 
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Graph 32: Added Variable Plots for Model for Model 15‐6 (No VC) 
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Graph 33: Residual vs. Predicted Values Plot for Model 15‐8 (VC) 
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Graph 34: Added Variable Plots for Model for Model 15‐8 (VC) 
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Graph 35: Residual vs. Predicted Values Plot for Model 15‐10 (Type VC) 
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Graph 36: Added Variable Plots for Model for Model 15‐10 (VC) 
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